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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
EARLY HEIDEGGER’S TRANSITION FROM LIFE TO BEING 
 
Heidegger was not always preoccupied, as he himself would later come to 
believe, with the question regarding the sense of being. Eight years before he published 
his magnum opus, Sein und Zeit, in 1927 he was totally devoted to finding a systematic 
way to bringing “life” as the ultimate source of meaning to explicate itself. In the years 
between 1919-1923, “life”, and not “being”, is the matter of philosophy par excellence, 
only to be disregarded, even refuted as a “proper” matter of philosophy in the subsequent 
years. In this paper I examine the philosophical motives that led Heidegger from life to 
being. The purpose of this project isto trace the emergence of the “thinking of being” in 
“life philosophy.” I will show that the transition from “life” to “being” is not at all as 
radical as Heidegger wants it to be whenever he voices his concerns about the 
metaphysical grounds of life philosophy. When “life” is understood in the exact terms in 
which Heidegger himself understands it in the years between 1919-1923 then, I argue, the 
transition to being is more a radicalization, and by no means an abandonment, of life 
philosophy. In the process of elaborating an understanding of life so fundamentally 
sympathetic to life that it can claim itself to be life’s own self-understanding, Heidegger 
comes gradually to realize the importance of life’s own way of living understandingly, 
the performative sense in which it [life] itself understands itself to be, for the very effort 
to understand life. Life is now interpreted as a way of being for which this very being, its 
way of being, is an issue for itself.  
In the first chapter I go back to the original motives that led Heidegger to choose 
life, lived experience, as the proper topic of philosophy. It is here that Heidegger 
 
 
discovers that philosophy is ultimately about an entity that is somehow concerned with 
itself already in being-engaged to “something” other than itself. Intentionality is 
interpreted as the manner in which an entity is playing itself out, as it were, in engaging a 
world. In the second chapter, I follow his elaborations of this newly discovered topic, the 
“personal” character of experience, with a focus on the unique way in which he develops 
it by both rejecting the Neokantian approach to life and by critically appropriating 
Dilthey’s conception of lived experience. The third chapter presents Heidegger’s 
“insights” into life – which will remain unchanged, only put to different uses when the 
topic changes from life to being. The fourth chapter takes up the issue of how life is (and 
is itself)in being referred to its own past. Here I show how life is found to be “in need” to 
appropriate what it has been as the way in which it can be itself. Chapters five and six 
delve into the proper relation between living and philosophizing by focusing on how life 
is living-in-understanding. It is shown here how Heidegger elaborates, unfortunately 
insufficiently, his method of “formal indicators” which will enable him to interpret life as 
a “way of being.” Such interpretation leaves open the possibility, however, of either 
interpreting life as the manner in which being itself can be experienced or, as Heidegger 
does in the first early years, or interpreting being as the manner in which life can come to 
itself. Early Heidegger can only justify the former interpretation: in developing for itself a 
sense of being which can only be performed as a way in which life lives, life develops a 
genuine self-understanding. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Heidegger became famous for his insistence on the idea that the absence of the 
elucidation of the question of the sense of being (Seinssinn), in short, the question of 
being, might have deeper philosophical consequences than meet the eye. In Sein und Zeit  
(1927) Heidegger lays out the project of elucidating the sense of being. The project is to 
be conducted on the basis of an ontological elucidation of precisely that entity which by 
its own being is capable of understanding both its own being and the being of entities 
different from itself. Heidegger labels that entity as “Dasein.” The ontological 
characteristics of Dasein are found to be existentiality, facticity and falling prey. The 
investigations of facticity – precisely as it is understood here in this context - were first 
initiated years earlier, in the total absence of the question of being.  
An essential part of the fundamental analytic of Dasein, the actual content of the 
book, namely the hermeneutics of facticity, can be thus detached from the overall project 
of elucidating the question of the sense of being. This detachment has its roots in the way 
in which Heidegger conceived of the “theme” of phenomenology as of 1919.  This 
detachment also raises some interesting questions as to Heidegger’s overall project and, 
equally importantly, as to Heidegger’s philosophical development until his writing of 
Sein und Zeit. This apparent autonomy of the content of Sein und Zeit from the overall 
project might also be responsible for Heidegger’s failure to bring his project to 
completion. 
From 1919 to approximately 1922, Heidegger works on a phenomenological 
interpretation of factic life in the complete absence of a need for the clarification of the 
sense of being. In this period life, our life1, is the ultimate, irreducible, fundamental, 
originary source of intelligibility or meaning as such. These results – and their subsequent 
development - will later, in the context of the question of the sense of being, come to be 
known as the analytic of Dasein. At the moment of their birth, however, they were 







considered to be analysis towards working out the possibility of a “primal science of 
lived experiences,” a “primordial science of life in itself”, or of “hermeneutics of 
facticity.” The same analysis will later be put to different uses when the overall aim of 
investigation shifts from (our) “life” to “being.” Heidegger himself recognizes in Sein 
und Zeit that the analytic of Dasein as he understands it in this context is but the 
samehermeneutics of facticity he initiated years earlier in the early Freiburg lectures.  
The author would like to remark that he has repeatedly communicated the 
analysis of the surrounding world and the ›hermeneutic of the facticity of 
Da-sein in general in his lecture courses ever since the winter semester of 
1919-20.2 
Since the hermeneutics of facticity has been obviously initiated in the absence 
of the question of being, we are now left to understand this apparent “independence” of 
what constitutes the actual achievement of Sein und Zeit (a very elaborate hermeneutics 
of facticity, or existential analytic of Dasein) and its professed overall aim, that of 
working out the sense of being on the basis of an existential analytic of Dasein. There is a 
gap,which could not be bridged, not in this book anyway, between what Heidegger 
achieves in this book concretely, namely the analytic of Dasein, and what he aims to 
achieve here, an elucidation of the sense of being on the basis of an elucidation of the 
sense of that being capable of understanding being. In the following I will investigate 
Heidegger’s shift from “life” to “being” with an eye open to the possibility that the 
autonomy of the hermeneutics of facticity from the overall project laid out in Sein und 
Zeit might in fact resulted in Heidegger’s failure to bring his project to completion. My 
intention, however, will be to focus on the motives behind Heidegger’s decision to 
abandon “life” and embrace “being” instead as the main topic of philosophical thinking. 
In the course of my exposition of Heidegger’s motives leading from “life” to “being” a 
particular theme will show up time and again: the living being is being-self, or the self-in-
being (later Dasein – to be there as a self), a being whose raison d'êtreis itself and is only 
insofar as it realizes it, or put in a less solipsistic and egostical terms, a being who is only 
insofar as it isconcerned with it-self factically, that is, in experiencing its own world.  
This recurrent theme will be shown to be the main motive leading Heidegger to “move” 





from life to being and also the main reason why being is not the solution, as it were, to 
the problematic of life, but merely another way of formulating it. 
How important is for the project as laid out in Sein und Zeit the fact that the 
analytic of Dasein can be worked out in its absence, independently - as it were - of the 
project itself? The answer to this question can only result from attempts at answering 
these three questions: 
(1) Why was Heidegger preoccupied with “life” in the first place?  
(2) What motives lie behind his decision to shift his focus from life to being?  
(3) How can this shift be interpreted in light of the fact that Heidegger simply 
relocated the results arrived at in the life-context into the context of the meaning of 
being? 
It is easy to interpret the hermeneutics of facticity (the phenomenology of life) as 
a “precursor” of the analytic of Dasein as if the hermeneutics of facticity grew and 
developed organically into the problematic of the question of being. This is exactly what 
most commentators, with few but notable exceptions, have done. The first lectures were 
regarded as just the first piece of the puzzle that Heidegger will try to put together in Sein 
und Zeit. Each piece of the puzzle could but be understood in light of what the whole 
puzzle, once put together, brings to light. Such an interpretation had the advantage of 
having Heidegger’s own blessing since he was the first one to interpret his entire 
philosophical career as being from its inception captivated by, if not downright obsessed 
with, one question only, the question of the sense of being3. On such an interpretation, 
even these early lectures, which do not contain a word that might, even remotely, refer 
one to the problematic of being as would be understood much later from 1923 onward, 
must somehow be pervaded with the same obsession with the “question of the sense of 
being.” Surely, when seen in hindsight, from the vantage point of Sein und Zeit, the first 
lectures can indeed come to be seen as the laboratory out of which Sein und Zeit, the 
project, was born. But this would amount to reading into them an (hidden) intention, 
which is not explicitly there. This is why I will attempt to understand the first lectures as 
Heidegger himself intended them to be understood when he wrote them.  




The main claim I will advance here is that Heidegger, as a careful reading and 
interpretation of his early Freiburg lectures from 1919-1924 will reveal, was interested in 
those early years not in the question of the sense of being but, to keep with the 
terminology of Sein und Zeit, in the question of the sense of living being, or factic life, 
and that the shift from life to being was indeed a necessary, profitable move provided that 
phenomenological ontology remained subordinated to, and within the scope and aims of, 
the hermeneutics of facticity, and unnecessary, and to some extent unsuccessful, the 
moment the living being was not longer the aim of phenomenology, but the springboard 
for phenomenological ontology.  Around 1923, Heidegger will say repeatedly that being, 
understood transitively, means being life4. 
We will spend a great deal of time analyzing the lectures from 1919 for the simple 
reason that it is here that Heidegger makes, to use Theodor Kisiel’s words, his first major 
“breakthrough” to his own topic, which should and can explain his preference for “life” 
as the topic of philosophy, and also because the lectures are the foil against which 
Heidegger will eventually come up with “being” as the genuine topic of philosophy. 
These first lectures as well as the next lectures he will give over the next 2-3 years are all 
the more important as they contain clues as to where Heidegger is, philosophically 
speaking, coming from and, most importantly, heading to. Obviously, for my purposes 
these lectures must receive a special treatment.  
Heidegger was struck early on by the peculiarity of “how we are and live,” by 
life, by living experiences. He realized that life is an object of investigation like no other. 
Life is not like other subject matters, topics, entities, or domains of entities encountered 
in life. Life is unique and therefore calls for its own manner of approaching and 
addressing. Early Heidegger’s philosophy culminates with the idea that life is so unique 
and different that a proper investigation of life must raise the question of the very way in 
which such an “object” (life) is there in the first place, namely the question of life’s sense 
of being: in what sense is life there?  In what sense am I? What is the sense of “am” in “I 








am”? In what sense do I live? His lectures between 1919-1923 can all be regarded as his 
original contributions to “life-philosophy”, and only indirectly to “ontology”.  What he 
was interested primarily was not “being” per se, but living being, our living being. He 
tried to grasp our life first and foremost as “something” which is (given, present, “there,” 
da) in a way completely different from all the other ways in which other entities are said 
to be; as something which is in such a way that it can even elucidate the ways in which 
other entities are there. After a couple of years, he started focusing increasingly on life as 
“a kind of being.” Philosophy itself undergoes a fundamental change from being the 
fundamental knowing of life’s origins5 to a “fundamental knowing comportment to 
entities as being.6” “How we are and live” is a kind of being, one unique mode of being 
there. Since Heidegger was all this time focusing on how life is in its own way, on how “I 
am” genuinely, on our ordinary, typical experiences, Heidegger “re-does” his 
interpretations of life this time with a more concentrated focus on life as “being”. Life is 
now baptized with a new name, Dasein7, in keeping with his new emphasis on the way in 
which “we are,” that is, our specific mode of being. This ontological spin put on his 
analysis of life will culminate in Sein und Zeit, where the living being, Dasein, still plays 
a major role but this time only insofar as it can open up an “horizon” for understanding 
the sense of being as such. The living being is a being, a special one to be sure, one that 
does not “merely occur among other beings,8” rather distinguishing itself from other 
beings by its special “relation” to being. But the living being is nevertheless just a being. 
It is no longer seen as the aim of phenomenology, but merely a necessary step towards 
achieving a “higher” purpose: the elucidation of the sense of being as such.   
In what follows I intend to defend the following two claims: (1) The shift from 
life to being was not initially one from one topic, life, to a different one, being; it should 
rather be understood as more of a movement within the same topic, life (the sense of life), 
as an attempt at bringing the same topic, life, more genuinely into view by rebranding the 








“uniqueness” of life in formal-ontological terms: “life as being.9” (2) Despite his efforts 
to regard life as being, or the living being as a being, and move beyond factic life or 
living being to being as such, Heidegger does not manage to surpass his insights into 
factic life. In other words, he does not make any philosophically significant advances 
over his hermeneutics of facticity.  
To (2). If in early Heidegger life, the “being of life” (life as a “how” of 
being10), is found capable of elucidating different other senses of being, being in the 
sense of being significant to me (Bedeutsamkeit), being in the sense of present-at-hand or 
being-in-view (Vorhandenheit), but most importantly life’s sense of being as facticity, in 
Sein und Zeit the project is ultimately aimed at an elucidation of the sense of being as 
such, where the “special interpretation of a particular entity, Dasein11” is indeed 
necessary only as an “horizon” opening up the possibility of elucidating the sense of 
being as such. Heidegger’s actual investigations into the sense of being, however, do not 
move beyond his investigations into facticity as the “sense of being of life” (Seinsinn von 
Leben12), the living being. As a result, his decision to interpret our life as a “how of 
being” and then to increasingly put an ontological spin on his approach to life, and focus 
more on the various senses of being by regarding the hermeneutic of Dasein as the 
“starting point” or origin of philosophy as “universal phenomenological ontology,13” 
does in fact indicate the impossibility ofdissociating, in any relavant way, a meaningful 
elucidation of the sense of being from an elucidation of the sense of being of life, from 
(our) living being.  Seinssinn is ultimately traceable in, as and through Seinssinn von 
Leben. The only senses of being are those given as and through living being. 
Fundamental ontology depends on the hermeneutics of facticity to an even greater extent 
than Heidegger would have liked in Sein und Zeit. Ontology is and remains first and 
foremost the “science of the being of our living being.” Heidegger is absolutely right in 











pointing out time and time again that the peculiarity of life, the kind of “object” 
(“something”) life, my living experience, is calls for a new understanding of the sense of 
being, but this sense of being is first and last life’s sense of being. Sein und Zeit wanted to 
be a rekindling of the traditional question regarding the sense of being, but it ended up 
being an elaboration of the question of the sense of living being.  
In Sein und Zeit Heidegger no longer takes “life” to refer exclusively to “our 
life,” and extends its meaning to incorporate “life in general,” the kind of life biology has 
as its proper object of investigation. By “life” Heidegger now means “biological life.14” It 
should be kept in mind, however, that the early Heidegger never had “biological life” in 
mind when referring to “factic life,” and that he comes by 1923 to identify “factic life” 
with Dasein.15 Since “life” is in Sein und Zeit an expression standing for “biological life,” 
the ontology of (biological) life comes to be regarded as “founded upon the ontology of 
Dasein.16” That there is a tension even in Sein und Zeit between factic versus biological 
life is clearly evidenced by Heidegger’s indecision as to how fundamental the 
phenomenon of “life” is for philosophy: on the one hand, life as biological life requires a 
prior elucidation of the ontology of Dasein, and, on the other hand, philosophy is all 
about life since, according to Heidegger, “philosophy of life” says as much as “botany of 
plants,” that is, the expression is a tautology. The shift therefore in Heidegger’s thinking 
from factic life to being is simultaneously accompanied by a shift from factic to 
biological life. When Heidegger distinguishes the analytic of Dasein from the ontology of 
life, he is in point of fact claiming that biological life is to be “founded on” life 
understood as factic. At the beginning at least, the facticity of life, as Heidegger 
conceived of it, had nothing to do with biological life. 
It is thus all the more important that we read the first Freiburg lectures on their 
own, that is, independently of Heidegger’s later developments and, most importantly, of 
the question of the sense of being, and understand them just as Heidegger intended them 
to be understood at the moment of their conception. We will avoid treating them as mere 








“precursors” of Sein und Zeit. In other words, Sein und Zeit does not occupy the focal 
center of our investigations. We will place it on an equal footing with the lectures he has 
given since 1919. For our purposes it is thus all the more important to pay close attention 
to the existence of, the fine line between, and also the relation between, two relatively 
different contexts: the early context in which Heidegger developed his philosophy of 
factic life, and which culminates in the idea that facticity is the sense of being of life, and 
the context in which being sheds, as it were, the living character, and becomes itself 
capable of elucidating the sense of living being. If in early Heidegger the aim is to 
elucidate the living being and the sense of being in terms of living being, in Sein und Zeit 
the ultimate aim is to arrive at an elucidation of the sense of being in terms of living 
being that can eventually be able to reinterpret the living being in terms of the sense of 
being. For most commentators, the early lectures are nothing but an “early stage” on his 
path towards Sein und Zeit.  
Our reading of the Freiburg lectures goes to some extent against the 
mainstream in that it proposes to read these lectures given by Heidegger in the period 
between 1919-1923 as exhibiting a philosophical autonomy in terms of the theme under 
discussion and the methods employed in addressing that theme, an autonomy which, even 
if easily reducible to, or appropriated by, the problematic of being as developed by 
Heidegger immediately after 1923, does not necessarily have to be so. Our claim, namely 
that early Heidegger was by no means interested in being but in our living being, does not 
go well with the by now well-entrenched popular idea that “throughout his long 
philosophical career” Heidegger had been “fascinated” by one question only: “What is 
the meaning if being?17”  
 
Otto Pöggeler’s “Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers” 
Otto Pöggeler, one of the first and most knowledgeable commentators of 
Heidegger’s philosophy, believes that the first requirement incumbent upon the readers of 






Heidegger is to “simply listen to the one question which Heidegger thinks through.18” 
According to him Heidegger’s thinking took its inception from its contact with the 
fundamental question of metaphysics: what is being19? Accordingly this question is seen 
operating in the background of all of Heidegger’s early philosophical attempts. Pöggeler 
concedes that in Heidegger’s Freiburg lectures from 1919 the discussion of being “has 
vanished;” in the center of Heidegger’s preoccupations is now “factic life, life in its 
actuality20.” The commentator appears to be familiar with the early Freiburg lectures (or 
at least some of them), since he dedicates almost a page to their brief summary. However, 
he needs to arrive at the lectures from 1923 in order to be able to comment upon them, 
more specifically, to comment on their relationship as a stage in Heidegger’s 
development to the next stage or stages. And the only way in which he could possibly 
relate these lectures to the later question of the meaning of being is by claiming that the 
proper understanding of factic life should in no way be conducted in terms of traditional 
metaphysics, that is, the traditional interpretation of being, but must in point of fact be 
conducted in such a way as to be able by itself to lead to a new interpretation of 
traditional ontology. That Heidegger indeed is trying to forge a new and highly original 
understanding of factic life, one that is in no way reliant upon the traditional concepts of 
philosophy, is beyond any question. Also, that Heidegger’s radical interpretation of factic 
life leads necessarily to a reinterpretation of traditional metaphysics is, I believe, obvious. 
It is, however, questionable whether this new interpretation must end up in, and have as 
its only aim, the forging of a new understanding of “being,” as Pöggeler appears to leave 
the impression. Besides, it is clear even from the way in which Pöggeler summarizes the 
early Freiburg lectures that their topic, factic life, stands in almost no relation to the later 
question of being. The only relation is that the radical interpretation of factic life has 
indeed the side effect of putting the entire metaphysical tradition into a new light.  
For the young Heidegger, who had taken up the question of Being and 
whose thinking now began with factic-historical life, the question had to 









be asked whether metaphysics had after all done any justice to factic life.21 
But Pöggeler overemphasizes the importance of this relation at the expense of 
Heidegger’s positive insights into factic life in order to facilitate his overall aim of 
interpreting Heidegger’s path of thinking as a unified path guided by one “thought” only:  
Heidegger’s thinking is all about “being” even in those contexts where being is hardly 
mentioned, and something else is explicitly recognized as staying in the centre of 
philosophical investigations, namely factic life. In all fairness, it should be said that one 
can indeed identify there a possibly intrinsic, however indirect, relation between these 
and the subsequent lectures whose climax is Sein und Zeit: a new interpretation of factic 
life conducted on the basis of the newly arrived-at insights provided by Husserl’s 
phenomenology, perhaps Lask and Dilthey’s preference for life as the source of meaning, 
will call for a new interpretation of traditional ontology.  
The interpretation of factic life has to question anew the traditional mode 
of conceptualization from the ground up. The theory of Being, or 
ontology, must also become a problem once again in terms of the 
interpretation of factic life, the hermeneutic of facticity.22 
But again, we do not have to understand them in light of what will be done after 
1922. And even if we do, that is, even if we believe, as Pöggeler does, that the 
interpretation of factic life not only leads to, but actually must become, a new radicalized 
interpretation of traditional ontology, it should never be forgotten that this 
problematization of traditional ontology can only be done in terms of the interpretation of 
factic life.  Be that as it may, even Pöggeler acknowledges that the young Heidegger’s 
thinking “began with factic-historical life.”  
 
Kisiel’s “Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time” 
Kisiel, too, finds the early lectures to be extremely important. For one thing, they 
are important in that it is here that Heidegger, according to him, figures out what his 
philosophical topic is, the same topic that will later be in the center of Heidegger’s 
preoccupations in Sein und Zeit. Of course, the “topic,” although the same as in Sein und 





Zeit,does not bear the same title, since it is not “being” or “the sense of being” that 
Heidegger is focusing on here. Only by way of an interpretation could Kisiel claim that 
“factic life,” or more precisely yet, the inconspicous Umwelterlebnis, the environing 
living experience, is in point of fact the “same” topic as “being.”  
We could not agree more with his assertion that the early “juvenilia” contain 
“perhaps the key to all of Heidegger” despite their “raw and crudity23.” However, this key 
- as Kisiel sees it - is the early writings’ ability to shed some light on Heidegger’s later 
development, on the conceptual apparatus employed by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit as 
well as on the detours and philosophical decisions taken by him long after he completed 
his “masterpiece.” For Kisiel the early period is one in which Heidegger makes some 
“fumbling steps toward his insight.” They are “raw” when compared with the riper form 
exhibited by Sein und Zeit. This insight will be refined and carefully developed in the 
years to come to reach its climax in Sein und Zeit. But these early lectures also contain 
some insights left unpursued by the writer of Sein und Zeit, insights that will be much 
later recovered when other options become unavailable or untenable. But the most 
important thing for Kisiel is that these Freiburg lectures are exactly the starting point of 
Sein und Zeit24. They are not to be considered in their own right, but in light of what they 
will give rise to, namely those insights conducive to the complex of ideas exposed in Sein 
und Zeit. Such a reading is, however, validated by Kisiel’s declared intention of writing a 
genesis of Sein und Zeit, although one can sense in it the implicit assumption that 
whatever is valuable in the early lectures is valuable precisely because of the further 
elaboration it receives in and after the writing of Sein und Zeit. 
 
Rüdiger Safranski’s “Ein Meister aus Deutschland” 
Safranski is not a philosopher, and has thus no intention of offering a 
philosophical interpretation of Heidegger’s entire life and career. He simply wants to 
present Heidegger, the man and the thinker, as he was in the historical and cultural 






context in which he lived and worked. As such we would expect that he would show 
more sensitivity to the contextual aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy than a philosopher 
would. He as a matter a fact spends a great deal detailing the most important 
philosophical achievements of Heidegger’s first lecture with an unexpected sense for 
philosophical nuances. However, when it comes to move beyond this lecture, it is again 
the problematic of the “sense of being” that appears to facilitate his intepretative 
transition to the next lectures:  
Heidegger’s intention is clear. There is, however, a certain excess in the 
penetrating intensity of his philosophizing, an excess which makes his 
thinking so fascinating even at this early stage. The excess is hidden in the 
question, which he does not yet explicitly raise, but which would be later 
reiterated ritualistically: the question of being. Heidegger delves deeper 
into living experience in order to track down our “being in situations.25 
For Safranski this first lecture contains thus a “surplus” of intention, a surplus 
that is, obviously, left unexpressed. It is as if Heidegger intends something in these 
lectures that does not quite find a proper expression in the lectures themselves. And this 
surplus is conveniently found to be none other than the question of being:  
An excessive intention directed at ‘being’.26 
Not all commentators, however, share the view that Heidegger’s first lectures 
mark a beginning that could only end in Being and Time. A few others see in the first 
lectures an originality that cannot easily be subordinated to the project as laid out in 
Being and Time. For different reasons, to be sure, and for reasons different from mine 
also, some commentators see in the first lectures “a unique period in his development” 
that “cannot be absorbed into either his Being and Time or his later writings, as he 
himself and others have attempted to do,27” while others experience in them a 
philosophical force whose traction is so great that “if we continue to fall with 
Heidegger’s 1921-1922 lecture courses we will never be able to escape back (or forward) 
to Being and Time.28” 









Let us now return to these early lectures and try to see them as they are, and not 
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Chapter Two: Erlebnis - the “living of something” or living 
experience29 
Why Erlebnis? 
In 1919, in the first lectures Heidegger gives in Freiburg as Husserl’s newly 
appointed assistant, he shows an interest in several topics that are closely intertwined: the 
idea of philosophy, philosophy as a worldview and as a critical science, the idea of 
science and the possibility of a fundamental or primal science, knowledge and the 
possibility of grounding knowledge, lived experience and the possibility of a scientific 
approach to lived experiences, phenomenology and transcendental value philosophy, and 
last but not least, the essence of the University and the University reform.  The titles of 
these three first lectures indicate only partially the actual contents covered by Heidegger 
in these lectures: (1) Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem, (2) 
Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie, (3) Über das Wesen der 
Universität und des akademischen Studiums. 
I will now present a selective reading of these lectures in order to emphasize 
the topic Heidegger appears to be most preoccupied with and the strategies he works out 
to deal with it. Another reason for presenting a selective reading of the first lectures is 
closely related to Heidegger’s own methodology: according to him, it is only by going 
systematically through the issues as he exposes them that one can eventually arrive at a 
genuine understanding of the very “object” of philosophy.   
Judging by the opening sections, the first lecture, The idea of Philosophy and 
the problem of worldview, is occasioned by the need to clarify once and for all whether 
philosophy is essentially a worldview or not. Its theme is “the idea of philosophy.” 










Heidegger chooses the idea of worldview as a foil against which he proposes to address 
the idea of philosophy. It was widely accepted among German intellectuals of that time 
that philosophy is a worldview and as such its mission was to find the ultimate, most 
universal and valid cause and interpretation of the world, and, of course, of everything 
occurring in the world, human existence included30. However, in keeping with the 
Kantian tradition, philosophy appears also to have an additional function, namely that of 
securing the foundation on which any knowledge can be built. In other words, philosophy 
retains in addition to being, and striving for, a worldview, the function of a critical 
science. The worldview is the aim of the critical science but by no means identical with 
it. Philosophy thus appears to have an inherently irreconcilable nature: it is 
simultaneously critical science and worldview.  
What if philosophy is neither? Heidegger sets himself the task of exploring this 
possibility. What if philosophy is not an interpretation of human existence and the world 
around done with the more or less declared intention of answering the most pressing and 
deepest concerns of mankind?  What if philosophy is, in a sense, a science “more” 
fundamental than any other science (critical sciences included), and any worldview 
whatsoever? Is that possible? How can we conceive of philosophy as a primal science? 
The rest of the lecture, as well as the other two lectures, will try to explore the possibility 
of conceiving of philosophy as a science more fundamental (Urwissenschaft) than any 
other science in a radical opposition to the idea of philosophy as a worldview. 
After raising a serious methodological problem with regard to the very attempt at 
establishing a primal science (how can a primal science be established when it itself is 
called for by its very definition to establish anything else?), Heidegger discusses and 













easily dismisses the answers that can be, and have in fact been, offered to this problem: 
(1) the history of philosophy: it cannot determine what philosophy as a primal science is 
simply because we already must know what such an idea is in order for us to find it in the 
history of philosophy; history after all is only for a historical consciousness, that is, is 
constituted in and for life in and of itself; (2) philosophical personalities: to look in 
philosopher’s personalities for clues for figuring out what the primal science is amounts 
to falling back on a previous position (philosophy as a worldview) since it takes the 
philosopher to be the creator of a worldview; (3) Inductive metaphysics: the idea that the 
primal science can be somehow inductively constructed out of the particular sciences and 
their relations is deficient in that it ends up according no cognitive value to this primal 
science: while the particular sciences deal concretely with their respective regions of 
being, the primal science by contrast would have “being in general” as its object of study. 
But it would not be capable of saying anything cognitively relevant beyond what the 
particular sciences have already established about their respective regions of being. 
Besides, such a primal science would not be primal at all since it itself is established only 
on the basis, and as a result of, the scientific conclusions arrived at in particular sciences. 
Each particular science has a region of being as its own object of investigation. The sum 
of all these objects (the “whole” being) does not result in a new domain with a new 
corresponding science. It is here the point where Heidegger makes the shift from the 
“object of knowledge” to the “knowledge of the object.” It appears that the only way in 
which we can stand a chance of figuring out what this primal science could be is by 
focusing not so much on the object of knowledge (being in general, domains of being or 
life), but rather on knowledge as such (of any object). All particular sciences are bodies 
of knowledge. Philosophy wants to study the “unitary sense of knowledge” as such31.  
The next chapter (“The critique of teleologically-critical Method”) is as a matter 
of fact Heidegger’s own Prolegomena zu einer reinen Logik, with the only difference that 
instead of rejecting the psychologistic approach to the problem of the validity of 
knowledge – Husserl himself did this in his Prolegomena -, Heidegger will go on a full-
blown attack against the approach to knowledge taken by the South-West school of 
Neokantianism, in particular by Windelband and Rickert, and then in the next course, 




against the approach taken by the other school of Neokantianism represented by Natorp. 
It is safe to claim thus that this chapter is perhaps a needed complement to Husserl’s 
Prolegomena in that in critiquing the Neokantian approach to knowledge it in fact rejects 
another attempt at reifying the process or the event in and by which “meaning” comes 
about in the first place. We will see in a moment why this is indeed the case. 
By shifting our focus to knowledge as such, we have apparently moved into the 
domain of psychology as psychology was traditionally regarded to have “knowledge” as 
one of its objects of investigation. Psychology regards knowledge or cognition as a 
mental or psychical process. The problem, however, is that psychology is after all an 
empirical science and cannot as such be in any position to provide “the validation, the 
origin for absolute knowledge32”. Despite the fact that psychology as an empirical 
science cannot by itself account for absolute knowledge, it is however the “mental 
process” that constitutes the “sphere” where we should look into for figuring out what the 
primal science could be.   
The where, the sphere, appears to be found; yet what is now problematic 
is the how.33 
Moreover, knowledge is precisely that which all sciences have in common as 
sciences: they are all bodies of knowledge. The problem now is to obtain a correct 
understanding of the nature of knowledge as a mental process.  
Kant made it clear that the concept of mental process (das Pyschischen) is open 
to two different interpretations: on the one hand, the mental process can be understood as 
an empirical process and subject as such to the empirical laws of nature (the domain of 
psychology as an empirical science); on the other hand, however, the mental process 
having truth as its ultimate goal is guided and oriented in its course by principles and 
axioms that are not empirical any more. The mental process is oriented towards finding 
and establishing the truth, and must as a consequence follow the “laws” that ensure the 
obtaining of truth. This is, according to Heidegger, the position on knowledge adopted by 
the South-West School of Neokantianism. A mental process is not simply an occurrence 







in the natural world, but one that has a goal, namely the truth. A mental process is 
therefore normatively oriented. It is only by following certain principles or axioms (in 
short, norms) that the mental process qualifies as a cognitive mental process. But how are 
these norms themselves given? The establishing of the primal science as a science of 
absolute knowledge, or as a science of the “unitary sense of knowledge,” requires the 
proper understanding of the way in which “norms” guide and orient the mental process in 
its search for truth. How can their validity be established?  
According to this particular version of Neokantianism, it is exactly the 
goal/telos of knowledge (truth) that should determine the norms of thinking and their 
validity. Hence the title “teleological method:” there should be norms guiding anyone as 
to how oneought to think if truth is that which is sought for. The act of cognition as a 
mental process must proceed in accordance with the empirically given psychological 
laws, but should obey the normative laws of thinking if truth is its goal. These normative 
laws are not empirically given. They are a priori. The truth is an ideal. The critical or 
teleological method turns out to be a new way of approaching cognition; different from 
the psychological method that treats any act of cognition as wholly reducible to an 
empirical mental process. This method proposes to investigate cognition not in terms of 
the empirical mental processes, but in terms of the ideal validity inherent in any act of 
valid cognition. But what are the forms and norms that cognition as a mental process 
must possess in order to be valid? What norms are conducive to, and guarantee the 
obtaining of, truth? In order to be able to establish the “valid” norms and forms required 
of any act of thinking to qualify as valid, the teleological method must possess 
beforehand an idea of what “truth,” or validity is. The problem, however, is that the 
teleological method was called for in the first place to establish the norms in accordance 
with which an act of thinking can become valid cognition. In other words, teleological 
method presupposes already that which it sets itself to find out, namely the truth.  
Heidegger is not content, however, with simply pointing out this apparent 
begging the question fallacy that this position appears to entail. He believes that the idea 
that the same mental process is both empirical (is such-and-such) and ideal (as valid 
cognition it ought to be so-and-so) is worthy of further consideration. For reasons that 
will become apparent later it is now important to see how and why Heidegger finds this 
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phenomenon, “oughtness,” worthy of discussion. He asks,  
How is this ought-character there, which is its correlate in the subject? 
and then continues,  
A being is theoretically cognized – what about an ought? As long as the 
original experiential directedness peculiar to the living experience of an 
„ought“, the way in which an ought-character is given and the way in 
which it is taken as such, is not clarified, the already problematic method 
remains obscure in its own core.34 
The teleological method depends essentially on an elucidation of the (living) 
experience of ‘oughtness’, on how an “ought” is experienced concretely, as it claims that 
mental processes ought to follow certain norms in order to become valid. In other words, 
the oughtness-experience (Sollen-Erlebnis)is the place to start for the teleological 
method. What is needed therefore is a phenomenological description of those experiences 
in which we “ought to” do something. A phenomenological elucidation of such an 
experience brings in new questions regarding the inextricable relation between oughtness 
(ideal validity) and values, and between truth and values. Is truth a value? Is value an 
ideal in the sense of Sollen?  
An ideal appears to be something “valuable”, and represents as such a “value.” 
According to Heidegger, however, Sollenerlebnisse are not identical with the experiences 
in which values are given (Werterlebnisse). As a matter of fact, “value” becomes an 
object only as a result of a process of formalization35. Values are not originarily given as 
“objects” in the value-experiences. Properly speaking, there are no such objects as values, 
and this can be easily seen by again paying attention to those lived experiences in which 
something valuable is lived through. There are only valuable things, or, better yet, 
‘valuing’ experiences.  
A value is not, on the contrary, it ‘values’.36 
It is one thing to regard something as a value (Für-Wert-Erklären) and quite 










another to simply value something (Wertnehmen). It is even difficult to adequately speak 
of “valuing experiences” without falling back on the language of objectivity, which 
cannot but couch the valuing experiences in terms of the object-subject relation (the 
valuing subject and its corresponding value). Values as objects are a theoretical by-
product. But an unprejudiced look at the way in which I live through or experience the 
value-comportments37reveals that “our language is not yet up to the new fundamental 
typology of experience.38” The elucidation of the valuing experiences, and the distinction 
between “taking something as a value” and “valuing experiences as such,” make it also 
clear that truth cannot be given in the same way in which I live through valuing 
experiences.  
In joyfulness I am valuingly living joyfulness through; in truth as truth I 
live.39 
The distinction lies in the fact that while I am, as it were, taken in by the valuing 
experiences in the sense that the valuing “irrupts in me,” the truth, by contrast, appears to 
be given to me in such as way that I am sort of left untouched by it: I am simply 
establishing it without me being somehow involved in its establishing. The truth remains 
what it is even without my establishing it. The truth is taken to be in such a way that it 
remains what it is even if I myself were not there. By contrast,  
In valuing there is nothing theoretical; it has its own ‘light’, it spreads its 
own brightness.40 
The further elucidation of the distinction between value and truth makes it necessary to 
clarify whether values are „valid“ in the same sense in which „truth“ is said to be valid. 
In other words, we need to become clear on the forms of living in which validity is 
experienced. Such a necessary elucidation, however, seems to be either missing in 
Neokantianism or demotedto the status of a secondary problem. 
Norms are always norms for… In this case, it is the psychological mental 
process (which is a being, ein Seiendes) that stands for the material to which these norms 









are applied. The act of cognition is thus regarded as a unity having two constitutive 
elements: the material represented by the mental process understood as a ‘being,’ and the 
ideal (Sollen, norms) applied to this material41. The ideal is not, obviously, a being in the 
same sense in which the mental process orienting itself in accordance with an ideal is said 
to be a “being.” They appear to be two different “worlds” separated by a huge and 
insurmountable fissure. The value philosophy remains, according to Heidegger, numbed 
by this fissure gaping between being and norm (ideal, value), and incapable of bridging 
the gap. But Sein and Sollen are somehow intertwined in that the mental process (das 
Psychische) stands under a norm, and the norm is always a norm for … (a mental 
process). Too much emphasis on the factual, thing-, or object-like42 aspect of the mental 
process – even if considered in its dependency on or relation to ideal norms - is, 
according to Heidegger, the source of this rigid separation between Sein and Sollen. This 
is why it becomes all the more necessary that we explore deeper into „this lability of fact 
and cognition of facts,“ until it becomes unmistakable in itself43.   
As it has become already clear, Heidegger has adopted two of the main tenets 
of Husserl’s phenomenology in the very way in which he deals with the cognition (of 
facts): (1) cognition is an experience, something we live through, and as a result its 
clarification is made possible by the fact that (2) it can be subjected to a 
phenomenological description. It is only insofar as it can be lived through that cognition 
could be “elucidated.” Without delving too much into it, Heidegger admits implicitly that 
cognition-experience is in need of clarification. He wants to clarify what is going on in 
the ordinary experience of cognizing something and either confirm or disconfirm the 
traditional interpretation of cognition on the basis of its alleged evidential origin in 
experience. What is elucidated, however, is cognition as experience, as something lived 
through. Nevertheless, the elucidation of cognition as experience, later as phenomenon, 











will not be, as we will find out soon, another “cognition.” In other words, in the 
cognition-experience one does not necessarily experience cognition as experience. The 
experience of cognition is not necessarily the same as the cognition-experience. One 
thing though that distinguishes Heidegger’s approach to cognition from Husserl’s is that 
the critique of previous interpretations of cognition is crucial to the proper conducting of 
a phenomenological description of the experience of cognition. 
What is a mental process (das Psychische) after all? Why is it that it is 
precisely this being that has the peculiarity of being able to stand under a norm? The 
mental process in the science of psychology is a temporal object-, thing-like, reified 
being. It is always changing. Such a reified entity can be further analyzed into elementary 
processes, and as a basic fact can also be broken up into elementary parts (sensations, 
representations etc.). The parts are themselves reified (factual) parts since the being 
whose moments they are is itself regarded – in contradistinction with the ideality of the 
norm – as a brute fact, a reified procesual being. The only adequate method for making 
these reified parts accessible is “description.” However, from this perspective, description 
itself is but a psychological phenomenon, a reified mental process, a “thing.”  
What could this mean: a thing describes another thing?44.  
If there are only reified entities, what would then be the point in inquiring into 
whether “there are” reified entities? There would be only reified beings and that would be 
all. It would not even made sense to speak of there being only reified entities since in a 
world made of such entities there is no place for something like “there is/are…” Such a 
reified world is completely mute. In other words, the act of inquiring, comprehension as 
such, would not be found in an absolutely reified world. Things would have no “sense” or 
“meaning” at all, since comprehension would not be there to establish the reflective 
difference between entities and what they are, their sense. Things would be mute: in a 
world of stones, of “brute facts,” there would not be stones. Language itself breaks down 
at this point for it is incapable of comprehending such a world. Philosophy therefore 
would not be possible. Meaning and the grasping of meaning would have no “place” in 





this world (homeless45). We can indeed cast the spell of reification on anything we 
encounter, but by doing so the very act of inquiry46, of comprehension, encountering or 
experiencing itself, becomes unintelligible. In such a world there would be no place at all 
for comprehension. Philosophy as the attempt at making sense of what is going on would 
make no sense at all. 
We are now at a methodological road junction which can determine 
whether philosophy will live or die. We are facing an abyss: either into 
nothingness, that is, the absolute reification, or into another world, more 
precisely, into the world for the very first time.47 
Things, however, do make sense to us. We do experience their “being,” in the sense that 
we do know what they are, and even if we might be completely mistaken in our approach 
to, and claims about, what we experience, it is something other than a completely reified 
world that could “clarify” how it is that we could be “wrong.” The very question, „Is 
there something?” appears tocall into question by itself the possibility of an absolutely 
reified world. As already said, in an absolutely reified world, this question would be 
nonsensical since the conditions of its possibility would not be met. “Everything” would 
be just stones or like stones… There would not even make sense to speak of “everything” 
or “like” or “just like.” Therefore, a question like, Is there something?, is an affront to the 
idea that there are only reified beings and nothing else.  
And because it is clear that the absolute reification presupposes, or leads to a 
conception of a world in which cognition, the act of comprehension becomes homeless, 
Heidegger goes back to the “experience” of asking the question, is there something?, for 
no reason other than to discover in it how the “reified nexus” can still be present as an 















object forcomprehension48. What is really there ultimately, and how, what concretely do 
we have in mind when we ask ourselves, is there something? How is the object 
(something as something, in general), and its comprehension, given in the experience of 
asking, is there something? It all goes back to the experience of comprehending 
something, to the very living of comprehending something, to the concrete situation of 
comprehending: the concrete, factic comprehension of something as experience 
(Erlebnis).What is that which is comprehended, and how is it concretely being 
comprehended in a concretely performed (lived and living) experience, namely that of 
asking the question, Is there something? How is it lived through? At this point, Heidegger 
abandons his critique of Neokantian interpretation of cognition and lauches into an 
phenomenologically original description of the “experience” of asking, Is there 
something?. 
The question is lived through. I live through. I live something through.49 
And this is precisely the reason why Heidegger sets himself the task of 
elucidating what is going on in asking whether there is something (Frageerlebnis). What 
is (the sense of) this (lived and living) experience? What does it “contain”? How does it 
take place concretely? If we can ask such a question, it means that the question is 
somehow, to some extent and in clearly definable limits, “meaningful” to us. How does 
the “meaningful”-character of this experience present itself? How does the concretely 
asked question become meaningful to us? In what sense does this question (-experience) 
make sense to us? 
What is crucially important here is to find a way to grasp the (living) asking-
experience as it unfolds itself, as it takes place; it does not matter what we have to say 
about it, what we already know about such things; what matters is how it itself becomes 
meaningful from itself, by unfolding itself. The experience of asking, is there 
something?,is already meaningful to us before and prior to us asking how it has become 
meaningful. It has already become meaningful through and as “our asking” the question, 
in our “carrying out of the asking.” It is, in a sense, meaningful in itself. Erlebnis is 






already here interpreted essentially as “taking place,” unfolding, enacting, as being 
performed. In a sense, Heidegger is implying here that there is a distinction to be drawn 
between (1) the way in which the question itself becomes meaningful (how, why, to what 
extent, under what conditions etc.) in our asking it –genuine living or lived living, and (2) 
the way in which the question becomes meaningful when regarded as meaningful – 
theoretically regarded living, non-lived living. By paying attention to how this specific 
question is concretely lived through, or experienced, Heidegger has only one thing in 
mind: to take the lived experience precisely in the same way in which it itself presents 
from itself. To understand it in this way is by no means the same thing as finding causes, 
conditions, or preconditions for such an experience. To find causes for lived experiences 
would amount to reifying them, to explicating them as “things.” Heidegger, by contrast, 
wants to understand the “pure motives of the sense of pure lived experiences.”  
The word Erlebnis itself is today so obsolete and faded that it should be 
left aside if it were not so appropriate. It cannot be avoided, which means 
that it all comes down to understanding its essence.50 
Our review of Heidegger’s first lectures is intended, among other things, to 
show why and how Erlebnis comes to play such an important role in early Heidegger. We 
have gathered enough information to safely claim that even if Heidegger begins by 
placing himself clearly in the tradition of life-philosophy51 which regarded Erlebnis as 
the ultimate philosophical prize, experience as it takes place and is livedbecomes the 
fundamental theme of Heidegger’s philosophy in virtue of its ability, as the actual 
concrete unfolding (enactment, effectuating, actualizing, fulfillment, performing) of the 
comprehension of something, to contain the key to intelligibility as such, to how, under 
what conditions, in what sense and to what extent we can make “sense” of “something,” 
of anything at all. 
 











A science of Erlebnisse 
The proper way to grasp experiences is by bringing them to giveness in 
accordance with their own full sense, where by “full” sense Heidegger means the 
“concrete,” ‘factical” manner of self-presentation of lived experiences. We must “see” 
the living experience with its own eyes, as it were, in the manner of its own 
comprehension. We must always be ready to keep to the lived experience as such and 
grasp that which presents itself from itself. Heidegger has already employed this method 
when he addressed the ought-character of some experiences, and also the valuing 
experiences. Now it is time to apply the same method again on another experience, 
namely that of asking,is there something?52 
The unprejudiced and unmediated seeing of the lived experience of asking does 
not find any „I“ that does the asking, nor a psychic subject who experiences contents in 
the form of a mental process. Relative to the specific way in which the asking is 
conducted, it can be safely claimed that “nobody” asks this question. The questioner is 
irrelevant to, absent from, the questioning as it unfolds. To even speak of mental 
processes, or even of an experiencing subject, an ego, a subject “doing,” as it were, the 
asking, would be to read too much into this experience as it presents itself. It itself does 
not know anything of a subject “having” an experience.  The experience itself, in the 
manner of its own comprehension, does not know anything of an experience being 
attributed to an experiencing subject. What can be found instead is a lived living of 














something, a ‚life out to something.’53To live is always to live something. The most 
important thing that has to be emphasized about this interpretation of experiences is that 
from such a perspective the experience is no longer comprehended as a thing-like event 
in the natural world, but rather as a new phenomenon of its own kind. Upon attempting to 
see the lived experience exactly in the way in which it presents itself, that is, as it is in its 
own unfolding and in accordance with its own intrinsic intelligibility, one thing becomes 
clear: we are no longer grasping it in the same manner in which we grasp other things and 
occurrences. The lived experience is not “a mere entitative natural occurrence.54” The 
lived experience is not a thing that “exists brutally,” a thing that comes into and later out 
of being. My lived experience is “something new, not of the kind of thing-like, object-
like entities.55” It is not a process in the usual sense.  
It is not a process, but the event of coming into its own [Er-eignis].56 
The experience in question here does not, according to Heidegger, do justice to 
Erlebnis. As a result, he introduces an apparently different lived experience, an 
“ordinary” one, the experience of seeing the lectern upon entering the classroom, and 
contrasts it with the experience of asking, Is there something? The comparison reveals 
that this experience of seeing the lectern (Umwelterlebnis) “presents” the lectern (and not 
some object devoid of any significance - Bedeutung) in such an unmediated way that 
reification can only be understood as a secondary and derivative act founded upon the 
instant comprehension of the lectern as lectern. In the living experience of the lectern, the 
lectern is there immediately, directly, on the spot, out of hand (in einem Schlag). It is not 
as if I see an object devoid of any significance, and only afterwards I attach significance 
to it. I immediately see it as lectern, and then, if need be, I can eventually come to see it 
as an object of some sort:  
The signifying-aspect is what is first; it offers itself to me immediately, in 
the absence of any reflective detour through grasping something as 
thing.57 










I live in such a way that everything, no matter how strange it may seem, makes 
somehow sense, is significant, means something, and matters somehow, to me.  The 
things I deal with are things I know most of the time what to do with, and even if I 
sometimes may encounter things I do not know what to do with, this “perplexity” is itself 
an indication of the fact that I always live primarily in a familiar world surrounded by 
meaningful, significant things. It is, as it were, for lack of a better expression, a “familiar 
perplexity.” Heidegger uses an unusual expression to name this phenomenon: es weltet. I 
live in such a way that I already “know the significance” of that which I experience in the 
sense that I “know what to do with” it or “know how” to deal with it somehow. The 
constantly operating familiarity of the environing world which makes itself known in the 
significance of anything I can possibly encounter (“I know what to do with it”) is 
arguably what Heidegger refers to by the German verb: es weltet, it worlds. 
Es weltet refers also to the phenomenon that each and every thing whose 
significance I immediately recognize, on the spot as it were, stands in an inconspicuous 
but essential relation to many other familiar things in its vicinity. Without saying it so 
explicitely, it is clear however that for Heidegger Es weltet operates on a wholesale 
manner. I immediately recognize/comprehend the thing that I see as my lectern, but along 
with this comprehension, I also immediately “see” the books, the windows, and already 
have an understanding of everything that populates the surroundings of the lectern: the 
lectern can appear to me as my lectern only out of the familiar surrounding populated 
with “things” whose significance I can already grasp: lectern, books, desks, classrooms, 
buildings, students, professors, semesters, universities, education etc. Familiar things can 
be familiar to me not in isolation from other familiar things, but only on the basis of an 
essential belonging to a horizon of familiar things, “together with” other things.  
The unprejudiced “seeing” of an ordinary lived experience makes it clear that I 
am primarily surrounded by lecterns, glasses, cars, walls, friends, windows, enemies etc. 
and not by “objects” that become what they are, namely lecterns, cars etc. only later on in 
my dealings with them. The sudden encounter with an unfamiliar object is nothing but a 
case limit of my lived familiarity with significant (meaningful) things. The experience is 
thus the event of the immediacy of an on going, unfolding meaningfulness.  





Living in the surrounding world, it makes sense (es bedeutet) to me 
everywhere and always, it is world-laden, ‚it worlds’58 
What Heidegger appears to be implying here can be formulated as follows: that 
which is lived through has already been comprehended somehow without having become 
first an object of explicit reflective focus.An important conclusion he reaches here but 
will develop in the next courses is that to experience something is simultaneously to have 
an understanding of it somehow. Cognition of it can only come about in the wake of my 
having already somehow comprehended it as something meaning something to me. It is 
only on the basis or in virtue of its having been somehow already comprehended that the 
object can eventually be analyzed. And the “object” is comprehended in the sense that I 
know what to do with it, I am already relating to it somehow, I know how I should go 
about dealing with it (either by holding it in my hands if it is a hammer, or by talking to 
him/her if it is a person etc.) To “comprehend” its significance is not a theoretical 
process; it does not presuppose that I have come to regard, look at or considered the 
significance and then acted on it, fulfil or carry it out. On the contrary: I know its 
significance in the sense that I have already somehow acted on it, realized or performed 
it. As Harrison Hall puts it, it is a kind of knowing in “the sense of possessing the skill or 
competence, not in the sense of having the right sort of beliefs.59” What things are when 
encountered in a surrounding world, in an environing experience, consists in us doing, as 
it were,or fulfilling their significance, taking them as that which they are, that is, what 
they mean. The object is in the sense of “meaning” something to me = I am already 
acting, comporting on the comprehension of its significance. The significance is 
primarily lived through, and not merely congnized. My comportment towards something 
is the first, primary, fundamental expression of my comprehension of that something, of 
its significance. The significance of an encountered thing in the surrounding world is not 
a static and fixed entity. The significance is what it is only by my enacting, fulfilling it.  
The significance is not first and foremost a linguistic but a “practical” meaning. Things 
are what they are by my enacting their significance, by “my acting on their meaning.”  








And things in my surrounding are what they are precisely because I take them so, that is, 
I act on such a comprehension of their meaning: that thing is a car precisely in virtue of 
my taking it as a car, in virtue of my relating to it as a car.  Although Heidegger does not 
say it expressly, it is clear however that for him the meaning is not a static reality, a fixed 
something similar to stones: a meaning is a meaning as long as I take it as meaning 
something, as long as I am performing it. To put it in my own words: my comportment 
towards things is the performing of my comprehension of their significance. 
I should take the time here to note that the move Heidegger makes here and 
which will prove crucial to our understanding of the transition from life to being consists 
in distinguishing the “ordinary,” surrounding or environing experience from the reflective 
experience. The fundamental difference will be found in the unique “presence” (da or 
dabei sein), or the lack thereof, of the “I” in experiencing. In reflection, the experience is 
intentionally depersonalized. The cognition of the object is intentionally kept away from 
having any significant relation to the one cognizing. Cognition proceeds always on the 
assumption that it should not matter “who”cognizes. Even if Heidegger does not yet say 
it expliciltly here, there is no doubt that this depersonalization of the theoretical 
experience is the source of his later conception of das Man: in the theoretical experience, 
I should see what anybody can see, I should grasp only what anybody else can grasp. I do 
not matter at all in and for my cognition-experiences. I have them, I live them through, 
but the fact that it is me who is living them through is completely irrelevant for what is to 
be achieved in these experiences. Are all experiences impersonal? Our first experiences, 
and the most ordinary ones, are far from being impersonal: I suddenly see the thunderbolt 
and am frightened. I am not only grasping instantly, “on the spot,” “all at once,” what is 
going on (the thunderbolt on the sky, myself running on the valley all by myself, miles 
away from other people, on a cloudy night etc.) but also what is going on affects me, I 
find myself somehow disposed toward what is going on. The experience involves me 
essentially. It is not just an experience but a lived-livingexperience: in living it I am 
somehow connected, stay in touch with what is going on, the whole surrounding world is 
comprehended by me somehow, and the comprehension finds its expression in my 
reactions to, plans about, review of, what I see as taking place. I do not see justa 




by the thunderbolt etc.) And my being frightened with it makes me experience it in a 
different way than what I would typically see it when I would simply want to study a 
thunderbolt for scientific purposes, or when I see a thunderbolt represented in a painting: 
how I experience becomes intrinsically one with what I experience; what I live through 
depends essentially on how I live it through. What I experience is the way it is precisely 
because I am somehow there, present (“dabei sein60”), I resonate in the whole experience. 
In my ordinary experiences, that which is experienced is not a simple object, an object-
like entity, just a thunderbolt that I see, but something that matters to me one way or 
another. I am not irrelevant to my own experiences. What I live through is always lived 
through in one way or another, somehow: for example, I could be bored sometimes with 
a mathematical problem, sometimes I could be really excited about the same problem, 
sometimes indifferent, sometimes I may look at it dismissively or deeply concerned. I am 
always there somehow61. But this “how” characteristic of all my experiences is not itself 
noticeable in the experience; it is one with “what” I experience. This explains also why 
the experiencing and what is experienced are not two entitative objects put somehow 
together62. The experience is always “personal,” which means that its intentionality is not 
merely relational in character63. It is only when I strip the experience of the living, 
personal character, that is, I ignore the “quality of the act” in Husserl’s terms, that I can 
downgrade the intention to the status of a mere relation.  
What Heidegger finds, at this stage of his philosophical development, as the 
defining mark of Erlebnis as it takes place is that it is persönlichpar excellence. It is thus 
the personal character of any experience that renders it “living” in the first place. This 
“personal” or “living” character of lived experiences will always from now on preoccupy 
Heidegger. It can also be said to be what distinguished Heidegger’s phenomenology from 
Husserl’s in that Heidegger’s phenomenology is built around the idea that the “object” of 
investigation is ultimately of a “personal” character, that intentionality is not “fallen from 
the sky,” as he will say later, but the ongoing dynamic of an entity with a unique identity, 
that of a living being.  What I am living through is, in some sense, appropriated by me; I 








am always “owning” anything that I lived through by living it through as something that 
“speaks to” me, represents something tome, matters to me somehow, is what it is thanks 
to my experiencing it. This also explains why it is never easy for us to pay attention to 
“how” we experience things. “What” we experience, the content of our experiences 
captures our attention completely. Therefore, any experience is genuinelymy lived-living 
experience64. In these experiences the familiarity of significant things is somehow 
appropriated by me in the sense that the familiar things “I always know what to do with” 
are, as it were, cut out or tailored for me: I find the mountain I see too difficult (for me) to 
climb, the lectern too high, my parents pretty annoying, my job an undeserved pleasure, 
the color of my car very intense, the house that I have in need of repair, etc. Things are 
not neutral, indifferent and undetermined objects. Lived experiences grasped in their 
performative character are ways in which “I” make the things I am dealing with “my 
own:” I appropriate them, take them into my possession somehow (proper-ty). And I also 
come to know myself in and through my dealings with things: Erlebnisse are Er-eignisse, 
events of coming into one’s own,that is, “appropriated by an historical I.65” In my lived 
experiences “I” appropriate the things I encounter by knowing how to react to them, how 
to go about in my dealing with them, by “always knowing what to do with them.66” And 
my own self reveals itself to itself in such “going about.” Ex. I reluctantly climb the 
mountain and only if I have to since I find it too high (I do not like climbing), I pretty 
much avoid my parents since I find them annoying (I would rather stay away from my 
parents), seeing the house always reminds me of the repairs I have to make etc.  

















And even if lived experience presupposes the act of experiencing (das Erleben) 
along with that which is experienced or lived through (das Erlebte), these two are by no 
means two parts that can be somehow put together into a higher unity constituted by the 
lived experience. What is even more important is that not only the experience of asking, 
Is there something?, but any lived experience whatsoever is a phenomenon of its own 
kind which is far from presenting itself in the same way in which thing-like, object-like, 
reified entities present themselves. Any lived experience is, in accordance with its own 
sense, an occurrence like no other:  
I understand it not as a processual occurring, as a reified thing, an object, 
but as something completely new, as an event (of coming into one’s 
own)67. 
In other words, an experience is an unique event whose sense can easily be 
distorted once it is interpreted as a real event happening in the natural world. Reified 
entities are established in opposition to, or at least in separation from, “me.” By contrast, 
seen in its purity, the experience reveals that 
The living (experience) does not take place before me, like a thing which I 
am simply laying down, like an object; I myself bring it into its own for 
me, and it comes into its own in accordance with its own essence.68 
To summarize, lived experiences are not like any other things, objects or 
processes. They are uniquely “personal” events. They are of a unique character: Ereignis, 
events of appropriation or, better yet, events of coming into one’s own. As Ereignisse 
they are fundamentally unique events in, by and as which the self  (‘I’) appropriates a 
world for itself, makes it its own and becomes thereby intelligible to itself. The 
appropriation consists in the comprehending of the nexus of significance to which all 
things encountered belong, which comprehension, in turn, is performed or enacted in no 
other way than by one’s going about in one’s dealings with the things encountered in a 












certain way.  
Any attempt at reifying experiences as events of coming into its own ends in 
distorting their very sense. And reification has already surreptitiously set in whenever the 
fundamental character of Erlebnis as an event in which I am comprehensibly in an open 
relation to “something” by taking it to be significant or meaningful to me (mean-ing it) - 
and I do so in the very manner in which I havealways already found myself dealing with 
it -, is lost or ignored. By omitting how things encountered in a surrounding world are 
already meaningful to us, reification proposes another interpretation of the sense of 
experience as such: experience is all about the object; experience is, properly speaking, 
“experience of the object.”   
The object as what it is, its being, does not touch me. I am no longer the 
one that now establishes. The act of establishing is, as living experience, 
still a rudiment of lived living; it is de-living. The object as such, that 
which is cognized, is a-way, removed from the genuine living of it.69 
To be able to see familiar, surrounding (umweltlich) things as mere objects 
presupposes thus a specific modification of the originary manner of living. The originary 
living of something (experience) is one from which “I”70 am not bracketed. Seeing pure 
objects, however, is an experience I take myself out of. Owing to “me,” my lived 
experience is precisely what it is. The living (experience) understood as Ereignis is the 
“origin” of any other kind of living. Without further ado and much preparation, 
Heidegger now shifts the entire discussion onto the possibility of a science of lived 
experiences, of the living as such. The Neokantian approach to the idea of philosophy as 
a fundamental science in the sense of absolute knowledge – leaving aside the fallacy 
which it entails and the unexplored presuppositions it rests upon -, ends up, according to 















Heidegger, transforming the world into a world of “mute” objects despite its initial 
commitment to a separation between Sein and Sollen. Such a world cannot adequately 
explain how inquiry, philosophy itself, is at all possible, not to mention that it cannot in 
the end explain anything. Philosophy, according to Heidegger, is possible only as a 
systematic inquiry into, a science of, living experiences as Ereignisse, as events of 
coming into one’s own. Heidegger’s breakthroughhere is to have grasped the living 
experience as an eminently “personal” experience, as “something,” an event or happening 
(Ereignis), in which I find myself living in a familiar context, in other words, 
experiencing things and situations which are always, in a sense, my own and come to 
experience myself in such experiencing. 
 
A (non-theoretical) science of lived experiences 
The lived, living experience,“personal” to the highest degree, becomes now the 
focus of investigation71. The very possibility of philosophy depends on the possibility of 
there being a science of lived experiences as “the living of something”: “How is such a 
science of living possible?72” This science, however, appearto be from the beginning 
beset with some very serious problems.  
According to Heidegger, any science is essentially conditioned by the ability to 
bracket the self from the experience as such. The emphasis on the object is proportional 
to the vanishing of the self. The objectivity in science is precisely this ability. The object 
of any science is the end result of a process of objectification understood as a process of 
dispossessing the living of the “object” (Erlebnis) of its “living” character73, which 
results in a separation of that which is lived through (the object) from that which lives – 
the experiencing or living self. The living character of the lived experience (life) consists 












in the resonance (Mitschwingung, Mitanklingen) of the self in the giving or experiencing 
(es weltet) of familiar, significant things.When the self is bracketed from its own living of 
things, the world of significant, sense-laden, familiar things and relations becomes a 
world of objective, neutral objects awaiting further determinations. The experience is 
now impersonal. The truth of science is always an “objective truth” in the sense that the 
ideal aim of science is to arrive at an understanding of its objects having no essential 
relation to an I in particular, but to any I, an I in general, to a “subject in general.” Again 
we can anticipate here Heidegger’s later intepretation of the “falleness” of Dasein as das 
Man, the impersonal ‘they.’ Theoretical comportment is precisely this ability to 
contemplate or intend objects as objects for, or as given to, an “I” in general, an 
impersonal I, a cognitive or theoretical I. The theoretical “I” is no longer the “living” I, as 
Heidegger puts it, but the mere correlate of an absolute objectivity. The “personal” 
character characterizing any living experience as it is lived has now become lost:  
By proceeding theoretically I get myself out of the living.74 
Theoretical cognition is “embodied” in the extant sciences. Therefore, the 
particular sciences have a special relation to this cognition. The particular sciences are 
designed to produce theoretical cognition. Theoretical cognition takes the truth as 
objective truth. The particular sciences want to establish the truth about their respective 
domains. Truth, in turn, is understood as “universal truth”, that is, the “theoretical” 
concept of truth goes hand in hand with the idea of universality; it has the character of 
universality. Theoretical truth is to be distinguished from other “truths,” namely from 
ethical, artistic and religious truths75. Unlike all the other truths, unlike all the other 
cognitions which all lack the character of universality, the theoretical cognition comes 
with the added advantage of facilitating our understanding of these non-theoretical truths 
since the very idea of theoretical truth has an essential relation to the idea of universal 
validity and thus to theoretical cognition.  
In conclusion, the idea of science in general appears to stand in clear opposition 
to the idea of a science of Erlebnisse precisely in their living character as science is 
possible only as a dispossession of the living of its living character. The experience is no 






longer genuine, but artificial (künstlich), no longer “personal,” but impersonal; the I is no 
longer the “full,” concrete I but an “empty” I76.This science would have to be able to be 
an objective science of a non-objectified, non-reified lived experience, which clearly does 
not sit well with the very idea of a theoretical science in general. In other words, the 
possibility of a science of lived experiences in their living character calls for a science 
that is not theoretical in its approach, a non-theoretical or pre-theoretical science. Such a 
science would pay full consideration to both the way in which the I is there (da or dabei) 
or the “resonateness” of the I in the experience, and the operative significance of 
anything appearing in and as such an experience. In other words, this science would not 
lose sight of the essential appropriation that takes place in and as living, appropriation 
that consists in the self’s owning a world for itself and discovering itself in this “owning” 
of anything encountered.  Or, to put it differently, such science would take into 
consideration the Ereignis-character of living, its “personal” character. 
The extant theoretical sciences, by contrast, all rest on the possibility of  
(1) removing any essential involvement with an I from the experience/living of 
the subject matter under investigation, and of  
(2) stripping the subject matter of any prior “significance” (Bedeutung) it 
already had within the world of familiar things (Umwelt) I have always been surrounded 
with, and reducing it to a mere “object” in general. The lectern, for example, becomes a 
mere instantiation of an object in general; it no longer is a lectern primarily, but first and 
foremost an object:  
If the genuine sense of familiar things, their significance, is somehow 
annulled, then that which is already established as merely given has been 
faded into an mere thing.77 
Husserl blamed the inability of the particular sciences to grasp the peculiarity 
of consciousness (or lived experiences, since Husserl employs Bewußtsein and Erlebnis 
almost interchangeably) to their inborn tendency to interpret anything as a natural object, 
that is, as an entity fully determinable in terms of a spatio-temporal unity as prescribed by 








the laws of the exact natural sciences. This naturalization of consciousness has been one 
of the main impediments towards developing the idea of philosophy as a rigorous 
science78. For Heidegger, however, such an interpretation is shortsighted. It is not merely 
the “naturalization” tendency of all theoretical sciences that accounts for the ruinous 
circumstance in which philosophy finds itself today (still further away from 
accomplishing its historic mission of becoming a rigorous science), but rather the hidden 
effects of theoretical attitude at work in all sciences.  
It is not simply the naturalism as people thought (Husserl, Logos-essay), it 
is the general dominance of the theoretical which has distorted the 
problems.79 
The living dissolves itself under the gaze of theorizing. Philosophy should be 
able to come to grasp the lived experiences methodically and rigorously precisely in their 
“living” character. To put it differently, philosophy should be able to have an undistorted 
access to Erlebnis (the living of something) as lived and not as posited and thereby 
regarded in the theoretical attitude. And since the theoretical attitude is founded upon the 
living attitude in the sense that it can only come about as a modification of the genuine, 
living attitude, philosophy should be, if anything at all, a pre-theoretical science of lived 
experiences in their living character.  
 
The theoretical attitude 
In order to explore the possibility of a pre-, and non-theoretical science, the 
theoretical aspect of the extant theoretical sciences has to be fully acknowledged and 
understood. The first step thus towards establishing a non-theoretical science is a full 
recognition and understanding of what “theory” and “theoretical” mean.  
So far Heidegger has discovered that the theoretical aspect lies in a derivative 
or secondary (not originary or genuine) comportment towards anything encountered 










which empties the experience of its “living character.” It is as if the self is disowned of all 
familiar things. The self is no longer at home in its surroundings:  the familiarity 
(significance) of things lived through in the modus of a specific comportment towards 
(dealing with, reacting to, moving among, together, against etc.) them seems to vanishe 
along with the self. By modifying the manner of experiencing, the “content” of 
experience changes as well. Consequently, theoretical explanation of lived experiences is 
no explanation at all. The theoretical comportment towards them is already distorting 
their sense:  
Explanation as fragmentation, that is, in this case truncation: one wants to 
explain something which one no longer has genuinely, and does not want 
to, and can, let it be genuinely.80 
The theoretical comportment sees only real objects everywhere. The only 
explanation it is capable of is one that explains one real object by reference to another 
real object81.  
However, the possibility of elaborating a non-theoretical science of living 
experiences depends entirely on a fully-fledged understanding of the process by which 
the genuine living experience modifyies into a theoretical experience.  
The process of stripping the experience of its living character is a gradual one. 
The starting point is the thing as “given”82 in the living attitude83, that is, in the 
environing experience of familiar things: for example, the lectern which is genuinely 
lived through as being too high, or too dirty for me etc. becomes a lectern in general, no 
longer too high or too dirty. The familiar thing gradually loses its original significance. 
This lectern is then understood as being built out of a material, wood for example. I now 
come to see the lectern as “something made of wood,” then as a material thing in general, 
and eventually as a mere “thing” in general. If the starting point is a “thing” that has a 
role to play in my world of familiar things, the end point of the process of reification 











(theorizing or objectification) is an object in general, and the world of such objects is 
there not for “me” but for a self in general. Consequently, we can even speak of degrees 
of liveliness of living, which, of course, have nothing to do with how passionately one 
can live one’s life. The degrees of liveliness refer to the gradual disappearance of the two 
aspects (I-resonateness and operational or worldly significance) of the living character of 
any genuine (that is, pre-theoretical) living.  
When the self is detached or removed from living, the self becomes a 
contemplative or reflective I, a theoretical I, the mere correlate of “thingness.” This self 
enacts now a different sense of the things encountered. Things are now “different” for 
such a self. The self is now interested solely in achieving “cognition” about the things 
stripped of their significance in the world of familiar things. The experience now splits 
itself into the cognized object and its cognition.  It is important to say it again, however, 
that for Heidegger the theoretical attitude is founded upon, and comes second to, the 
attitude the self has in and towards the world of familiar surrounding things. As a matter 
of fact, the theoretical attitude is born out of the ordinary, that is, living attitude. This 
explains why Heidegger raises the question regarding the “genesis” of the theoretical 
attitude from the environing experience, the living attitude. The theoretical attitude is still 
a lived experience, but one abstracted from its genuine living character, and reduced thus 
to a bare minimum. In this connection, one further question arises: can the theoretical 
attitude account for its own genesis? Can we come to a full understanding of what the 
theoretical attitude is by constantly remaining in the theoretical attitude? In other words, 
can theory be satisfactorily explained by theory itself? Can there be such a thing as a 
“theory of theory?” If cognition cannot be but theoretical in nature (the setting up of an 
object in opposition with a cognizing subject by the gradual process of bracketing of the 
self along with the stripping of familiar things of their environing significance), then, in 
light of what we have said so far, theoretical cognition is in no position to account for its 
own genesis. The theoretical attitude is but a specific modification of the way in which 
the pre-theoretical, living attitude is oriented towards anything it can encounter. 
Philosophy as a fundamental science is possible, if at all, only as a kind of 
comprehension which is not theoretical in character:  




theoretical science, a genuine Ur-science, out of which the theoretical 
itself emerges.84 
Once the theoretical attitude sets in, the living character of the experience is 
lost:  
The ‘it worlds’ is not theoretically established; it is lived through ‘as 
worlding’.85 
Since living experience cannot be captured in its genuineness through 
theoretical reflection, Heidegger admits implicitly that theoretical cognition is as a matter 
of fact distinct from, and even opposite to, a kind of comprehending pertaining to living 
experience itself. Genuine living has its own “comprehension” of the environing world, 
which is distinct from theoretical reflection. Now the most important question is how we 
can come closer to grasping the nature of this pre-theoretical comprehension proper to 
living as such. Only going back to the genuine act of living and its own comprehension 
can provide the answer:  
We want to perform the living of surrounding things in full liveliness and 
then, looking at it, seeing it, we want to see both it and the looking at it, 
and study how the first enacted seeing occurs.86












Phenomenology as the pre-theoretical science of lived experiences 
The only way out of this apparently inescapable theorizing is, according to 
Heidegger, to follow “the principle of all principles” proposed by Husserl in Ideas I:  
Everything that offers itself originarily in ‘intuition’ should be taken as 
that which it offers itself.87 
This principle, however, is the highest theoretical principle, although Husserl himself is 
not clear on this point. Heidegger likes to see in the fact that the principle is one for all 
principles the clear indication that it is not a theoretical principle like all the others: it is 
prior to, or beyond, any other principle. It is a phenomenological principle. 
Phenomenology, so Heidegger, is the best, perhaps the only, candidate for the role of pre-
theoretical science of lived experiences. Phenomenology, however, is not construed as a 
science among other sciences. In a sense, phenomenology, as Heidegger understands it, is 
not so much a science as a fundamental attitude on the basis of which it is now possible 
to gain access to living in its undistorted sense. It is a way of disclosing experiences in 
their living character. It is not cognition as a heightened attention, enhanced and focused 
awareness, focusing, on living when living. Hence it would be more appropriate to speak 
of a phenomenological attitude or method than of phenomenology as a science. The 
principle of all principles is less a principle than an attitude, a specific comportment. This 
phenomenological attitude is, according to Heidegger, the basic attitude immanent in 
living itself undistorted in its living character, it is the comprehension proper to the act of 
living itself:  
It is the Ur-intention of genuine life in general, the Ur-attitude of living as 
such, the life’s sympathy identical with living as such.88 
It is, in other words, the “intention” of life itself in its genuineness. It is how life 
itself is lived in accordance with its own sense.Although it is the fundamental or basic 
attitude, this by no means entails that it is the first to be encountered, or the most ordinary 










one. On the contrary, this basic attitude requires preparation. In a sense, the lecture so far 
has consisted in preparing the way for approaching this basic attitude. The path followed 
thus far has led away from the theoretical and towards this non-theoretical basic attitude.  
The mere possibility of seeing the living (of something) raises some questions 
as to whether this seeing does not again go against the very “sense” inherent in living. To 
be able to “see” and then, on the basis of such seeing, to describe the living (of 
something), I apparently must cease living it through already. Once I stopped living it 
through, the living becomes something I can look at89. I no longer follow the “direction”  
(“sense”) prescribed by, or inherent in, the lived experience itself, but come instead to 
turn my attention from what I was led to in the first place to that experience as such 
(devoid this time precisely of its performative “sense” as I am no longer performing or 
actualizing it).  What and how something is in the living of it is distinct from what and 
how something is when posited and regarded as separated from the living of it. For 
example: I am right now looking at this screen. It is the “looking at this screen” that I am 
now interested in “seeing.” The danger lies in the fact that once I am no longer 
performing the “looking at the screen,” in other words, “living it,” the experience of 
looking at the screen undergoes an almost unnoticeable, yet fundamental, change. I am 
no longer living it through, but have come instead to “reflect” on it, look at it for its own 
sake. Reflection is based on the ability to merely “intend” something as an object, to 
experience (live through) the object solely for the sake of the object itself. In reflection, 
we are in the theoretical attitude. We already know that the theoretical attitude misses or 
overlooks the living character. When we are dealing with lived experiences, the living 
and the theoretical attitude are fundamentally different. A lived experience (the living of 
something) cannot be, apparently, both lived through and reflected upon at the same time. 
I either live it through, or reflect upon it. If so, then it follows that the theoretical attitude 
is unavoidable:  
It is hopeless: theorizing is unavoidable if we want Erlebnisse to be the 
object of a science.90 
The experience was what it was precisely because of “me” being caught up in 








performing “its sense,” in its enacting (The lectern I see is a lectern for as long asI am 
taking (“mean-ing”) it as a lectern and comport myself towards it accordingly). The 
“sense” dies out, as it were, once I am no longer “out to” orient myself in accordance 
with it. No longer performing the “significance,” or “living it out,” I am no longer 
experiencing the same thing. It is clear thus that the “significance” constitutive of the 
living character of experiences (Ereignis-character, es weltet) is not only constantly 
operating, but also performative in character. It is what it is only in the performance of it. 
The ability to look at experiences – no longer living them through - is apparently 
accompanied by the losing of the immanent “sense” inherent in any lived experience as 
such. What I can look at is no longer the originary lived experience in its living character, 
but the lived experience in the absence of its living character.  The “looking at” 
presupposed by the alleged science of lived experiences appears thus to be nothing else 
than another form of theoretical positing of something as an object. Can there be a 
“seeing of,” intuiting or “comportment towards” (Verhalten zu) something which is not 
in itself objectifying? Can there be a “seeing” which does not stand over against that 
which it sees and outside it91? Phenomenology as a pre-theoretical science of lived 
experiences depends on an affirmative answer to this question92. 
























To answer this question, Heidegger distinguishes between two senses of the 
theoretical. There is, on the one hand, theory in the sense of the process of de-living we 
have already discussed above. Theory in this sense is a gradual process stripping 
progressively the lived experience of its living character. Whenever I come to intently 
look at something, that something has thereby been posited by me as standing over 
against myself, as an object (Objekt) I have somehow before me, and can now be looked 
at, separated from me and devoid of its significance in the surrounding world of familiar 
things.  On the other hand, however, there is a “formal theorizing” (and its correlate “die 
formale Gegenständliche”) that does not consist in a gradual process of stripping the 
lived experience of its living character. This newly distinguished sense of the theoretical 
has a completely different genesis than the theoretical in the sense of a gradual process of 
de-living (Ent-lebung). For one, it is not motivated by the mere “desire to know” which 
































itself has its origin in the isolation of the familiar thing from the all-around significance 
of the surrounding world in which “often and indeed for the most part93” I am inevitably 
caught up. It is not a process. Theorizing in the first sense is a highly gradual process. 
Depending on how far the de-living process has gone, the object of theoretical reflection 
appears so and so. The object of the end stage of the process of theorizing is the 
“theoretical something,” or “something in general.” For example, by gradually 
disregarding the self from the environing, ordinary, experiencing of the lectern, the 
lectern could gradually to be regarded as wooden lectern, then as a wooden thing, then as 
a thing in general, and finally as “something” in general. It is important to note that one 
cannot arrive at the theoretical something in general without first having gone through all 
the preceding stages. The theoretical something is, as it were, level-bound. At the last 
stage the disappearance of any material content is complete; we are no longer dealing 
with anything in particular:  
It is absolutely worldless, world-alien; it is the sphere where one runs out 
of breath, where one cannot live.94 
In the second sense of the theoretical, however, anything that can be lived 
through or experienced can be considered to be “something” (Etwas), a formal 
something: the lectern is something, the wooden lectern is something, the wooden thing 
is something, the thing in general is something, even the theoretical “something in 
general” is something in this second sense: 
Whatever is in general lived through is a possible something, regardless of 
its world-character. The sense of something is precisely this: ‘whatever 
can be lived in general.’95 
The interesting thing about it is that it is not bound by any level of the process of de-
living or theorizing in the first sense.  I do not have to go through all or any of the levels 
of theorizing to be able to grasp the lectern as “something,” the wood thing as 
“something” etc. This formal something has thus a different origin than the theoretical 











something. The theoretical something is motivated by a gradual isolation of the 
significant thing from the world of familiar things and a concomitant focusing on the 
order and structure (material determination) of the realm to which the object belongs, 
while the formal something has its origin in what Heidegger calls “the pre-worldly 
something.96”  
Heidegger plays with two German nouns to help him build the case that there 
are two fundamentally different senses of the “theoretical”: a theoretical something, 
Objekt, and a formally theoretical something, Gegenstand. The theoretical object is the 
end result of the gradual process of de-living, while the formally theoretically object as 
Gegenstand is not bound by any such process. The object presupposes thus the vanishing 
or even “freezing” of the living character of the lived experience, the receding of the “es 
weltet” from the experience of a significant thing, the “absolute cancellation of the living 
relation.” The experience of a theoretical object is no longer “personal.” The formal 
objectualizationhas nothing to do with the theoretical sphere, that is, with the theoretical 
object in general. The formal object (Gegenstand) appears also to be devoid of any 
specific material determinations. Its lack of determinations, however, by no means 
identifies it with the theoretical something. In the next lectures Heidegger will give more 
details about the “theoretical something:” generalization, as distinct from formalization, 
is the cognitive procedure corresponding to the theoretical something. Just as the formal 
something is the correlate of a process of formalization, so too the theoretical something 
is the correlate of a process of generalization97. Generalization is possible only within a 
structurally stratified region of being, an immanently organized, internally classified 
region, where each level is so “set up” as referring to lower or upper level of objects with 
which it shares something in common, like in: Veronica is a woman, a human being, an 
animal, an organism, then a material composite etc. Generalization therefore makes sense 
only within a region of being, and depends essentially on the content specifications of the 
region itself. Generalization presupposes a materially organized and structured region and 
as a procedure consists in classifying an element into an organized whole. 
But how is this formal something motivated? When we say, “Veronica is an 







object,” we are obviously not moving within an internally ordered region of being like 
others: (biological) life, history, physical nature etc. What can account for its genesis? 
How can we explain it out, on the basis and in terms of, living itself? Heidegger’s answer 
is simple: this possibility of regarding anything as a formally theoretical something sends 
us back to life itself, to something going on long before we set out to understand these 
things: it is how life itself is lived: to live is to “be out (to)”, “to live out towards” 
(something). But this tendency towards something, life’s immanent tendency, “relating,” 
the relational aspect alone, can be to some extent abstracted from its embeddedness in a 
nexus of familiar things, relations etc., and regarded on its own, in isolation from the 
whole living situation: this is the genesis of the formal (still theoretical) something. It is 
the other pole of the relating aspect of living as such: it is the  “object” (Gegenstand)seen 
exclusively as that to which the tendency tends.  
The thrust into a world can be theoretically diverted before its coming to 
definite expression.  This is why the universality of the formal character of 
an object[Gegenstand] befits its origin in the in-itself of streaming living 
of life.98 
It is the object seen purely from the perspective of relating itself: any relating 
presupposes a relation to …  something, a “formal” something. It is theoretical in that it 
presupposes again the same abstraction of the self from the experience, or the reducing of 
the fully concretely existing I to an I in general. It is formal in the sense that it lacks 
material determinations. The formal something does not belong to any (material) realm of 
being. The object is not determined in accordance with its own content (Wasgehalt) but 
as that to which any relation has to relate itself necessarily, that is, formally.  The 
theoretical comportment stops, as it were, before it reaches the object, and “veers off” 
onto itself, determining that to which as a comportment it must necessarily and 
essentially relate as “an object in general,” a formal something.  
it regards the object from the side that it is seen; it is determined as 
grasped; as that to which the cognitive relation is directed.99 










The theoretical something as well as the formal something are distinct, 
however, from the lived something (erlebte Etwas), the something of living 
(Erlebbarkeit). This “something” is constitutive of life in and of itself. In a sense, life is 
this “tendency” towards “something,” genuinely towards a worldly something, and not 
towards an isolated content or isolated object, be it formal or not. This “something” is 
neither theoretical nor theoretically formal in nature. It is not even a worldly something: a 
lectern, a car etc. It is a pre-worldly something. In the middle of the night, I suddenly 
wake up and ask: “Did you hear something?” In my experiencing of this kind of 
something, specific ways in which it can show up are prescribed to it. According to 
Heidegger, our entire comportment towards this kind of “something” is different from 
our theoretical comportment towards either the formal or theoretical something.  It is 
“something” without material determinations but ready at the same time to take on a 
worldly character: “Ah, it was just the cat.” This categorically different “something” with 
its total lack of determinations is lived however in the manner of genuine, pre-theoretical 
living: the absence of worldly, and not material determinations matters to me, is 
significant to me: it is not justa theoretically formal category (something in general), or a 
theoretical abstraction, but a “worldly” (significant) lack of determinations. It is ready, in 
other words, to become a “worldly something” in the manner described above: lectern, 
cat, neighbor, car etc. This “something” is hence“pre-worldly:” something noticeable 
only in the rare situations in which familiar things lose the character of familiarity, appear 
“strange” all of the sudden, and are seen only in their capacity for becoming “familiar” 
worldly somethings yet again. This “something” understood as a pre-wordly something, 
or as das Erlebbare überhaupt, can be itself lived through understandingly if only in rare 
special situations. Heidegger names two of these special opportunities: in the moment of 
gliding from one living world into another, and in the moments of a particularly intense 
life. Otherwise it goes unnoticed.  
In this pre-worldly something as the genuine something of living there lies “the 
moment of ‘towards’, ‘in the direction to’, ‘into a concrete world’100”. And what is 








extremely important here is that the living of this pre-worldly something or the 
“something” of factic experience, as Heidegger will call it in the next lecture101, is not 
accompanied by the vanishing of the self from the living of it or the losing of the 
“familiar” or worldly character of genuine living as such. In other words, it does not lead 
to the “most radical ending of the facticaly lively and personal life-relation.102” In the 
living of the pre-worldly something there exists the possibility of experiencing 
“something” without the undesired consequence of losing the living character of the 
experience as such. In the living of the pre-worldly something the living as such, the 
living experience is preserved in its utmost concreteness and genuineness, but only in 
accordance with that which enables the experience to “anticipate” the fully concrete, 
ordinary experience of a worldly something. The pre-worldly something is the “index for 
the supreme potentiality of life.103” It is, as it were, the reminder that our life, the world 
as we live it, is just a way in which life can be lived, a way in which life can take the 
form of the world in which we live de facto. That our factical life is a way in which life 
can come to expression does not render our, or any other, “form of life” contingent. It 
only means that the world as we live itconcretely is a way in which life becomes what it 
can be. By having discovered the “pre-worldly something” as the “index for the supreme 
potentiality of life” Heidegger will now have to develop a new understanding of “how 
life is lived,” “the world as is lived,” of “factical life,” as everything now depends on how 
he conceives of “life” itself as the expression of a certain “potentiality.” 
In the Objekt-experience (theoretical something), the significance characteristic 
of a genuine lived experience is no longer there; likewise in the Gegenstand-experience 
(formal something). In the pre-worldly something the significance is not yet there, the “it 
worlds”–aspect of the environing lived experience is not yet there, but is “life full” 
nevertheless. It is now understandable why Heidegger avoids assimilatingErlebnis – 
always conceived of as genuine living (events of coming into one’s own, the self’s 
unique being there somehow, it worlds, things as significant things within a meaningful 










context), and never as Husserl apparently did as a “mental, inner, private event104” - to 
eitherObjekt orGegenstand. According to him, even if anything at all qualifies formally 
as Etwas, a formal object in general, the genuine living of something is not appropriately 
described by such a formal characterization. A more appropriate characterization would 
be to say, according to him, that it is a phenomenon, here in the sense of something lived 
through. It is “lived through” [erlebt] in the sense that it is only in the performance of it, 
in the living of it, and by no means in the sense that it is the explicit focus of our living. A 
phenomenon is obviously something, but such a statement does not say much about what 
makes Erlebnis unique as a living-lived “something.”Erlebnis as a phenomenon is lived 
through without being the intentional object of our experiences. As the pre-wordly 
something it is that which enables the showing up of the intentional objects of our 
experience: lectern, books, etc. in that these intentional objects are specific ways or 
expressions in which life encounters itself in and as worldly objects. As we will see 
shortly, the pre-worldly something cannot become directly “explicit” without us falling 
back on theorizing.  
What Heidegger discovers here is that the significant things of our world as 
experienced by self in its ordinary (non-theoretical) experiences are themselves a 
determinate manner in which a pre-worldly “something” gets articulated. In other words, 
in the living of something he discovers an intentionality more basic than the one 
operative in perception and cognition. The objects of perception and cognition are 
themselves expressions of a more fundamental intentionality, or motivations, as 
Heidegger puts it at this time. They are determinate ways in which the pre-worldly 
something can come to full expression, ways in which lifes encounters itself. Anything in 
life is “motivated.” The pre-worldly, living and lived-through something is not an object 
but itself identical with the “motivational process of life.105” This fundamental 
intentionality/motivation, however, unlike Husserl’s intentionality, stands in much closer 
relation to the “appropriation” character of lived experience. It is the intentionality as the 
fundamental characteristic a “personal life:” 









The events [of coming into one’s own] ‘happen to me.’ Motivation is the 
basic form of the nexus of life.106 
There is no coincidence that Heidegger prefers MotivationoverIntentionalität as 
he tries incessantly to keep to and never lose sight of the “personal” character of any act 
of living. Unlike Intentionalität which can, as we know from Husserl, be the fundamental 
mark of a “transcendental consciousness,” impersonal through and through, Motivation 
indicates that whatever the object of experience is, it itself is nothing but a way in which 
life, always “personal,” encounters itself. The lived experience is always the living of 
something107. Equally importantly, in addition to the immanent tendency toward an 
object, the lived experience is equally characterized by a motivation orienting it toward 
an object. Erlebnis is not a mere relation between a self and a possible, self-subsisting 
object. Erlebnis is an Er-eignis, an event of appropriation (proper-ization): whatever I 
experience is always significant to me somehow, a way in which a motivation comes to 
realization, which only means that things are always experienced in light of my own 
expectations, past experiences, acquired knowledge, in short, my possibilities.  
The Ur-character of ‘something in general’ is the Ur-character of life in 
general: namely that life in itself is motivational and has tendency; 
motivational tendency and tendentional motivation: the fundamental 
character of life, to live onto something, to become a world in certain 
worlds of living. The index for it lies in ‘something’.108 
The significance (Bedeutsame) has thus a wholesale character in the sense that 
it does not operate, as it were, on an individual basis, but rather holistically: es weltet - it 
affects anything and everything I have encountered or will ever encounter (in the modus 
of “I know what to do with it”).  
According to Heidegger philosophy as a pre-theoretical science can only be 















possible as a methodical and systematic “following” (accompanying or partaking of) 
(mitgehen) the immanent motivation and tendency inherent in the living of the pre-
worldly something as a “motivational process.” It is possible, in other words, as some 
sort of intuiting of life’s motivation to become (or mature) itself into a world, in its 
motivational tendency towards a world, in other words, before it becomes fully immersed 
in, settles down as and is absorbed by worldly somethings (cars, lectures etc.) In my own 
words, it is an intensified re-living of life’s own “need” to settle down, as it were, in and 
as a world of familiar things, people and situations, which begins with the insight that the 
world as is lived is but a way to fulfill this need. This intuition is not objectifying because 
the pre-worldly something is not an object, neither theoretical (Objekt) nor formal 
(Gegenstand). This “partaking” is not objectifying or reifying as long as it limits itself to 
following the “motivation” inherent in life’s tendency towards a world, and not the full-
blossomed worldly “something” resulted from life’s having already established itself in 
and as a world. In the way in which a worldly something is concretely, facticaly, that is, 
non-theoretically experienced, the phenomenological intuition wants to regain access to 
the immanent motives that have configured, and thus are still figuring in, this concrete 
experience of a worldly something in so far as it is an living, personalexperience 
(Erlebnis) after all. The phenomenological intuition attempts to grasp the worldly 
something “in the making,” as it were, to “relive” the motivations and tendencies 
inherent, configuring, leading to, and at work in our experience of it, and see how it has 
become to be what it is in our experiencing of it.  The worldly something is, in a sense, a 
result, an “expression” or “manifestation”: it “is” = it “has been encountered as”. Better 
yet, and to avoid the misleading suggestion that something becomes what it is in various 
stages, our worldly experiences are “phenomena,” expressions of various ways in which 
life itself fulfills its own motivations in the very manners in which it encounters and 
comprehends its objects already, before adopting any cognitive stance. Any thing, any 
(worldly) something, can be seen as an “expression” of a certain way in which life is 
lived, in which “we” can experience things. Things are what they are as fulfillments of 
certain sense-possibilities. The pre-worldly something is Heidegger’s condition of 
possibility for seeing how something can be (is to be) experienced by us, better yet, can 





The intuition catches life, as it were, in its orientation towards a world of 
significant things. The language employed by such a pre-theoretical science is not 
objectifying since the meanings of the words and expressions are not to be identified with 
their objective, thing-like references. The meanings of words have a “worldly” function 
in the sense that they do not refer to an object of some sort, but rather give expression to 
how the experiencing orients itself motivationally and a priori109 towards something, or 
to how life itself orients itself a priori towards becoming established in and as a world:  
They express life in its motivated tendency, resp. its tendentional 
motivation.110 
The meanings therefore have the essential peculiarity of expressing 
Ereignischaraktere111. It gives expression to the motivational tendency of the living act 
(Erlebnis) to be the living of … something.  This “partaking” of how life becomes 
motivationally the world in which it lives is what Heidegger calls “phenomenological 
intuition:  
The phenomenological intuition as the living of the living112. 
Attentive immersion in and partaking of the experiencing itself in its dependency on, and 
motivated orientation towards, something - this is what Heidegger means by the “living of 
living” as phenomenological intuition. In ordinary life (when life has established itself in 
and as a world of interconnected significant things), we are fully immersed in, and 
absorbed by, the intentional object of a worldly character. The living as such in its 
tendency and motivation makes way to, and retreats before, the worldly something which 
now captures our attention completely. Therefore, the motivational aspect and that which 
is motivated are not explicitly given in such a situation. 
As a result, the most appropriate method of the science of living is for 
Heidegger the phenomenological intuition conceived of as the living of living itself, and 
not description, as was for Husserl in the first edition of his Logical Investigations.  












Description always presupposes the givenness or the presence of the object described 
which allows thus for a separation between the object to be described and (the method of) 
description as such. The object must be given prior to, and independent from, the act of 
description113. This entails that description always comes too late on the scene, after the 
object has somehow come to be given. In the case of phenomenological intuition that 
which it intuits is not given prior to the act of intuiting, but along with and in it114. This 
might explain why, according to Heidegger, phenomenological intuition is not a simple, 
neutral registering of the living in its a priori motivated tendency towards a world (there 
is nothing prior to the phenomenological intuition), simply given prior to, and 
independent from, intuition, but an attempt at making sense of it, making it speak, 
making it explain itself.  
The phenomenological intuition as the living of living, life’s 
comprehension, is hermeneutical intuition (making intelligible, sense-
giving).115 
Life is thus intelligible or graspable, comprehensible (verstehbar) in and of 
itself (which by no means amounts to saying that life is rational), as long as it is 
comprehended in its immanent motivated tendency towards a worldly something, and 
phenomenology is nothing but the investigation of life in itself116. It is, in a sense, itself 
the experience of the very “need,” fundamental to life, to find its own fulfillment in the 
very way in which it encounters itself in dealing with ordinary things and situations.  This 
explains Heidegger’s penchant for the ordinary aspect of life, for the everydayness of life, 
and his reluctance to see in limit-situations, like Descartes’ thought experiment of 
hyperbolic doubt, or Husserl’s description of perceptual experiences, paradigms of how 
life is lived. 
All these programmatic ideas are clearly in need of further elaboration. 










Erlebnis, Situation and Ereignis 
In the next semester, the summer of 1919, Heidegger expands very briefly his 
views on living experiences and introduces a new concept, Situation: the lived 
experiences are necessarily and immanently united into what he now calls a situation.  
Situation is a certain unity in natural living.117 
An example of a situation is, according to Heidegger, the objects on my desk, or the 
climbing of a mountain to see the sunset, or the Fall semester. It is a unity not of static 
moments, but of Ereignisse: the seeing the clouds, the mountaintops, the sun, the forest, 
the listening to the words of your companions, the eating together with them etc. 
However, the mountain I have just climbed cannot be seen when standing on top of it. A 
situation is not genuinely a process that can be observed in the same way in which natural 
events can be observed and analyzed. A situation is an event of an unique kind: it is ein 
Ereignis. I am essentially involved in what is going on118 without being myself the object 
of a conscious reflection or awareness. The self does not stand out in the situation. The 
self merely “swims” in the situation without having a noticeable presence: the “I” is 
essentially a situational I (Situations-Ich).  
Each situation “contains” various Erlebnisse. The situation brings the lived 
experiences into a certain unity (Einheit). As belonging to the same situation, the 
experiences have a certain “tendency” or “motivation” in common. Motivation is “the 
fundamental form of the nexus of life.” As being motivated and somehow oriented, any 
situation opens up a horizon of expectations. A situation is by its own nature “open.119” 
The vanishing of the situation amounts to a disappearance of the “sense” all experiences 
had in common thanks to their belonging to the same situation. When the “unity of a 
situation” vanishes, it changes the experience as a whole (die ganze Erlebnissphäre) as it 
results in the vanishing of the “unity of sense” which all lived experiences had in that 
situation. Upon the vanishing of the situation, that which is lived retains a new identity, 










allowing for a new and different way of relating objects in isolation (objectuality). This 
identity, however, is not longer situational120. Or, it is a new type of situation 
characterized by a categorically different kind of intentionality (theoretical attitude); 
however, what is experienced, das Gelebte, is there “in a different sense.” In such a case, 
the lived experiences lose the unity the situation gave them. The situational I recedes into 
the background, which for Heidegger amounts to the self’s losing the historical character. 
Each Erlebnis can, according to Heidegger, undergo this modification from 
Situationserlebnis to “merely being-oriented toward.” 
Situations can interpenetrate each other. Life experience is defined as a 
continuously changing nexus of situations or Motivationsmöglichkeiten (motivational 
possibilities).  Heideggerdoes not offer any specific details except to say that any 
situation “lasts,” and “durations” (Dauern) of various situations are again intertwined 
with one another just as situations themselves are. For reasons that will become clear in 
the next chapter let me point out that for Heidegger this Dauer intrinsic of any situation 
accounts somehow – again Heidegger is very skimpy on details - for the self’s inherent 
“historicality:” 
Each situation has a ‘duration’. The particular ‘durations’ specific to 
different situations interpenetrate each other… The I is itself situational-I; 
the I is histor»ic«.121 
Despite the scarcity of details, I can relatively easily notice a certain ambiguity 
in the way in which Heidegger defines  “situation.” On the one hand, a situation contains, 
as he himself puts it, Ereignisse that happen to me122. Furthermore, each situation “has” 
Erlebnisse pervaded by the same “sense” (Sinn). Situations can vanish. Their vanishing 
amounts to Erlebnisse losing “the unity which the situation gave them.” The unity of a 
situation appears to be nothing else than the unity of Erlebnisse in the situation. Each 
Erlebnis can undergo this modification. Situations interpenetrate each other. Life 
experience, as I already pointed it out, is a nexus of situations, always changing. On the 
other hand, though, a situation is ein Ereignis, and no longer containing more Ereignisse. 










It is eine gewisse Einheit im Erleben (unity in living), an Erlebenseinheit (unit of living). 
Heidegger even employs the relatively awkward expression “jedes Erleben123“ leaving 
the door open to interpreting him as suggesting that Erlebnis and (ein) Erleben are one 
and the same. Few other passages lend credence to this interpretation. Consider, for 
example, how Heidegger accounts for the necessity of a constant renewal of the 
theoretical attitude out of the natural one:  
This Erlebnis [of renewal, my note] can be taken as the core of a new 
situation, it ultimately determines thereby a nexus as situation 
(Situationszusammenhang), a nexus of life.124 
Or consider how he defines the historical I in terms not only of the (constantly 
interpenetrating) durations pertaining to various situations, - situational I is historical I -, 
but also as Erlebniszusammenhang: when the “unity in living” is seen from the side of 
Erlebnisse being lived – gelebte Erlebnisse – , and not from the side of the possible 
connections between that which is lived – gelebte Gehalte -, the nexus appears as 
“historical I,” as life experience:   
That which is lived depends on motives that are in turn functionally 
dependant on what has happened. It is die Erlebniszusammenhang that 
forms the historical I.125 
On such interpretation, Erlebnis is nothing but eine Einheit im Erleben, that is, a 
situation. But at this point, Heidegger is not wiling to go as far as to draw this conclusion 
explicitly. Experiences are “in” situations, situations “have” experiences, and experiences 
are of situations. He makes use sometimes of a conception of Erlebnis reminiscent of 
Husserl and Dilthey. Although he sometimes uses the term Erlebnis in the plural, 
suggesting thus that the many lived experiences form somehow life in its totality, or at 
least, a situation, which in turn “forms” life experience by its nexus with other situations, 
other times Heidegger also mentions some paradigmatic Erlebnisse, like for example 
Umwelterlebnis,in such a way as to suggest that Erlebnis is more, or even something else, 












than one discreet, numerically unique, experience, standing in some essential relation 
(nexus) with other, numerically distinct, lived experiences. It is an “articulation of life as 
a whole,” and not merely a frozen, as it were, moment of life. When I will get to 
Heidegger’s critique of Dilthey we will see how important this “ambiguity” or “tension” 
in Heidegger’s conception of Erlebnis will turn out to be. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that Heidegger is first and foremost interested in bringing to 
systematic transparency what it means to be alive, what Erlebnis is all about, to 
experience life, to live through, where Erlebnis is seen as the ultimate and irreducible 
source of intelligibility, of “spirit,” the last recourse of any attempt at understanding 
anything. All philosophical questions and problems, like all questions and problems in 
general, arise out of this ultimate level of Erlebnis and could only be adequately 
addressed by going back to it as its source. Philosophy itself is made possible and 
facilitated by specific contexts originating in life itself.  
Erlebnis, as Heidegger understands it in 1919, has an inherent performative 
dimension in the sense that its proper understanding can only come about out, as a result 
of, and as its performing, carrying out: 
The being of life, of lived experiences, is not the occurring (Vorkommen), 
but effectuation (Vollzug).126 
It means carrying out a certain manner of being with, towards, in relation, out to, etc. 
something. In other words, the living of something can only be understood through and 
by “having” it, living it, through the experience of life.  Erlebnis is also essentially, first 
and foremost, an experience of life (Lebenserfahrung) in its twofold meaning: the 
experience of life in the sense that it is life itself that has an experience, goes as it were 
out of itself towards some content, and also an experience of life in the sense that life 
itself is somehow experienced, lived through, manifests itself, makes itself known in 
having an experience of something: I have an experience of… and I experience myself. 
Erlebnis is thus the event in and as which I come to experience something as I experience 






myself in that experiencing. The living is the event in which I live my own self, as it 
were, in living something through. The experiencing self and that which is experienced 
are by no means two separable items that are brought together in the higher unity of 
Erlebnis. Erlebnis as Ereignis is precisely this event where the living self is living 
precisely by living itself out in living something (“live” as a transitive verb). 
 As such it would come as no surprise to see Heidegger abandoning to some 
extent using the term Erlebnis and using more often the term Lebenserfahrung. What 
Heidegger says about philosophy, namely that it can only be made clear out of and in the 
act of philosophizing itself, is all the more applicable to life and the understanding of life: 
life can only be made transparent through life. Differently put, understanding life requires 
being alive, in the sense that the ultimate motivation of life has to be available somehow, 
and not suppressed, at the moment of understanding life.  No reflection on life alone will 
ever be able to seize it in its living character. Reflection as lived experience strips itself of 
the living character and already changes the “sense” of anything it encounters as 
reflection: reflection has only objects before it. The pre-theoretical living, by contrast, 
does not experience objects, but a context of familiar or significant things. The pre-
theoretical Erlebnis, that is, die umweltliche Erlebnis or Umwelterlebnis, encounters 
objects as telling significant, even relevant, “things” appropriated by the self and 
belonging essentially to a familiar context of such familiar or significant “things.” The 
theoretical Erlebnis, by contrast, severs the self from any pre-given relation to its object, 
and abstracts the object itself from the familiar context out of and in which the object has 
been originally found. The only relation to the object left to the I is the cognitive relation: 
the self merely wants to know the object purely, that is, as the object is in itself, separated 
from any pre-cognitive relation to the I, to any I. Objects, however, are not originarily or 
genuinely given in theoretical lived experiences. The theoretical lived experience with its 
corresponding attitude is derived from a pre-theoretical living, from the environing lived 
experience. A specific modification of the environing lived experience is necessary in 
order for the theoretical lived experience to emerge. In order to understand this kind of 
living one has first to “submerge” in it, go along with it, (re-)live it. If the theoretical 
experience can be accounted for by going back to its source, as it were, to the 





than itself. It is the very “having of it” (living it – the living) that makes possible an 
access to it. Obviously, the having of it is essentially different from “reflecting on” it. 
Reflection, in a sense, comes always too late. In reflection I always make the discovery 
that I have already been there before I even started reflecting on my lived experiences. 
The environing lived experience is thus a self-experience of life itself. It is not genuinely 
an object, either formal or theoretical object. It is an “expression” of the ways in which 
things can present themselves as belonging inextricably to a context of familiar things, to 
a self only in the self’s dealings with them. It is an “expression” of life as a whole. It is a 
phenomenon.  
Crucial to Heidegger’s attempts to ground philosophy anew is his claim that 
there is something going on in the very act of living, in the very experience of life, in the 
very living of life that gets lost once one tries to reflect on it from a theoretical 
perspective. In other words, Heidegger more or less directly implies that there is a 
significant gap, in need of further phenomenological elaboration, between how I find 
myself in living and how I reflect on myself as living. The facticity of life (the 
manifestation of life’s “supreme potentionality,” the world as realized potentionality or as 
motivated) to which Heidegger will as of now constantly point to and discuss should be 
understood in this context as designating Heidegger’s attempt to capture the “living” or 
“personal” character of Erlebnis, the way in which life encounters itself in and as the 
worldly experience, the self-experience dimension of life-experience itself:I have always 
already somehow experienced myself before I could even come to reflect upon me and 
realize that I am the one having the experience. I know myself somehow, as it were, long 
before I have expressly and deliberately come to reflect on myself, and the manner in 
which I have already found myself is different from the manner in which I find myself 
when reflecting on myself.  Importantly, this self-finding has its own way of 
understanding (umweltliches Verstehen) which is in no way the same as, or even similar 
with, the theoretical reflection.  
In some notes Heidegger wrote for a projected course in 1918/19, he inserts a 
paragraph from one of Adolph Reinach’ books, which is, I believe, very useful in 
shedding light on his interpretation of life in this period:  





participate in this lived relationship, the relation does not lie before me, on 
the contrary, I myself live myself through in this relationship, which 
obviously cannot have an object-character... Thus there immediately 
emerges a distinction: in perception I come through the reflection on it to 
the knowledge that ‘I perceive it.’ In living the dependency through, I find 
myself dependent without the reflection that could lead to the realization 
that I myself could feel dependent.127 
Heidegger’s philosophical preoccupations from now on will be exclusively 
devoted to exploring methodically this dimension of having-(comprehensibly)-found-
myself of my life-experience itself: the facticity of life, one’s own world as life’s way of 
fulfilling its inherent motivations. In the terminology of these first three lectures from 
1919 the focus of philosophical endeavors must be on the life in its living character. It 
would not be, I believe, an exaggeration to claim that Heidegger’s subsequent philosophy 
is largely the development of the insights contained in his conception of the living of 
something arrived at in this first lecture:  
after all it is somehow my living. I am there, I am living it through, it 
belongs to my life…128 
and 
It is only in the resonance of the I that something in the environing world 
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Chapter Three: From Erlebnis to Lebenserfahrung 
Introduction 
As expected, Heidegger will not simply abandon the ideas broached in these 
first lectures and start with fresh new ideas. He will continue to work on a “science of 
lived experiences” by building upon the insights and conclusions he already arrived at in 
these first lectures. In the lectures given between late 1919 and 1921 we find him 
preoccupied with the same philosophical problems and continuing to work on the same 
solutions he offered here. And he will continue to critically demolish all previous 
philosophical conceptions of Leben and Erlebnis. But, as Derrida so nicely put it,  
Heidegger’s unceasing effort to discredit Lebensphilosophie suggests that 
the question of life disturbs almost all of his analysis and conceptual 
distinctions.130 
It is precisely in the context of the phenomenology of life that Heidegger will 
develop most (if not all) of the fundamental ideas that will later enter into the 
construction of Sein und Zeit. The aim of this second chapter is twofold: 1. to show that 
and how Erlebnis will be gradually replaced by Lebenserfahrung (life experience), and 
that this move coincides with another move from Leben to Dasein - where Dasein should 
not be conceived of in traditional terms as mere existence, or reality, but rather along the 
lines described earlier, as the unique way in which the self is “there” in experiencing a 
world. It is precisely in the context of this development that Heidegger comes to use life 
and Dasein as synonyms until, in the years after 1922, he will eventually abandon life as 
an appropriate philosophical term in favor of Dasein completely; and 
2. to substantiate the claim that Heidegger develops from within the context of 
a life phenomenology some fundamental concepts without which Sein und Zeit would not 
have been possible, concepts like Dasein, existence¸ the concept of formal indication,  
different meanings of being, and many others. Of course, I will try to show that 
Heidegger develops all these fundamental concepts in the absence of any question of the 
meaning of being, as he will understand it several years later, and also that it is very 
doubtful to even advance the claim that the question of the sense of being is “implicit,” 







operating, as it were, in the background of Heidegger’s philosophical investigations. I 
will try to show that any ontological questions – not necessarily the full-blown question 
of the sense of being from Sein und Zeit – not only arise from Heidegger’s constant 
preoccupation with life, but as a matter of fact, are entirely depend on it. The first thing 
that has to be said in this context is that Heidegger appears early on to be fully aware of 
the distinction between beings (Seiende) and being (Sein). In a lecture from 1919, when 
he criticizes Rickert for not having had a clear insight into how the research into Erlebnis 
is to be properly conducted131, and takes issue with Rickert’s interpretation of the content 
of judgment as “unreal transcendent sense” insofar as it is independent from the mental 
act in which the judgment is performed, Heidegger continues by saying: 
Should the sense be taken to be an entity or something that exists? The 
entity is after all what its being says it is; this is nowhere clarified.132 
and then continues 
Sense is therefore by no means to be interpreted as an entity, as something 
that exists, and should not be assigned to the domain of being, unless of 
course we indiscriminately regard anything that can be thought of in 
general as a being; in this case, even sense would be an entity.133 
This awareness on Heidegger’s part of the distinction between Sein and Seienden, and its 
crucial but unresolved significance for Rickert’s philosophy, coupled with his 
determination not to embark upon it in a clear and decisive manner, is only an indication 
that the distinction might not be all that important for Heidegger at this time after all.  
The main claim is that it is precisely the fine-tuned phenomenological 
interpretation of factic life that ultimately draws Heidegger near to employing new terms 
like Dasein and existence, understood of course in a new, non-traditional sense. These 
new terms are not meant, not in this context anyway, to supplant the life problematic 
already in full play in the first lectures. On the contrary, they are all meant to clarify, to 













bring up new and important distinctionswithin, the phenomenology of life, distinctions 
that would otherwise remain undetected. But it is factic life, and by no means being or 
anything else for that matter, which requires, according to Heidegger, a more fine-tuned 
approach and subsequently a terminology that might leave the misleading impression that 
the problematic of life is increasingly abandoned. I will defend this claim in more details 
in the course of this chapter, but by way of anticipation let me just say that the clear 
indication that the terms which will later find naturally their place in the so-called 
language of being (Dasein, existence, facticity, fallenness, ready-at-hand, Bedeutsamkeit, 
Vorhandenheit etc.) not only emerge out of Heidegger’s analysis of factic life, but they 
continue to retain an essential relation to factic life (for example, the category of having-
found-myself in my worldly experiences will turn out to be the facticity of Dasein in Sein 
und Zeit) as Heidegger understands it in 1919-1920 even long after he abandons life as 
the fundamental topic of philosophy. 
For my purposes it is no longer important for us to focus on each individual 
lecture Heidegger gave in the period 1919 and 1921. I will instead follow some key 
philosophical terms as they are used and defined by him in this period. 
 
From Erlebnis to Lebenserfahrung 
As was, I hope, apparent from the first Freiburg lecture Heidegger gave in 
1919, life and living always meant for Heidegger human life, our lived experiences. The 
remark is significant for it indicates that Heidegger has never been preoccupied with life 
in general, as it pertains to all living beings, of all kinds. Questions regarding the very 
possibility of philosophy have apparently made it necessary that he put our life in the 
center of investigation. At the same time, we should avoid the mistake of assuming that 
Heidegger is here restricting his attention to just one way of living, namely human life, 
and ignores thereby, or simply leaves aside, other equally important kinds of life. If we do 
philosophy, Heidegger appears to reason, then philosophy has to be understood as a 
possibility grounded in our life. As we will see time and again, life and philosophy are 
always for Heidegger deeply intertwined: one cannot be understood without the other. It 





possibility, one, perhaps very important, of our possibilities.  We should never lose sight 
of the fact that by life Heidegger always means our life, and not biological, or animal life.  
And our living is characterized by an intelligible, transparent self-giveness or “presence” 
(dabei) of the self in the its own living of a worldly something. 
From late 1919 and early 1920 on, Heidegger will come to favor “life” 
(Leben)over “the living of…” (Erlebnis). “Life” moves clearly and explicitly in the 
center of his investigations. The domain of philosophy is life in and of itself. 
Phenomenology is the attempt to grasp how life itself experiences itself134. 
Phenomenology is all about finding the way or ways in which life is being lived in its 
own fashion. Erlebnis, as a term, increasingly disappears from Heidegger’s vocabulary. 
For our purposes it is important to understand the reasons behind Heidegger’s decision to 
not use the term Erlebnis any more.  
Heidegger is aware that there is distinction between Leben and Erlebnis.  When 
he criticizes psychology for its mistaken conception of Erlebnis as a mental process, he 
accuses it of not rigorously distinguishing between Leben and Erleben135. He accuses 
psychology of borrowing its own concepts of life and living not from life as is lived but 
from life as is theoretically reflected upon, that is, from an objectifying conception of life. 
According to him, psychology operates with a concept of Erlebnis that is possible only 
on the basis of the cancelling of the “living life.136” Psychology loses thereby any 
possibility of understanding what Erlebnis is genuinely. Not even phenomenology has 
any chances of success unless it first clarifies this important philosophical distinction 
between Leben and Erlebnis:  
It is necessary thus to determine the concept of living [Erleben]. We 
cannot stay content with the alternative: objects – lived experiences 
[Erlebnisse]… But how are we to understand the nexus of lived 
experiences? What is the relation between living and life? Do living and 
life coincide? Do they have different meanings?137.  
If they are not identical, then their relation becomes a problem, even a 









fundamental problem of phenomenology138. A clarification of the concept of living is 
also crucial for shedding light on the formation process of philosophical concepts:  
Can I ask, what role can Erlebnisse play in the formation of 
phenomenological concepts if I have not defined them in their basic 
sense?139 
An elucidation of Erlebnisse appears therefore to be absolutely necessary:  
We do not yet have any concept of ‘Erlebnis’. We want to define it 
precisely in a truly radical way140.  
The problem, however, is that such clarification seems to be missing from the 
extant published material. Some notes written in 1919 bearing the title Leben, mentioned 
in GA 58 and which might have had a significant bearing on how Heidegger himself sees 
this relation, have been lost. The task of elucidating this distinction seems thus to be left 
to us, the readers of Heidegger. We have two ways to come closer to understanding how 
he conceives of this “relation”. One way is to pay closer attention to those passages 
where such a relation, or the lack thereof, is clearly alluded to. The other way is to review 
Heidegger’s critique of those philosophical positions that, in his view, have mistaken 
Erlebnis for something it is not (for example, for a “mental process” or an “irrational” 
event bound to be forever beyond the jurisdiction of rational activity).  I will follow both 
these leads only to the point where it becomes satisfactorily clear – to the extent possible 
– how Heidegger viewed this relation and why Erlebnis comes into disfavor.  
 
The concept of “Erlebnis” as emerging from Heidegger’s critique of 
contemporary philosophies of life 
In a lecture given in the summer semester of 1920, Phenomenology of intuition 
and expression (GA 59), Heidegger devotes a great deal of time to criticize the two major 
conceptions of Erlebnis attendant on two approaches to life, and dominating the 
contemporary philosophical landscape of his time: on the one hand, the conception of life 
as manifesting, objectifying, and, on the other hand, life as a multiplicity of 








experiences141. These two approaches find their expressions and are fully developed in 
the philosophies of Dilthey and Natorp, respectively.  
For Dilthey anything there is is a priori regarded as an expression of life; for 
Natorp, life itself is a priori viewed as a rational activity playing off an irrationality lying 
at its very core. In both cases, life figures as the fundamental phenomenon that solely 
represents the main focus of all philosophical investigations. Leben is the fundamental 
phenomenon of philosophy, of any philosophy. As a matter of fact, it is Leben as 
Urphänomen that represents for Heidegger the defining mark of the philosophies of his 
time. It is noteworthy that for Heidegger both conceptions of philosophy have in point of 
fact the same goal: to get to the “concrete actual Dasein” or “the actuality of life”142. It 
would be no exaggeration to claim that Heidegger himself had become preoccupied 
philosophically with “life” as a result of his being embedded in the most influential 
philosophical trends of his time. And since philosophy then took life to be the “basic 
phenomenon” under investigation, it only seemed natural to him to begin his 
philosophical career by bringing his own contribution to this research program. But, as I 
will try to make the case, the “first” topic is, for Heidegger, also the last.  
 
Heidegger’s critique of Natorp 
In Heidegger’s view, Natorp conceives Erlebnis only from the side of that 
which is lived through, das Erlebte.  This Erlebte is, in turn, regarded as being mere 
subjectivityout of which an objective object can emerge. The subjective is subjective only 
relative to the objectivity emerging from it. Das Erlebte is not the object as such, as the 
object is presented via that which is lived through, via subjectivity. The object itself can 
become subjective, something merely lived through, or an appearance, and become thus a 
new occasion to conceive of a new object. The problem that arises here concerns 
obviously the proper way of presenting this subjectivity, in other words, the problem is to 
“reproduce the complete concretion of that which is lived through.”  
 Following on Kant’s footsteps, the proponents of this conception of life view 







consciousness as the constant activity of determining the subjective, sensible experience 
into an objective, organized experience.  Scientific, objective knowledge can only come 
into play when consciousness has been able to configure (form or categorically 
determine) the unformed, undetermined raw material it has experienced via sensibility, 
by somehow in-forming the unformed material with its own forms (Kantian categories). 
Whatever is lived through, experienced but incapable of being appropriated by 
consciousness remains merely lived-through, but not known. Erlebnis in this context 
takes on a specific meaning: it refers to that which is experienced through sensibility but 
remains “categorially unformed,” “untouched theoretically”, utterly subjective, to that 
which is directly, simply and passively lived through143. As such Erlebnis is irrational 
since the very conditions under which a meaningful discourse about it is possible are not 
being met. As a result, there emerges a tension between life understood as the rational 
activity of informing the unformed sensible material, in general, of structuring the lived-
through into an organized and cognizable totality (experience in Kantian sense), and life 
as Erlebnis, as the irrational, passive, purely receptive living or experiencing144. Life is 
regarded again as the “multiplicity” and “interconnectedness” of lived experiences145 in 
their twofold meaning.  
In Natorp’s terms, in order to be known the subjective must be determined 
objectively, that is, established in accordance with some universal “regulations” (logical 
laws of relating the multiplicity into a unity) of consciousness (Gesetzte). The lived 
experience in which something appears to the subject cannot be known directly. 
According to Natorp, there is no 
immediate access to the immediacy of psychic experience [Erlebnis]; it 
can only be approached by a [methodical] regression from its 
objectivations, which must therefore [first] be secured in their own purely 
objective justification.146 
The only way to arrive at an appropriate understanding of lived experience is 
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by way of “reconstruction”. We “go back” somehow from the objectification to the 
subjective by reconstructing the way in which the subjective has been objectified. To do 
so, we need to know “how” consciousness determines its objects. To be an object for 
consciousness is to be constituted in consciousness. Consciousness is the “unity of 
multiplicity”. Whatever is for consciousness “is” in consciousness in the same sense: 
consciousness knows only one sense of being: being constituted in the sense of being 
brought into the unity of consciousness147. The nexus of lived experiences can only be 
reconstructed by way of an understanding of the way in which the “universal logic of the 
object” operates. Ultimately, the “true life of the psyche can only reside in a 
supratemporal nexus (of primal thinking, or primal logic).148” Life in its concreteness is 
nowhere to be found.  
 
Heidegger’s critique of Dilthey 
In my view, we cannot overestimate Dilthey’s influence on Heidegger. I fully 
agree with Sharff’s finding that our appropriation of Heidegger has not so far paid due 
consideration to his appropriation of Dilthey. Even a cursory reading of Dilthey makes it 
fully clear that Heidegger took a lot from Dilthey’s conception of life. Since my purpose 
here is restricted to Heidegger’s critique of Dilthey’s conception of Erlebnis, I do not 
deem it necessary to go into a very detailed and thorough presentation and analysis of 
Dilthey’s philosophy of life, nor do I find it necessary to enter into a discussion of 
Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey. I will focus instead on those aspects only that 
reveal Dilthey’s take on the “relation” between life and lived experience, and how 
Heidegger critically interprets it149.  














 Dilthey wanted to arrive at an understanding of life from the standpoint of life 
itself.  For him natural sciences are the advanced expressions of the felt tendency 
originating in life itself to overcome resistance, to overcome nature. It is the expression of 
our tendency to conceive of nature in such a way as to make it controllable and 
predictable.  The human sciences, on the other hand, originate in a different “tendency” 
inherent in life. They are the mature development of life’s tendency towards a 
“thoughtfully enhanced self-awareness.150” “Life grasps here life.151” While natural 
sciences are possible only at the expense of bracketing or neutralizing “der Mensch 
selbst,” in other words, his lived experiences, from the cognitive experience of nature, the 
human sciences, by contrast, are born out of man’s “need” to understand himself, his life, 
his experiences in their living character. 
We take possession of this physical world insofar as we study its 
regulations. These regulations can be found only insofar as the living 
character of our impressions of nature, the nexus in which we stand 
inasmuch as we ourselves are nature, the lively feeling in which we enjoy 
nature, withdraws increasingly behind the abstract conception of nature 
built on the relations of space, time, mass, movement. All these moments 
work together so that man brackets himself in order to construct nature out 
of his own impressions, as a great object ordered by regulations.152 
Nature therefore cannot be understood; it remains forever “alien” to us. What 
we can understand is our “creations” and ourselves. This understanding not only is of life, 
but also comes from life. The human sciences are advanced ways in which life can 
develop from within itself an understanding of itself. Human sciences have one objective 
only: to provide a reliable cognition of the “concatenation of lived experiences in the 
human-historical-social world.153” The grounding of the human science consists in 
investigating the possibility of such understanding. Philosophy is coming to 















understanding how the human-historical-social world gets formed out of the lived 
experience of the past154. Through thinking we become aware of, realize what is that 
which we have lived through. Philosophy, however, is the supreme “energy of making 
aware.155” It seeks to complete the tendency of the human sciences to bring life’s 
manifestations to self-understanding by making explicit how life itself can become its 
own object of understanding. In a sense, its object is not life per se, but the very mode in 
which life becomes, from itself, an object for itself that she can now understand:   
It is the function of philosophy to bring to completion - in a way that 
brings together, generalizes, and legitimatizes – this scientific thoughtfully 
enhanced awareness of life.156 
Everything thus comes down to understanding how life can develop an 
understanding of itself from within itself. Life is “given in living and understanding.157” 
The lived experiences are what is immediately given158. Anything real, the world, is 
given in my living of it. What I live through presently is the only reality, as it were, 
accessible to me:  
The principle of Erlebnis [Erlebnissatz] says that anything which is there 
for us can be there for us only as given in the present. Even a past lived 
experience exists only insofar as is given in a present experience.159 
The present is always there, and whatever is appears only in it. Erlebnis, so 
Dilthey, is the very way in which reality is given to me160. The “filling” of my 
experiencing with reality goes uninterrupted while the content of my experience changes 
constantly.  
That which in the flow of time forms a unity in presence insofar as it has a 


















unitary meaning, can be designated as Erlebnis.161 
It could be understood, as Prof. Schatzki does, as “the smallest unit of presence 
in the flow of time with unitary meaning.162”. But, it is important to note that the fact that 
Erlebnis takes place in time, in other words, it is an occurrence in time163, should 
however not be construed as entailing that Erlebnis is a “smallest moment” in time, and 
life as the nexus of lived experiences is the somehow unified series of discreet intervals 
or durations in time. Erlebnis, according to Dilthey, can be any unityin time, not 
necessarily the smallest, with a unitary meaning: 
We then call Erlebnis every inclusive unity of parts of life related together 
through a common meaning to the course of life, even if the parts are 
separated from one another through interrupting processes. 
Erlebnisse are what they are only in, and as belonging to, a Zusammenhang 
(nexus) of Erlebnisse. The nexus is not superimposed on them, they are not forced to 
belong to it: the nexus gets formed “out of” the very way in which a lived experience 
occurs. Erlebnisse form indeed a “unity” in the flow of time, but the unity should not be 
construed as a temporal unity; the unity comes into being through meaning.  Via 
remembrance each Erlebnis is found to have a “meaning” in the whole of life, that is, is 
found to have a “relation” to the other Erlebnisse belonging to the “same” course of life.  
For life itself is there in this particular modus of relations of a whole to its 
parts… The category of meaning designates the relation of parts of life to 
a whole grounded in the essence of life.164 
However, life is not only the nexus of lived experiences, but, more importantly, 
some sort of a nexus in the presently lived experience. When I live something through I 
am necessarily, immanently, essentially taken back to the past and forward to the future. 
My presently lived experience can only make sense out of this being-carried-away 
(Fortgezogenwerden) back into the past and forward into the future.  Life is “determined 
through time.165” The question is, how?  
Dilthey had, in my opinion, two different interpretations of this relation and had 










accordingly two different conceptions of life. On the one hand, the future and the past are 
“related” to the present (Erlebnis) as past and future Erlebnisse. The past takes the form 
of another, only remembered,experience, temporally distinct from, but related via 
meaning to, the present one. The future takes the form of another, only possible or 
anticipated, experience to which the present refers.  
In the series that is thereby emerging, the past and the future, the possible 
transcend the moment filled by Erlebnis. They are however related to 
Erlebnis in the series that organizes itself into a whole via such relations. 
Anything past is - insofar as its remembrance entails reiterating its 
comprehension - as an illustration structurally related to a former Erlebnis. 
The future as a possibility is likewise related to the series via its own 
specific circle of possibilities.  In this way there emerges in this process 
the intuition of the mental nexus in time, which forms the course or life. In 
this course of life each particular Erlebnis is related to a whole.166 
Accordingly, life is a nexus of (present, past and future) lived experiences. 
They together form a “series.” Nevertheless the nexus of life should not be conceived of 
as a “sum” of Erlebnisse, nor as some “essence” common to moments which otherwise 
lie outside one another.  It is, as he himself puts it, “a unity constituted via relations, 
bringing all parts together.167” It is a “constituted unity.”  
On the other hand, however, the future and the past are, according to Dilthey, 
not “transcendent” in relation to the present, references rooted in, but sending beyond, the 
present, but “immanent” dimensions or moments of the present itself, of Erlebnis 
understood now as Erleben. On this second interpretation, the presentis “filled with pasts 



















and carries the future within itself.168”  Erlebnis is not only referring, or in relation, to the 
past and future experiences, but “comprising” (the German word used by Dilthey is 
umschließen) the past in remembrance and the future in imagination. The past and future 
are possibilities inherent in the present, and remaining in it, as it were. On this reading, 
history is no longer something separated off from life, detached from the present by a 
temporal distance169. Erlebnis now  
contains at the same time as reality the structural nexus of life; a spatio-
temporal localization which extends itself from the present and so on.170 
Life is there as a whole as possessed in Erlebnis. Erlebnis contains the nexus or 
whole of life within and understands itself – has its own Wissen - already as occupying a 
certain “place” in this whole. Not only life as a nexus of lived experiences, but the lived 
experience as well “is a unity whose parts are related through a common meaning.171” 
Only as an occurrence in or over time can life be understood in terms of parts-and-whole 
relation. Only as an occurrence in time can a particular Erlebnis be “understood,” that is, 
remembered or anticipated, as belonging to the nexus of life via its meaning or place in 
the nexus. If Erlebnis now comprises “everything there is” within it, then it itself is the 
“whole” with its own distinct dimensions and essential moments. On this interpretation it 
would no longer be appropriate to speak of Erlebnis in the plural: there is just one, das 
gegenwärtiges Erlebnis, the (continued) living of …. In other words, Erleben and 
Erlebnis would coincide: 
Erleben and Erlebnis are not partitioned off one another; they are two 
expressions for the same thing.172 
and 
The totality of our essence is in Erleben.173 
It is precisely this ambivalence on Dilthey’s part regarding the proper 














interpretation of Erlebnis, and life respectively, that Heidegger will take issue with. For 
Dilthey, life as a temporal event itself is, on the one hand, the nexus of Erlebnisse. On the 
other hand, though, life is a nexus (the remembered past and the anticipated future in the 
unity of the present) possessed or containedin Erlebnis174– we have to keep in mind that 
Erlebnis means for Dilthey present or actual lived experience (gegenwärtiges Erlebnis). 
Life thus can be understood as the nexus of lived experiences (plural) or as lived 
experience (singular) as such. It is not the place here to go into any more details, but it 
can be argued, I believe, that this ambiguity can be traced back to the different 
conceptions of time and life respectively arising from Erlebnis in der Zeit and 
Zeiterlebnis: life as an occurrence in time, and as such construed as the nexus of temporal 
lived experiences, and as Erlebnis out of, and in which, time is lived: life as a process in 
time and as time-living occurrence. 
When life is understood as the nexus “contained” in each lived experience, it 
comes to acquire characteristics not to be found in life as the nexus of lived experiences. 
Time, movement and wholeness are the fundamental categories of life understood as the 
nexus possessed in Erlebnis.  Nexus, structure and development are the fundamental 
categories of life understood as the nexus of temporal lived experiences175. Heidegger, as 
























prof. Schatzki rightly observed, will keep the first three categories and reject the last 
three. In other words, on our reading, he will reject the interpretation of life as the nexus 
of lived experiences (understood as a series of occurrences in time, series occurring itself 
in time), and keep to the interpretation of life as Erlebnis understood as a happening 
immanently possessing, and stretching over, the past and future: an historical happening. 
Life is not an occurrence in time, but an event of time, anhistorically lived event, it is 
how time comes to be, namely in and as Erlebnis (or Erleben). 
Erlebnis is a qualitative being = a reality impossible to define through 
reflexive awareness.176 
Heidegger’s critique of Dilthey can be summed up in the following claim: 
Dilthey’s conception of life as an effectuation nexus of lived experiences is not genuine, 
but the outcome of some hidden traditional epistemological commitments. According to 
Heidegger, Dilthey saw the phenomenon of life in its genuineness, that is, as a historical 
nexus livedalways as a whole, all at once, but he was (mis)guided by the epistemological 
problem of how to conceive of the whole of life in such a way as to securely account for 
its understanding. Life as the nexus of lived experiences is, according to Heidegger, 
Dilthey’s solution to this problem: in addition to whatever life is, it should also be 
regarded as accounting for the possibility of its own understanding. As a result, Dilthey 
ended up, according to Heidegger, overloading his genuine understanding of the nexus of 
life with two unwanted features: an excess of Intelektualität inherent in Erlebnis, and the 
idea that life is somehow a unity constituted in/over time, “ein Verlauf in der Zeit,” which 
via remembrancemakes possible the understanding of life as a nexus. According to 
Heidegger, Dilthey was right in pointing out that the self is always experiencing itself out 
of the totality of a situation, but he believed that Dilthey had an “intellectual177” 
conception of this nexus. Dilthey, Heidegger will write later, 
wants to get at the totality of the subject which experiences the world and 
not to a bloodless thinking thing which merely intends and theoretically 










thinks the world,178 
but wants to do it, however, with a theoretical purpose in mind, with the 
intention of arriving at an “ultimate understanding.” 
(With some qualifications, I can even agree with Vetter’s assessment of 
Heidegger’s critique of Dilthey. According to Vetter, Heidegger had a deeply ambiguous 
relation to Dilthey: although he fully embraced the “theme” of Dilthey’s philosophy, 
namely the “historicity of life,” he fully rejected Dilthey’s method of addressing it179.) 
In other words, Dilthey’s epistemological concern with life finds its expression 
in his attempt to understand how lived experiences are so related that an understanding of 
life becomes possible in the first place. His answer was: the nexus of life is an 
effectuation nexus, has an historical character, is something that understands itself as a 
nexus only in time, through the passage of time. Accordingly, Dilthey, so Heidegger, has 
slipped into a non-genuine understanding of life.  Life is not longer seen as occurring all 
at once, in its wholeness in each and every moment, and experiencing itself as a whole in 
each and every experience of something (Erlebnis) but something that can come to 
understanding itself as a nexus only by appropriating past experiences, via remembrance, 
as its own “expressions.” Hence the triad: Erlebnis – Ausdruck - Verstehen. Erlebnis has 
its own knowledge (Wissen), but it can only become aware (Selbstbesinnung) of itself in 
an indirect way by recognizing itself in both its own and also other manifestations of life. 
Dilthey, so Heidegger, was right: life is historical, life is whole and in movement all at 
the same time, and also experiences itself as a whole and in movement in every 
experience it has of something, but the historicality of life has to be understood as a 
dimension intrinsic of Erlebnis: the genuine unity of past-present-future is givenall the 
time in my experiences, and not something arrived at in the course of time. Life, 












according to Heidegger, has its own “immanent historicality.180” Furthermore, the very 
“facticity” of life will be later understood not as a factum brutum, but in terms of the 
immanent “historicity” of life-experience181. It is this conception of the historicality of 
life that will culminate in early Freiburg years in Heidegger’s interpretation of Christian 
life-experience as “life living the temporality as such.182”   
In other words, Heidegger rejects Dilthey’s conception of Erlebnis as a 
“constitutive moment of life” and keeps to his understanding of Erlebnisse as 
“articulations of the whole of life.” Erlebnis is, as Heidegger claims already in late 1919, 
a “form of life.183”  
 
Conclusion 
According to Heidegger, both Natorp and Dilthey failed to fully appreciate the 
fundamental sense in which life is: namely life as Erlebniszusammenhang  ‘is’ neither a 
“temporal objectivity” nor an “objective domain184” constituting and constituted either 
historically or logically; “life” as all-at-once lived whole “is” genuinely only in “being 
lived”, Once this sense of life is properly seen, the problematic of life philosophy changes 
radically. The failure to see this fundamental character of life is to be attributed to the 
epistemological tension between “method” and “object” in philosophy: between life as is 
lived genuinely and life as is assumed to be by a specific goal of theoretical knowledge. 
The nexus is in both cases seen eventually as something to be arrived at, something 
“constituted”, a (re-)construction:  
Erlebniszusammenhang and the question regarding the way in which it can 
be so approached as to be grasped is beforehand determined by this idea 
[of constitution, my note].185 
Life as Erlebniszusammenhang is understood beforehand as a product or 












outcome of an activity, as being somehow “constituted” by way of either an historical or 
logical transcendentalism. Life understood as a nexus of lived experiences – regardless of 
the specific way in which the nexus is believed to emerge - is a theoretical construct. Life 
is never lived as a nexus of lived experiences186. Life is a nexus indeed, and experienced 
as such in every Erlebnis187. An Erlebnis is an articulation of the whole of life that 
experiences itself, Lebenserfahrung. 
A semester later Heidegger will be even more detailed about how 
epistemological motives have already misguided all philosophical approaches to life. 
Upon discussing and critiquing the ways in which history has been conceived in 
philosophy, Heidegger comes to the conclusion that all conceptions of history (Dilthey’s, 
Weber’s, Spengler’s, Simmel’s, Windelband’s, Natorp’s) have been deficient, and thus 
missed the very phenomenon they all were trying to elucidate, in that they were all right 
from the outset guided by the problem of how to secure historical reality, and the 
knowledge thereof, from what is merely historical and relative. Despite the obvious 
differences in the ways in which they conceived “history”, all had only one question 
constantly operating in the background and secretly guiding all strategies and 
conclusions: to move beyond the epistemological skepticism which “history” threatens to 
bring to unbearable proportions188. Regardless of the specific domain in which each 
placed “reality” (in atemporal universally valid ideas, or in the historical formations 
themselves, or in a combination of atemporal ideas and historical formations) they all 
tried in their own ways to solve an “epistemological” problem as if “history” and “life” 
are subject matters best approached from what appears to be primarily an epistemological 
interest – how to understand life and history in such a way as to avoid skepticism. It is 
not “what” and “how” they are, but rather how one can secure the knowledge of them, 
how one can come to a solid and secure account of them:  
The historical reality is in all three accounts taken as aobjective being. The 
path to it is the path of knowing…189 










It is as if “life” has already been set up to be approached in a specific manner, 
and that it is precisely this manner alone that determines in advance what is to be sought 
for, and what should count as a “valid conclusion” about what is looked for. The biggest 
mistake of both conceptions of life is that they have let an epistemological “idea” about 
cognition take the lead in their orientation towards life: life was beforehand, a priori, 
oriented towards the idea of “constitution190“. In both forms, life as expression and life as 
experience, life has already been understood as being constituted and constituting 
somehow, in different ways to be sure, the totality of experience. Epistemological 
considerations therefore crept in in both approaches to life and put them on a path that led 
further and further away from “life” as is genuinely lived. The result in both cases was 
the same: they ended up in forgetting what philosophy is all about, that which prompted 
them in the first place to search for a solution: the unum necessarium, the actual Dasein, 
the actual self-world, the historically enacted Dasein of each individual as individual.191 
The actual Dasein has not become a possible problem.192 
Since life has always been approached with the openly declared intention to 
arrive at a well-grounded, theoretically valid understanding of life, all life philosophies 
have so far fallen prey to objectifying “life” despite their honest attempts at grasping it in 
its peculiarity. “Securing” the knowledge of life took precedence over a faithful but 
enlightened partaking in living. Life as “constituted” is no longer the living life, life as is 
lived:  
The radicalization of the theoretical in the idea of constitution can never in 
principal lead to the concrete actual Dasein.193 
Life as the nexus of lived experiences coming into being in time should not be 
understood as being constituted, or constructed by the activity of consciousness. By doing 
so, Erlebnis becomes a temporal “objective domain” lacking a “self.” There is no self in 
the discreet temporal (Husserlian or Dilthean) lived experience, and we cannot arrive at a 
“self” unless we set out with one. The actual Dasein being sought forbecomes a selfless 
Dasein, a selfless, lifeless existence.  









Life is already lived as a whole centered on a self. We are already living this 
totality.Life in its wholeness is already lived and experienced as a whole but in the 
manner of life, not in that of thinking. Lived experience understood as a component, or 
moment, of a bigger complex (life), and as something that has to be “related” or linked 
together with other lived experiences in order to be able to “constitute” life in its totality 
is a misguided, that is, not genuine interpretation of life. Lived experience should be 
understood as Lebenserfahrung, an experience of life in which life is already there 
wholly, altogether, in its totality and concreteness, all at once, for the living self.  
 
Erlebnis and Leben in Heidegger’s texts 
For the most part, Heidegger uses these two terms almost interchangeably:  
The being of life, of lived experiences, is not the occurring (Vorkommen), 
but effectuation (Vollzug).194 
However, in keeping with his critique of life-philosophies which, as we know, 
failed to pay attention to the fact that lived experiences can only in abstracto be separated 
from one another and then put together in a higher unity, Heidegger will always 
emphasize the situational character of lived experiences. Neither are lived experiences 
hyletic data, as Husserl thought, but “concrete situations of life195”. Life is altogether in 
each situation196. Life is always concrete in situations197. Lived experiences are not 
things, nor isolated entitative occurrences, but expressive configurations of tendencies 
peculiar to concrete situations of life. The fundamental category of life is the situation198. 
Life is already lived through in its totality, as a whole, all at once in every moment. 
Situation is a life experience of life in its totality. To live is to live in situations, “which 
we ourselves are and live.199” 
 We should also take note of the fact that one of the first occurrences of the 











term “Dasein” which no longer takes the term to mean mere “existence”, brings clearly 
into stark relief the idea that Dasein is nothing but Lebenstotalität: “… a particular, 
perhaps unique typic of Dasein – totality of life –.200“  
It was already clear in 1919 that Heidegger understands lived experience 
differently than Dilthey, Husserl and Neokantians. For him, lived experience was 
Ereignis in and as which the self is da completely. With and in experience life itself is 
there entirely. The self is always“situational.” In a sense, there are only situations in 
which “I” find myself immersed, absorbed, and involved. “I am” means my living in 
situations, my finding myself in situations. A lived experience is thus the way in which the 
self is there completely in a situation, a way in which life experiences itself entirely: 
Erlebnis = Situation = Lebenserfahrung.Erlebnis is, as a matter of fact,situational 
experience, a concrete, actual experience of life in its totality:  to live is to live in 
situations. It is not just one, numerically one, lived experience, an isolated, discrete 
experience of an isolated particular object in which one and only one type of 
intentionality prevails, but rather one in which the whole of life, life in its totality, is 
somehow givenand lived through: a life experience. We do not typically have an 
experience, say, of seeing this piece of white paper, isolated somehow from “other” 
distinct, yet related, experiences: a lived experience, properly understood, is an 
experience of a situation, or living in a situation. It is an experiential whole (situation), 
which alone enables us to abstractly isolate just one moment and treat it independently. It 
is not by relating these abstractly distinguished moments of “living something,” that is, 
lived experiences, back into a unity, that we can arrive at the experiential whole, or 
situation. The situation as the experiential whole is already “lived” through long before 
we can separate it out in “discrete” lived experiences. To use Helmuth Vetter’s fitting 
words, the lived experience completely separated is ein Grenzfall201. 
To be sure, Heidegger never, to my knowledge, says explicitly that Situation is 
Lebenserfahrung. In his terms from 1919, life experience is the “continually changing” 
context or unity (Zusammenhang) of situations. This way of understanding situations and 
life experience, however, is very early, dating from early 1919. And still at this time, in 







some passages at least, life experience appears to be identified with situation: after all, the 
nexusof Lebenserfahrung is the nexus of situations202. After Heidegger develops his 
critique of life philosophies he will increasingly come closer to identifying Situation and 
Lebenserfahrung. Two arguments can be adduced to substantiate this claim: (1) 
Heidegger will increasingly abandon using the term Situation, and use instead more often 
Lebenserfahrung, until he will eventually come to favor faktisches Leben over 
Lebenserfahrung and (2) Some passages clearly suggest that both Situation and 
Lebenserfahrung are ways to express “what we are and live.” Compare, for example, 
“Situations that we ourselves are and live,203”and “Life experience which is directly 
accessible, and which we ourselves are and live,204” and“Factic life that we ourselves are 
and live.205”  
In early 1919 Heidegger is still hesitant about the proper way of understanding 
lived experiences and situations. Despite the actual results of his investigations, he 
continued for a short while to view Erlebnisse as emerging from, and belonging 
somehow to, situations. But the occasional use of expressions like Erlebnissituation206, 
Situationserlebnisse or Situationserlebnis207or even Erlebenssituation208 bear witness to 
an existing indecision on Heidegger’s part as to how specifically Erlebnisse stand in 
relation to Situation.Even Heidegger’s definition of a situation as a “unity in living” 
alludes to the difficulty of making a clear demarcation between Situation and Erlebnis.  
In my view it is only in the wake of his critique of the shortcomings of life philosophies 
as expounded by Natorp and Dilthey, that Heidegger drops entirely the term Erlebnis and 
employs instead “life experience”,  “situation” and “factic life”. Just as before lived 
experiences were understood as Ereignisse, so too now it is situation that is understood 
not as a natural event, activity or process of some kind, but rather as Ereignis. The 
occasional, infrequent reemergence of the term Erlebnis, however, gives me reasons to 












believe that lived experience is in fact abandoned as a term precisely because it is now 
replaced withSituation, an experience of life in one of its possible totalities209, an 
“articulation of life as a whole.” 
Lived experience as Situation and Lebenserfahrung is now more appropriately 
understood as a configuration, Gestalt or form of life210. As the result, the paradigmatic 
lived experience is no longer, as was for Husserl, the perceptual experience of an object. 
Lived experience conceived of as Situation is a form life takes. It is one way of living life 
“completely” as well as “concretely”. That it is precisely lived experience which is now 
understood as situation, as life experience (experience of life in its twofold meaning), is 
further evidenced by the fact that whatever Heidegger found as essentially belonging to 
the nature of Erlebnis is now transferred to Situation and Lebenserfahrung. As we 
remember, a lived experience properly understood is a highly “personal” experience in 
the sense that it involves “me” indispensably. Lived experience is as much an encounter 
with das Erlebte as is, in the appropriation of it by the self, an encounter of the self with 
itself. The self encounters itself as it appropriates, in living something though, that which 
it experiences – this is the genuine meaning of Lebenserfahrung. On our understanding, 
namely that lived experience is now better understood as situation and situation as 
Lebenserfahrung, it does not come as a surprise to see Heidegger defining both Erlebnis 
and Situation in exactly the same terms, namely as the specific character in which I 
myself have myself211. It is thus safe to claim that Heidegger is not simply abandoning one 
topic to merely pick up another one.  
To bring this section to a conclusion: Life conceived of as the “nexus of lived 
experiences” is in need of further elaboration if the phenomenology of life has any 
chance of becoming clear on its own possibility. Historically speaking, the 














interconnectedness of lived experiences has always been understood as being somehow 
either transcendentally logically or historically constituted, “fabricated” or “produced”; 
where life has been seen as both constituting and as something constituted. Owing to its 
hidden a priori interest and commitment to solving the epistemological problem of how 
life can be so set up as to secure its cognition to the highest possible degree, such an 
approach to life in terms of the idea of constitution fails to see that life is not the “result” 
of bringing together discrete lived experiences into the unity constituting life. Genuine 
constitution, as Einer Overenget so rightly put it, is not understood by Heidegger in terms 
of “fabrication” (poiesis), “where the product appears temporally after the act.212”  In 
situations, and not in discrete, uni-intentional, abstract experiences of individual objects 
(the perception of a tree, or the understanding of a symbolic sign), life is already lived in 
its totality, wholly. It is not like life gives itself piecemeal in different isolated lived 
experiences. On the contrary, life already gives itself wholesale in Erlebnisse understood 
now as “situations”, as “life experiences”. The question is therefore not how lived 
experiences can constitute a unity, but rather how life is already experiencing itself 
wholly in situations, that is, how life experiences itself altogether, in every respect.  
It should kept in mind, however, that even if Heidegger drops the termErlebnis 
off his vocabulary for the aforementioned reasons, it is nevertheless clear that he never 
conceived of lived experience as the proponents of various forms of transcendental 
philosophy did. In other words, his decision not to use the term anymore has more to do 
with his intention of distinguishing his own conception of Erlebnis from those of 
Dilthey’s, Natorp’s and Husserl’s, than with the concern that he might have already 
gotten the whole idea of lived experience wrong. The environing experience as the 
paradigmatic lived experience was already something else than the Husserlian and, with 
some qualifications even Dilthean, “mental, inner, private event.” He has appropriated 
from Dilthey a conception of Erlebnis as a “reality” already “containing” the nexus of 
life, as a “reality” having and living time within itself. 
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Chapter Four: Lebenserfahrung 
Life is the experiencing of something as self-encounter. Life is life experience. 
Das Erlebte is always lived or experienced from the standpoint of the self, in one of the 
self’s own tendencies. Everything in life is motivated; anything lived through or 
experienced has a „reason“ to be the way it is, a „sense“ inextricably bound up with how 
the self has foundhimself in encountering it. Life-experience is „active“ as well as 
„passive“: active in the sense that it gets to experience something and passive in the sense 
that it itself is experienced thereby. Life-experience designates the „whole active and 
passive position [Stellung] of human beings toward the world.213“ Anything is 
experienced in „a situation of the self.“ The situation characterizes the way in which das 
Erlebte is experienced. Das Erlebte becomes das Erfahrene.But 
We need to maintain the ambiguity of the problematic word ‘life’ in order 
to be able to indicate the phenomena intended by it.214 
The word „life“ thus refers initially to an unthematic relation of the self to itself215. 
Although life is, on Heidegger’s understanding, so close to us, even the closest, its 
proximity does not directly translate in accessibility and availability for investigation. 
The reason why life, despite its utmost proximity to us, is nevertheless so remote from 
even becoming a possible subject matter for phenomenology, lies precisely in the fact 
that life is too close to us: it is us. We ourselves are it.  
What is then this ‘life in itself’, what exactly is meant by this expression – 
this should be defined in a preliminary way… [It is, my insertion] 
something which lies so close to us that we do not even bother most of the 
time with it in an explicit manner; something in relation to which we do 
not keep any distance in order to be able to see it ›as such‹; and the 
distance to it is missing because we ourselves are it, and we ourselves see 
ourselves in accordance with life’s own orientations only from life itself 
which we are, which is us (accusative). (The absence of life’s absolute 
distance in itself and to itself).216 











We live in factic life – we are it itself, to us it is the closest.217 
It is precisely this unobtrusive life in its “most general typicality” on which 
phenomenology wants to focus somehow. Heidegger is again playing with a distinction 
that he draws between a theoretical self-experience of life and a worldly self-experience 
of life218. Anywhere we look, we see trees, other peoples, buildings, works of art, 
mathematical equations, books, stars and bodies of knowledge; life itself, however, is 
nowhere to be found as an object “out there” among other objects: this is how life is 
lived, how the experienced life appears in the very experiences ithas. It is precisely this 
character of life that has to be retained throughout the phenomenological investigations of 
life, if we want to remain true to our topic: life should be grasped in precisely the terms in 
which it itself lives. Life as is concretely lived is the expression of life’s encounter with 
itself. And life is nowhere to be found, although we ourselves are it, it is us. In living, 
anything but life itself arrests our attention. The apparent unavailability of life for 
investigation makes methodological issues to be all the more important. We cannot 
approach life in the same manner in which we approach other “topics” for the simple 
reason that life is “concealed” as a topic, is not readily available. The manner of 
approaching is as important as the topic itself. As a matter of fact, one cannot even 
dissociate the topic from the way in which the topic is arrived at219. Method thus will play 
a crucial role in Heidegger’s phenomenology of life. How do we experience life? How is 



















life given? What is the basic experience of life?  
However, before we get specifically into methodological problems, let’s review 
first some of the most important “categories” of life, at which Heidegger arrives in the 
relative absence of an explicit, fully developed, methodological approach to life.  As we 
will see, by category of life Heidegger does not mean what Kant, for example, meant: a 
concept of understanding employed in objective empirical judgments which renders such 
judgments universally valid for all judging subjects. A category is not an a priori 
conceptual manner of encountering a sensible material, it is not an intellectual activity in 
virtue of which das Ding an sich becomes a possible object of experience, an object for 
consciousness; the category is not primarily about “contents” or “objects,” but a manner 
of living, ways in which life is experienced, possibilities of life experience.  
 
Life has the character of a world 
As noted earlier, the lived experiences, the most common and ordinary ones, 
are what Heidegger in early 1919 calls environing lived experiences because that which 
is lived through or experienced can be what it is only from within an worldly context 
(Umwelt): I see a frightening thunderbolt on the background of a clouded sky, on a chilly 
dark night, when no other person is around me etc. It is not just the thunderbolt that I 
experience, but also the chilly night as well, the cloudy sky220 etc. The thunderbolt as 
appears in this whole experience (Erlebnis – Situation - Lebenserfahrung) is frightening, 
not just the thunderbolt apart or isolated from the rest. Everything in this experience 
stands intimately together, forming one experience [Erlebnis]: the dark sky, the chilly 
night, the valley, the felt loneliness, my walking down the valley etc. Thus the experience 
of the thunderbolt as it appears in this situation is ein Ereignis, an unique event occurring 
to me. The experience has a holistic character in a twofold manner: on the one hand, to 
experience the frightening thunderbolt is to experience all that renders the thunderbolt as 









frightening in that situation. On the other hand, however, I myself am completely in that 
experience, and I am experiencing myself as such: I do not experience (erfahren) only 
one “part” or “moment” of my own self in my Erlebnis. I do not experience myself in that 
experience as being something other than what and who I am in that experience, as 
something that stretches over that experience to other “moments” of my life, my self; 
there is, in other words, no “parts” or “moments” of my self left out of my Erlebnis. I am 
there completely. My being frightened in that situation does not leave any room for the 
co-existence or even the possibility in that situation of there being a self other than 
“frightened.” Since life is decidedly no longer understood as a discrete experience of an 
object, where the object is “constituted temporally after the act,” that which is 
experienced changes. The experience of life is genuinely a world-experience, the 
experience of a world. That which we experience in a situation, is not an object, but a/the 
world221.  
The ‘world’ is something in which we can live.222 
By contrast, nobody can live “in” an object: the self is a self only in 
experiencing a world, and not an isolated object. I live by always being somehow, one 
way or another but always somehow, engaged in or involved with worldly situations. Life 
is the world in which I live. Life is “worldly disposed223“. The world is not simply the 
context in which life evolves. Imagining myself in the absence of the current situation I 
am in now, would not result in a “pure I” but merely in a fiction. “I live always somehow 
in a situation” should not be misconstrued as somehow implying that I could live apart 
from the (any) situation (context/world) I am in. My life is my world. Life is the world in 
the sense that life is essentially my engagement, involvement, preoccupation, concern 
with things or issues (Sachen) that can be what they are only from within my world. The 
world is that which the self lives and does so by experiencing itself.224 
The world in which I live is lived in accordance with three relatively distinct 











kinds of “being there” or “engagements”: as a surrounding world (Umwelt: regions, 
towns, sciences etc.), communal world (Mitwelt:  brothers, compatriots, neighbors, 
coworkers etc.) and self-world (Selbstwelt - the world as my world)225. The surrounding, 
communal and self-worlds are by no means three distinct and independent “parts” of the 
same world. Neither should they be construed as different “domains of being”. As a 
matter of fact, there is only one world that is however lived to some extent, in some 
sense, differently depending on what and how I encounter, deal with in living. They are 
just different ways in which life is lived, that is, fulfils its own inherent tendencies or 
possibilities. Occasionally Heidegger uses the term lifeworld to refer to this threefold 
world of the living self226.  
Life is a modus in which I find myself in relation to the world, a way in which 
the world is experienced by me. As Heidegger will say in 1922, I am “ein Wie des 
Weltnehmens.227”  
 
Life has the character of a self 
Furthermore, my experiencing of the thunderbolt does not present my own self 
as a part of the experience, as a conglomerate of acts and processes going on in “me”, not 
even as an center of all my experiences: I find myself as the one being frightened, the one 
deciding to run as fast as possible, as the one feeling lonely etc: “I am” the one being 
frightened, running, looking back etc. “I am” not the subject or center of my experiences 
(the underlying substance), I am not the one “doing”, as it were, the experiencing. I 
experience myself by way of, and in, whatever I do, feel, encounter228. This is how I 
encounter myself, not by self-reflection or self-introspection.  This is who I am in living: 
I always find myself caught, involved in, and partaking of, situations: running, talking, 
planning ahead, being bored, being excited, resting, shouting, listening, being in pain etc. 








I am never first and foremost the spectator of my own experiences229. Unless I am 
theoretically oriented towards the content of experience, what I live through is always of 
significance for me. This, for Heidegger, translates into the fact that I am always 
somehow disposed towards everything I experience. It is not just an experience in the 
theoretical sense of an experience of an object, but a lived experience, that is, a personal 
experience, an experience as self-experience, an experience of the self: I do not see justa 
thunderbolt, but one that frightens me, a frightening thunderbolt. Everything appears the 
way it does precisely because I am somehow “there” (dabei sein230), I resonate in the 
whole experience. That which is experienced is not a simple object, an object-like entity, 
justa thunderbolt that I see, but something that matters to me, “impresses” me somehow. I 
am always there somehow231. But this “how” characteristic of all my experiences is not 
itself noticeable in the experience; it is one with “what” I experience. This explains also 
why the experience and what is experienced are not two entitative objects put somehow 
together.232 I live by “being there” in my world somehow: I live by always somehow 
being either mesmerized, excited, enthralled, bored, in denial, vexed, provoked, alienated, 
accepting, frightened etc.:  
And our life is only as life insofar as it lives in a world.233 
From the beginning Heidegger was convinced that Erlebnis cannot be properly 
understood in the absence of, or by ignoring, the way in which “I am” “there” (da) in my 
experience. Any reification of life, which in early 1919 was interpreted as resulting in 
eine Entlebung der Erlebnisse, results inevitably in the complete loss of the “self”- and 
“world”-character of life234.  
He will put all his efforts into trying to figure out a way in which he could 
adequately account for the way in which the “I” is “there” in his “own” lifeworld. 
Erlebnis, Situation, Lebenserfahrung, faktisches Leben refer essentially to the self’s 
participation to its encounter of a world. Obviously, expressions like “the I resonates” or 










“the I swims” in his experiences, used by Heidegger in early 1919, should have been 
perceived as highly unsatisfactory. The only reason for his using these non-traditional 
expressions was to stress the fact that “I am” in my experiences in a totally different 
fashion than traditional epistemology and ontology would have had it. Once he fully 
develops the idea that Erlebnis should be adequately grasped not as a discrete lived 
experience of an object, but rather as “concrete situation of life”, the investigation of the 
way in which the self lives or “is there” in its own world will take the form of an 
investigation of the self-world. But Selbstwelt is, on Heidegger’s reading, the “I and its 
living.235” It is noteworthy that it is precisely this living, “personal” character of any lived 
experience that continues to remain in the center of Heidegger’s philosophical 
preoccupations, even if a continuous refinement and adjustment have led him to focus 
now on what he calls Selbstwelt or sometimes Selbstleben:  
The self in the actual effectuation which life experience entails, the self in 
the movement of experiencing itself is the fundamental reality.236 
and 
Rather, we need to see that experiencing in its fullest sense is to be found 
in its authentically factic context of efectuation in the historically existing 
self, and this self is in one way or another the ultimate question of 
philosophy.237 
A life without a self, or lived by abstracting the self from the living experience, 
is no longer a “living life.238” It is precisely the absence of the self in living that makes 
possible the theoretical approach to life as something to be studied, an object. Life, 
however, is not an object; life is actualization, effectuation, carrying out. Life, which we 
ourselves are, is always “my life”, “your life”, “our life” etc. Life is always somebody’s 
life. In other words, life is always the life of a self: a self-life (Selbstleben). Life is indeed 
carrying out, effectuation, but by no means impersonal, soulless as it were, or selfless. On 












the contrary, the carrying out occurs im Selbst: 
The being of life, of lived experiences, is not occurrence, but effectuation 
– effectuation in self, but the self is not always there necessarily in an 
explicit manner.239 
The appropriation Heidegger mentioned in the first lecture as the characteristic 
of the I or self to render everything encountered as being somehow a way of fulfilling 
life’s own motivations, goes now under the name of Selbstwelt, self-world: the world is 
always the self’s “own” world. The world is the world of a self to such an extent that any 
self-presentation of the self amounts to a presentation of the world the self lives in, and 
vice-versa, any presentation of the world amounts to a self-presentation of the self240. 
Although life is always lived in accordance with its own possible dimensions as self-
world, communal world and surrounding world, the self-world plays however a special 
role: everything that appears or takes place in the world becomes intelligible on the basis 
of how the self living in the world is experiencing it. The special status the self-world 
enjoys becomes apparent for Heidegger when we pay attention, for example, to how the 
(communal, surrounding and self-) world is varyingly experienced depending on the 
changing position of the self (body) in space, or on the mood the self is in (the “same” 
things appear differently in accordance with the mood I am in). For all these reasons, 
Heidegger concludes that life is lived as centered on the self-world.  
The self never experiences itself piecemeal. To be for a self is to be one(-)self. 
The self is always his whole self in all of his experiences. A partial orfragmented self 
would not make sense. All of the self’s experiences are, and cannot but be, “complete”. 
Heidegger, to my knowledge, never says it explicitly, but it would follow from his 
conception of the living self that, properly speaking, there are no such things as lived 
experiences in Husserl’s sense. The unilateral experience of a single object is never a 
self-experience of a self because the self cannot experience itself as the self that it is in 
merely being directed towards an object: this experience would be a “limit-case”.The 
experience of a single object is an abstraction. The self is and lives only in a world: in 
situations, that is, in possible forms or configurations that life in its totality can take. This 







explains why Heidegger can say: 
The self is present to us in the expression of a situation. I am myself actual 
to myself in a particular life experience, I am in a situation -241 
I am „there“ to myself not in the form of an object, or an I. „I am there“ should 
be understood dynamically, as an “activity” or a process, for lack of a better word. The 
static “I”, however, is merely a word242. Even if the I is never an object-like entity to be 
found in experience, the I enjoys nevertheless a unique presence. In Heidegger terms, the 
“I” finds its own expression in the situation. The situation is precisely the situation it is 
thanks to the specific way in which the “I” is there. As a matter of fact, the situation is the 
self’s own way of being present there as the self it is. 
 
Life has the character of familiarity 
First of all, it should be noted that I am „there“ to myself in such a way that this 
„presence“ does not even become the subject of an explicit investigation. I am „there“ to 
myself in a way that does not require any further elaboration, clarification or even 
explicit attention. My „being-there“ (dabei sein) takes the form of an unobtrusive and 
self-evident familiarity with myself and my world. To be familiar with myself and always 
live this familiarity with myself in every and each situation I always find myself in means 
that I always find and have myself, as well as understand myself, in every and each 
situation. Living in a familiar situation amounts to “understanding” myself somehow. 
“Understanding myself as the one being frightened” is not the same as “making a 
judgment about me.” In other words, it is not like I am directing my attention to my own 
self and as a result of my seeing myself I then come to the conclusion that I am 
frightened. My understanding of myself does not come about as a result of a process of 
deliberation. Since Heidegger expressly denies any epistemological overtones to the kind 
of “understanding” pertaining to the self’s self-experience in situations, he would rather 
use expressions like “I have my self in situations,” “the self is understandable to 








himself”243. In each and every familiar situation I always find myself in, I “have my own 
self”.  
’I have my(-)self’ means: the living situation is understandable.244 
What we live through is always lived as something with which we are always 
familiar somehow (vertraut): In the current situation, I am writing. I am “there” as the 
one writing. In this familiarity with what I live through, I am there. It is this familiarity 
that is the expression of my being there. This Dabeisein, however, is self-referential. The 
self becomes present to himself in the familiarity that characterizes the way in which it 
lives in situations. I am there means that I am having myself somehow. I am there by 
understanding (1) what is going on and (2) what I have to do and (3) by ‘acting’ 
(effectuating) already on such an understanding.  Everything now shifts on finding a way 
to bring to light this self-referential “familiarity with myself” that lies at the core of each 
and every situation245.   
I am my own self in situations in the modus of intelligibility (Verständlichen). I 
normally do not ask myself questions like, “Who am I?” I am not normally the subject 
matter of a personal self-investigation, self-introspection, an object of study and inquiry. I 
am “having” my own self in the modus of a “process” of either losing or gaining the 
familiarity with the situation I am living in, that is, with life itself246. In other words, I 
“have my self” when, living in situations, I understand what is going on, know what to 
make of, how to react, what to do, or think, how to proceed, and, most importantly, I find 
myself performing all this “knowledge” (actually grasping, knowing, reacting, thinking, 
doing, resting, talking, responding etc.); and “I lose my own self” when “I am or feel 
lost,” as it were, when nothing makes sense to me anymore, everything loses the 
character of lived familiarity, when things appear strange and impossible to understand, 
when I do not know who I am anymore, and have troubles knowing what to do, I am 












baffled and feel weird247 etc: “One can live without having oneself248.“ 
As of now two new lines of investigations will open up as a result of 
Heidegger’s new conception of the self in living (Selbstwelt): these two lines are 
investigations into (1) how the self is being had (familiarity/meaningfulness), and (2) 
what the self is that is being had (situation). From now on we will see Heidegger being 
chiefly concerned with elaborating a systematic method for investigating the 
phenomenon of Mich-selbst-haben (of all lived experiences). The enigma of life lies in 
the very way in which the self is always there in always its own (world-) experiences. 
The lived experience is now understood as precisely the very way in which I (self-) 
experience myself in my own world-experiences: 
It is necessary to define the concept of living in an originary manner… 
The ‘pure I’ does nothing to help us understand the living 
Erlebniszusammenhang… When I ‘consider’ my life, remember a lived 
experience, then I live in that which I have lived through and in the living 
character of the lived experience I have lived through I have myself – 
indeed in a more concrete way than when I have myself when (artificially) 
oriented towards my empty ‘I’249.  
The trajectory followed by Heidegger so far can be summarized as follows: 
from   
1. Erlebnis as surrounding (environing) lived experience, through 
2. Erlebnis experience as life experience (situation), and to 
3. Erlebnis as the self’s self-experience as world-experience (the phenomenon 
of “In eine Welt Hineinleben undSich-selbst-lebens”).  
Grasping life in its unique character, in its “living” character, which up until 
now was understood as the attempt to understand how life itself lives in the manner of 
environing lived experience and then life experience, takes now the more precise form of 
grasping how I myself live in my concrete experiences, that is, how I am involved 










there250, how I have my own self:  
To have myself: life’s orientation towards its liveliness251.  
I live by somehow having my (own) self already in or through my 
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Chapter Five: From life experience to the being of life 
Ontology – the word expresses already that the decisive problem is being 
missed: History and Life.252 
Heidegger’s transition from life to Sein cannot be adequately accounted for 
without an adequate understanding of his newly developed and introduced philosophical 
method of formal indication[formale Anzeige]. In fact, the transition wasmotivated first 
(1) by an intensification of the efforts on his part to bring properly into view the 
“historical” character of life. If “historical I” was indeed mentioned, but barely 
explicated, in the first lectures and in contexts crucial for understanding the phenomenon 
of life, when the “historical” character of life is given its full due we witness the 
emergence of new terms, Dasein, Sein, Faktizitat and Existenz;(2) secondly by the 
employment of a new “sense” (in a formally indicative manner) in which all 
philosophical concepts, life included, should be understood. As we will see, Sein was not 
something distinct from Leben; itwas not meant by Heidegger to replace life as the topic 
of philosophy. It is simply meant to bring “life” clearer into view, to focus on life in a 
more appropriate way (in a formally indicative manner) by avoiding the possible pitfalls 
of theoretical attitude, into which one can easily fall by employing almost instinctively an 
insufficiently elaborated conceptual understanding of the “primordial sense” of life. Sein 
(always of life)is used to avoid the theoretical prejudices plaguingthe traditional 
philosophical conceptualization of life. Dasein becomes the formally indicate term for the 
living, personal self; and thirdly (3), by a preference on Heidegger’s part to replace “Ich 
erlebe etwas” (I live/undergo the experience of something) with “Ich bin” (I am). I will 
discuss all these three motives in full detail in this chapter. 
I will now begin with an investigation into the motives that led Heidegger to use 
the term Dasein in the context of his phenomenological investigations of life. The 
termDaseinappears, even if sporadically and without having a special meaning different 
from the traditional one: Dasein as existence, reality, and almost always meant as human 






existence253. That he oftentimes in the first lectures does not yet rigorously distinguish 
between Dasein and Leben is evidenced by the employment – very rarely though - of the 
coined term Lebensdasein254and the expression, used very often, [factic life/situation/life-
experience] “which we are and live.255” If in 1919/20 Dasein designates the “reality” or 
“existence” of humans themselves and their Erlebnisse, that is, the “reality” of life itself, 
starting from 1920 Heidegger begins to employ the term almost exclusively to refer to the 
way in which the self is da in and as its lived experiences, later life-experience, which, 
for him, is tantamount to the way in which life is there: Wie ist Leben da?256Dasein is 
initially Heidegger’s name for the “reality of life257”. 
 Everything depends on the reality of the latter [humans and their lived 
experiences, my note] if the universal science of lived experiences in 
general can have a meaning.258 
Thus it all begins with the question regarding the reality of lived experiences. 
And we know that their reality should not be construed theoretically, that is, as a “Dasein 
occurring in some domain of being.259” What then does “I live” mean? How do I come to 
encounter this phenomenon? How do I experience life260?  
After 1922, Heidegger comes increasingly closer to forging a new 
























understanding of the term Dasein, one which will find its mature and final expression in 
Sein und Zeit: although he will always keep to an understanding of Dasein as “being 
there,” “present” somehow (the world is da, history can be da etc.), he will increasingly 
come to designate by it that entity whose being, in its very being, is an issue for it261.  
However, what most commentators apparently failed to observe was that Heidegger was 
already employing this term systematically in 1920 in a sense not identical but very close 
to the one it would have later262. I am not here implying that Heidegger arrives at his 
unique understanding of Dasein already in 1920; what I am claiming instead is that the 
way in which Heidegger employs the term already in 1920 and in the specific context in 
which he deems it necessary to deploy it, paves the way to the later understanding of 
Dasein as the being which, in its own being, has being as an issue for it. Seeing how 
Heidegger employs this term and what he means by it will bring us closer to 
understanding how and why Heidegger makes the transition from life to being and also 
why, as we will see, this transition is more of a terminological change rather than a 
change in the very object of philosophy. 
 It is important to note that the need to give the term Dasein a new twist 
emerges, as we will see, from the need to “indicate” the historical, and closely 
intertwined with it, the factic character of life. It is the “historicity” and, closed associated 
therewith, the “facticity” of life-experience that makes it necessary apparently to 
introduce the term Dasein: the facticity of life-experience is not a brute fact, but 
something whose proper sense can arise only from a properly understood “historicity” of 
life-experience: “the facticity of life, Dasein, is in itself historical.263” Again and again it 
is not being, but a certain way of living that requires a refinement of the philosophical 
vocabulary. To give only a preliminary example, let us see how he employs the term in 
the lectures on phenomenology from 1919/1920:  
A experiential ground … ‘is there’ [ist da] - it does not mean that factic 










life registers its existence (das Dasein); it itself is and lives experientially 
in the world.264 
 
Different meanings of “history” 
Up until the summer of 1920, in the lectures on the phenomenology of the 
formation of philosophical concepts, the term Dasein makes very few, and 
philosophically speaking, insignificant appearances, only to be widely used, almost all of 
the sudden and without warning or preparation, when Heidegger has to clarify the various 
meanings in which history comes to play a role in and for life. It appears thus that it is 
only in connection with the historical character of life that Heidegger finds it necessary to 
introduce and use extensively the term Dasein.  
It is, again, in the context of an investigation into the formation of 
philosophical concepts that Heidegger undertakes the task of clarifying why it is that life 
has become dieUrphänomen of philosophy. In this context, he distinguishes, as we 
remember, two major approaches to life: on the one hand, life as objectification - and 
“therewith obscurely intertwined something like being, existing in this life and as such 
life, -” and, on the other hand, life as living, experiencing, seizing, - and “therewith 
obscurely intertwined something like being, existing[daseind]in such life, and enhancing 
it.265” In the same period, in the published article on Jasper’s psychology of worldviews, 
Heidegger will slightly change the words in which he couches his understanding of these 
two versions of life philosophy as follows: “thereby meant in an obscure manner 
something like ‘Da sein’ in this life and as such life,” and respectively “therewith 
obscurely intertwined something like ‘Da sein’ in such life” (Heidegger’s own use 
italics)266.Life as living poses the question of the proper access to the “living of Dasein in 
its intimacy, richness and obscurity.267”On the other hand, the conception of life as 
objectification brings up the problem of historical consciousness, that is, the 









“introduction of life as becoming into the present Dasein.268”. It is in this connection that 
history becomes a philosophical problem. For purposes that we will go into in more 
details in the next section, Heidegger distinguishes 6 ways in which “history” is being 
used in ordinary conversations (in natural attitude as Husserl might have put it), or, in 
other words, he distinguishes six senses in which “history” is lived through, encountered, 
experienced, in and by life itself: 
1. History as the science of history (“He studies history.”) 
2. History as an objective domain of the past. (“He knows how this problem has 
been treated in various historical periods). 
3. History as tradition (“There are people with no history”). 
4. History as a source of useful instructions for the present (“History is life’s 
greatest teacher”). 
5. History as one’s own familiar (“That man has a sad history.”) 
6. History as an event that concerns me, is somehow significant for me. 
“Something terrible happened to me in all these years.”269) 
It is in relation to 3), 5) and 6) (various senses of “having history” - 
“Geschichte haben”) that Heidegger will deploy the term Dasein extensively. The proper 
understanding of the various ways in which “the past” can be “had” is provided 
apparently by an analysis of 3. If even 3) should not be construed as representing 
somehow the “origin” of all the other senses in which someone can have history, it is 3) 
nevertheless that appears to be for Heidegger that which constitutes the background 
against which the other 2 fundamental senses in which history is da are discussed.  
The sense of history articulated by 3) reveals something important about 
“history:” namely, that history is something that can be “had.” A clarification of the 
“sense” in which “history” can be “had” becomes therefore necessary.  People with no 






history are people whose “Dasein,” ”das Daseins des Stammes,” is not affected in any 
way by the fact that their Dasein is the product of a process of becoming involving “past 
generations.” They do not “feel” themselves as the generation “succeeding” the previous 
generation, a stage in, or an outcome of, a process of becoming engulfing their own 
existence (Dasein):  
For them the past is not a character in which they live facticaly and 
somehow imbues the content of their life-experience.270 
Obviously, even people with no history still have access to the past: they do of 
course remember things they did yesterday, and are capable somehow to make use of 
yesterday’ experiences. “They have no history,” not in the sense that they have no past, 
and do not remember anything, but in the sense that the past is not “theirs specifically.” 
In other words, they do not feel as if the past belongs somehow to who they are and what 
they do, it is not a major factor in shaping their self-understanding, their actual life-
experience. By contrast, to “have history” amounts to preserving, in people’s own Dasein 
- in the very way in which they are da -,experienced as in process of becoming, the 
current stage of becoming as the outcome of this becoming for this very becoming. They 
see the past as “representing them,” as standing for who they have been; the past is in this 
sense “had” or “experienced” as their “own” past. What Heidegger appears here to imply 
is that the past shapes the self-understanding of such people, their actual life-experiences, 
the manner in which their daily activities are organized, what they consist in, what the 
priorities are, in general, how both individuals and the community as a whole are to go 
about their daily lives. Everything for this people is configured by how they understand 
themselves as being in “relation” to their own past. And they know it somehow. It is their 
past that determines for them who they are and what they should do. 
Out of this particular relation (Beziehung271) of having, intrinsic of Dasein, 
- as preservation and caring of one’s own past and existing (dasein) 
precisely in this preservation itself – the word ‘history’ acquires its 
specific meaning.272 









The preservation of the pastis the “rhythm of one’s own Dasein.” It is a 
“familiarity” of those who exist (des Daseienden) with their own past273. Their own past 
“figures into” their own Dasein274. The repeated emphasis on “one’s own past” is meant 
to bring into view that the historicity of certain people is characterized by an 
appropriation and absorption of the past into “actual existence,” into the actual Dasein. 
The motivation for being “interested” in the past in the first place, interest that is played 
out as preservation of the past, lies in the self himself (“das Ich und sein Erleben”): his 
own past opens up for the self the possibility of “finding” himself275. One’s own past 
represents who one is, and constitutes therefore the origin of one’s own coming to 
realization of what one is. 
 
To have (or not have) history 
It is noteworthy that, according to Heidegger, the “having of the past” is a 
relation in a special sense. First of all, it is not an objective, theoretical or cognitive 
relation: it does not presuppose the distinction between two different entities, people and 
their past. The past is not “had” as other things, like colors, hats, pets etc. can be “had:” 
the people are not in an “external” relation to their own past. Moreover, for people having 
(or not having) history, the past is not there (da) as something that can be acted upon, 
made use of, handled somehow: in other words, for such peoples the past is not 
something merely available for them to use. Furthermore, even if, theoretically speaking, 
any object can be regarded as an object in time and therefore as having necessarily a past, 
a “before,” the sense in which some people are said to not have “history” is obviously 
different: any people, regarded theoretically as something in the flowing time must have, 
objectively speaking, a past. But if some people are said to not have history, then the 
proper understanding of such “sense” of history assumes that “people,” their Dasein, is 
not merely an object in time, an objectively regarded object in the objectively regarded 









time. The manner in which “people with (or without) history” are da, exist is, as 
Heidegger puts it, not that of a “object;” they exist, are there, more in the manner in 
which a “subject” is there276. The “subject” or the self is always concerned with himself; 
the self is da by living everything in an appropriating relation to himself. The Dasein 
(existence/reality) of some peoples is essentially determined by the way in which they 
have understood themselves “in relation” to “their own past:” these peoples have 
“traditions.” The understanding is merely lived through: it is all about an “immanent 
relation of Dasein to its own past, which itself was lived through.277” “One has history” in 
the sense that history is “had” in the very way in which one is or lives. “This people have 
history” in the sense that the people cultivate their own tradition: they are and live in this 
cultivation and appropriation. In the having of history, history is not something one can 
have a relation with, on the contrary: history, more precisely, the manner in which one 
“has” its own past, defines who one is: 
It involves one’s own [past] which it [Dasein] ‘has’ as its own in the 
proper “relation” (Bezug) described above, and ‘is’ in this having.278 
As people with tradition clearly illustrate, Dasein has an intrinsic relation to its 
own past, rooted in itself, and consequently, Dasein can“have” it and “be” this very 
having: the having of history, how the past is experienced or lived through acquires the 
status of “being:” the having of history amounts to saying that one is how one was. One 
has the past in such a way that one “becomes” this having of one’s own past. “To have 
history” in this sense means that one’s own past is preserved and “taken along” in one’s 
own Dasein. 
However, this manner of being-there (Dasein) in relation to one’s own past as 
preserving and cultivating traditions is explicitly directed at the shared-world. When one 
lives in one’s own traditions, “which das Dasein gives itself,” one is preserving and 













cultivating one’s own past as the past of one’s own shared world. Obviously, the self-
world is always to some extent involved in the way in which the self lives this relation to 
the past as tradition, but it does not become an issue as such279. It is only in expressions 
like, “That man has a sad history,” that history is meant not as one’s own (eigen) shared 
past (in the modus of a constant preservation, taking along, and renewed cultivation of a 
shared worldly past), but as one’s own most authentic (eigenste) past whose origins are 
found in life’s explicit tendencies towards itself, towards the self-world. Here the self 
brings up the past as his own most genuine (self-worldly) past. The self does not come to 
himself, as it were, via the appropriation of a shared past, but directly inasmuch as the 
selfworld “is an issue for itself.280” All these ways of “having history” point indirectly 
into the direction of understanding the past as an event involving me somehow. This 
understanding comes to full expression in sentences like, “Something terrible happened 
to me all these years.” Here history is not an appropriation of the past, either shared or 
one’s own authentic past, but an event “happening” to me. 
 
Lived-ness of the past 
It becomes thus apparent that the introduction of Dasein as some sort of a special 
kind of existing or being there of the living self characterized by an intrinsic “relation” to 
“one’s own past” – that Dasein can let it come to full expression in the very way in which 
life-experience takes place, or the self is da -, is motivated by Heidegger’s move to 
elaborate a mode of lived-ness of history (gelebte Geschichte, facticity of life) at play 
but distinguishable somehow from the six traditional meanings of history. The way in 
which the past, always as one’s own, is co-experienced in actual life-experience 
introduces a “conflict281” right at the heart of life. The past is already experienced, “had,” 











encountered, lived through somehow. The past is genuinely lived past282. How the self 
has the past is already expressed in how the self lives: the self lives and is this 
appropriation of his own past. The self has no other possibility of being “himself,” would 
not know how to conduct himself, as it were, other than by constantly drawing on his 
own past. The past is always operative, as it were, in how humans live prior to their 
coming explicitly to terms with the past. Life is already historical. The living self is there 
as the self he has been for the self he is going to be. Life is already living its own past in 
pressing ahead into the future. The historical is immediate livingness. 
It is this specific “having of one’s own past” lived factically as a disturbing call 
to be oneself and giving rise to an irrepressible need of reassurance that determines 
beforehand anything that one can say meaningfully about history: it constitutes, in other 
words, the basic experience motivating the “ordinary” meanings of history. The various 
meanings of history find their origin in the way in which the past has already been 
encountered in life: as a source of possibilities for a self concerned to be(come) himself. 
History is motivated in life. As Heidegger will say a semester later: History is only 
emerging from and to a present. The “meanings” history has come to have are themselves 
the various expressions, more or less genuine, of how life itself has been referred to the 
past, encountered and lived it through. More generally, the living of something is already 
the expression, manifestation, phenomenon of life as lived, a certain way in which life 
has already been lived, encountered: and life is lived temporally. In other words, 
Heidegger wants to keep distinct how life can live its relation to the past (lived relation) 
from a theoretically understood relation to the past. To experience something explicitly as 
something, the past as past for example, is to have already experienced it in the very way 
in which one already is.Experience is not that much something the self “makes” or 
“does” as rather something the self “endures,” “suffers” or “undergoes.” The self lives by 
being referred to himself historically. 
Dasein, as a general designation for the specific manner, Wie, in which life is 
there, comes increasingly to be associated by Heidegger with human life in its capacity of 






“already having been related, referred, oriented” (das immer irgendwie Gerichtetsein283) 
in a concerned manner. By DaseinHeideggerdesignates the mode of living proper to 
humans in which they are “there” by already being referred to themselves in concern in 
living their own past into the future. Past, present and future are all lived through in the 
self’s concern with himself. Life as it is, the self in its ordinary daily dealings with 
various thingsand situations is a way of being referred to his own past in opening its own 
future. 
Philosophy has the task of preserving the facticity of life and of 
intensifying the facticity of Dasein.284 
Philosophy, to use my own words, should keep to the very basic experience of 
life, undistorted by theoretical reflection, try to always keep into view the very way in 
which the self is “there” to himself or “having” himself in living a world, and try to bring 
pointedly into stark relief the fundamentally self-referential concern for himself in how 
the self has already been projected, related, referred to and as himself in his life-
experiences. And life lives the past by having appropriated it in its actual experiences in 
an orientation toward itself, out of the fundamental preoccupation of the self to be 
himself. The past is “had” (“missing it” as in “not having it” is a form of having) by and 
in an actual Dasein; this having is lived, in other words, it has some sort of “existence” or 
“presence.” In short, it is there. Humans are this having of their own past: “Man in his 
concrete, individual, historical Dasein.285” Andrew Barasch explains this relation to the 
past in these words:  
The past has meaning only according to the mode in which it is 
appropriated by the self in its concern for fulfillment of a sense of 
existence.286 
And the same idea that Dasein is the way in which the self is da by being 













somehow already referred to himself – even if, in this case, inauthentically-, surfaces in 
another passage from the lectures on Christian religiosity from the same period: 
Dasein, the self, the being-real character of life is an absorption. The self 
is lived by the world, and this happens most intensely precisely when the 
self intends, in such Dasein, to live authentically. This ‘being lived’ is a 
particular How of facticity…287 
And the self develops a sense of what it means to be himself only in and out of 
this being-lived of the self. It is only because the self is already being lived that he can 
now encounter something, always in a concerned manner, in his own world.  
 
Existence 
Soon Heidegger will claim that the past is not a “feature” humans can choose to 
have or not have, an attachment to the actual life-experience which life can, if so chooses, 
lose somehow. Humans live historically in the sense that they “live and are” a certain 
way of being “in relation to” their own past. Dasein, at least initially, comes up in 
association with lived “having” of the past.This self’s intrinsic relation to one’s own past 
is always da in living. – I am what I have been. The concrete Dasein should be 
understood along the lines of Husserl’s conception of parts and wholes: the concrete 
Dasein is the whole Dasein288. Whole in the sense that Dasein is intended not only as the 
self’s experience of a world (what Heidegger in 1919 called erlebte Gehalte), the “living 
of something”-aspect of life, but the self-experience of the self (gelebte Erlebnisse, 
gelebtes Leben), the “lived”-aspect of life, expressed or manifested in and as the self’s 
experience of a world.  
If Dasein begins by designating a kind of living in which one is and lives one’s 
own understanding of being in relation to one’s own past, it will be soon be used in 












association with how human life is itself the expression of a certain way of “having” itself 
“temporally”. Dasein is the self who always ishimself what and how he himselfwas. This 
is HOW the self “has” himself in living. Life has an intrinsic temporal dimension. But, in 
providing possibilities to be himself, his own past is opening up the future. It is not only 
the past that can be lived, or had, the future also figures into the way in which the self is 
performing, in his own life, a manner of being himself: “Waiting gives the basic 
historical sense of facticity.289” Dasein is the term employed by Heidegger to designate 
this kind of life, that is, human life. To live is to be a self who comes to (has) himself in 
being what he was for a possibility of himself to be. To live is to be a certain manner of 
having one’s own self temporally (Dasein).  
The living character of all experiences was characterized by the inalienable 
unique holistic nature of the self in the experience of a familiar world and of a self-
transparent self. The self is a self only insofar as he is concerned with or care for himself. 
This self-concern that defines the self, coupled with the idea that the self can only come 
to be himself temporally is what will eventually determine Heidegger to focus more on 
the way in which life is there. As we can easily see, life is now conceptually couched in 
terms like “self,” “concern,” “familiar world,” “is,” “was,” or “having become.” Small 
wonder therefore to see Heidegger starting to focusincreasingly on the temporality of life 
that soon will become known as the fundamental distinction between being and time. I 
will return to this important point later. 
The fact that the self lives its own relation to its own past - which is nothing but 
a possibility of finding himself, of living as himself - does not necessarily mean that the 
self always lets this relation shape its own self-understanding or determine the manner 
and content of experience:“the motivations towards the self-world ‘sind mit da’, but they 
are existenzfrei.”The self is itself only by appropriating the past in such a way as to give it 
expression in and as the present:  
The performing-situation, authentic existence. - To appropriate the 
‘having’ so that the having becomes a ‘being’.290 
In other words, the relation to the past, although always lived somehow and 






always at work in determining how life conducts itself, can be downplayed in the actual 
experiences to the point where it not only plays no role anymore, but is even considered 
to be an obstacle to achieving a desired relation to the content of experience (see the 
theoretical attitude) – that is, is lived or experienced in a sense different from the one 
required by the very fact that the past is always the self’s “own” past, in a similar way in 
which the lived experience can be de-livened to the point where it no longer counts for 
the determination of the content of experience and the manner in which the content is 
experienced. But when the self’s own relation to its own past is given full due and taken 
as a fundamental factor in determining the content and manner of self’s experience, then 
the self’s relation to one’s own past is not only da, but also “makes up” the actual, factic, 
concrete, historically present Dasein.  
In this sense of co-being-there [Mit-da-Sein], of co-playing-a-role [Mit-
Eine-Rolle-Spielen], of “co-occurring” [Mit-vorkommen] in the factic 
world of experience, the past makesup [mitausmachen] the actual 
Dasein291. 
In Heidegger’s words, Dasein exists. The self himself lives as himself, can 
exist, in appropriating its own past, and lives this appropriation “understandingly” as an 
appropriation of himself, that is, is no longer merely da in his experience, but da as 
himself. The self is no longer alienated in life-experience. The self lives in the manner in 
which he can be his own self somehow, and this means the way in which he can “be” his 
own past: 
I monopolize my own past so that it is always again had for the first time 
and so that I myself am - from myself – affected always anew and thus 
‘am’ in a renewed performing.292 
The other extreme would be one in which “Man can be there, can have Dasein, 
without existing.293”  
This is the kind of “reality” pertaining to humans. It is the human being “in its 
concrete, individual historical Dasein.294” This is the primordial sense in which I live, I 











Such experience is not a type of immanent perception that is pursued with 
a theoretical purpose in mind and is intent on observing the qualities of 
present-to-hand ‘psychical’ processes and acts. On the contrary, the 
experience of having-myself in fact extends historically into the past of the 
‘I.’ This past is not like an appendage that the ‘I’ drags along with itself; 
rather, it is experienced as the past of an ‘I’ that experiences it historically 
within a horizon of expectations placed in advance of itself and for itself. 
And here the ‘I’ also has itself in the form of a self. To explicate 
phenomenologically the ‘how’ of this performing of experience according 
to its basic historical sense is the task that is most important for us in the 





The fundamental question guiding everything that follows concerns the 
manner and sense of the having of living [Erleben].296 
Heidegger was always interested in finding a way to reveal the way in which 
life lives and is lived before we can readjust our worldly orientation in the world and 
come to regard life from the theoretical standpoint, that is, before life is posited as an 
object and attempts are now made to discover what life can be - as an object before our 
eyes. Unfortunately, in the early lectures Heidegger is very skimpy on details about what 
exactly is the historicality of Dasein and how exactly does it constitute the facticity of 
life. We can only glean what Heidegger might have meant by it from the many references 
to facticity and historicality in the first lectures, references that, as said, are left mostly 
unexplained. He could give a more developed account of history, one that would find its 
way into Being and Time, only when the transition from life to being as the subject matter 
of philosophy is already in full swing, that is, in 1922-1923. This lends credence to the 
idea that it is the historical character of life that appears to have prompted Heidegger to 
abandon to some extent “life” as a proper philosophical term and employ instead “being” 
more and more. I will continue to follow Heidegger’s development by focusing on those 







apparent motives that led him from life philosophy to existential ontology. So far we 
have tried to show how the occurrence of the term Dasein understood as the manner in 
which life, or the self is da, appears to be motivated by Heidegger’s preoccupation with 
the historical character of life experience, and followed Heidegger’s own claim about the 
historicality of life constituting the facticity of life, by interpreting historicality as the 
self’s ‘carrying out’ his own past, his having-been, out of a self-concern for himself, and 
facticity as a moment of being-already-referred-to-himself constitutive of historicality. I 
will now bring in some passages from Heidegger’s lectures on the phenomenology of 
Christian life experience from 1920-1921 in order to provide further evidence that it is 
indeed the historical character of life that leads Heidegger to employ Dasein and Sein 
even in those contexts in which life, factic life now, or factic life-experience, is still 
claimed to be the subject matter of philosophy - the word factic now is no longer a 
relatively unnecessary addition to life meant merely to invoke life as such, “in and of 
itself,” but a crucial qualification intended to reveal what it is that we have in view now, 
namely life as “already-having-been,” life in its historicality.  The having-been moment 
should reminds us of the preworldly something as the “motivational process” of life 
itself, which renders life as is already lived, factical297 life, as a way life encounters itself, 
finds a solution, as it were, to its own inherent motivations. The interpretation of some 
passages from these lectures will also flesh out how Heidegger develops the idea that 
“facticity of life” is its “historicality.”  
To see life as it lives and is lived, “in its own orientation and its own style, in 
its own rhythm,” is to see it in its facticity298. Factic life is what “we are and live.” We 
live it in the sense that it “happens” to us. It is an encounter with ourselves299, which we 
experience in encountering worldly things (hammers, friends, the sunset, the plans we 
make, etc.). It is also, or better, the manner in which we live (faktisch leben): we live 












facticaly means that things are encountered in an orientation or tendency of the self to 
“come to itself.” Being-already-oriented or –referred-to and the specific manner in which 
this being-referred-to is realized in encountering a world constitutes the “facticity” of life. 
The facticity is historical, is in fact the historical300: “the facticity of life, Dasein, is 
historical in itself.301” 
My own past, history in general, is always of concern to me. My own past is 
not genuinely an objective domain of “past” entities that can or cannot have significance 
to me. But how does the self experience the past genuinely? 
How does the historical stand in Lebensdaseinselbst?302 
Time and again, Heidegger goes back to the source, the living-lived experience 
in which “the historical” originates and which alone “motivates” the various “standard” 
interpretations of history. The various interpretations of history are all “expressions” of, 
or various “responses” to, the “need” to deal with history, originating in factical life 
experience. In life, the “motive” to deal with “history” (the precise meaning is to be 
explicated only through a renewed performing of the experience which prompts us to 
deal with something like “history” in the first place) appears to be in our experience of 
our life’s passing. In factic life as opposed to life as is reflected upon, the past is never 
experienced as an object or a collection of objects having a certain common attribute. The 
past, genuinely my own past, is had as the disturbing reminder of my own temporality, 
where by temporality we should only understand a relation to an yet undetermined 
“transient” (Werden) character of my own life. I encounter my own past by finding 
myself “in need” to cope, as it were, with the “transiency” of my own being. My own 
past worries me insofar as it is somehow the source of my living genuinely; in his self-
concern the self is always oriented towards living himself as the “self” he genuinely is: 
the transient character of life needs to be lived as such, in complete purity, as it itself is 
the “original” experience of the historical as such.The genuine sense of the historical can 
be grasped only in keeping with the “transient character of life” as such. This transiency 
of my own life has to be fully experienced.  







Since it worries me, I always find myself trying to somehow “secure” myself in 
relation to my own past. Put it more bluntly: confronted with my own past, I always 
already find myself in “need” to know that everything is ok303, that I can come to 
appropriate my own past so as to make it stop being troublesome, worrisome, a cause of 
concern. The past is facticly experienced – that is, before I even come to reflect on it, it 
expresses how I am already “oriented” towards it – or lived as a disturbing character of 
my own life. But the past is also there for me to be appropriated by me, it is a task, 
something I have to deal or cope with somehow.  
Different philosophies of history are all various ways in which life can cope 
with “history,” can respond to its troubling and disturbing presence, as it were. For 
Heidegger, traditional philosophy managed to have three fundamental responses to the 
worrisome character of history: it tried to secure Dasein304by going against (Plato), with 
(Spengler)or out of history (Dilthey). While the first position wants to break up with 
history as it places the domain of being in opposition and beyond the historical, beyond 
anything transient and ephemeral, the second position sees the historical as the domain of 
being, and tries to secure the present (that is, itself) as one of the possible forms being can 
take in history, and the third position tries to reconcile the first two by regarding the 
historical as necessary for achieving trans-historical values and truths305. In all these three 
attempts at securing the present against the past, the factic character of history as a 
disturbing task in and of my own life, is annulled and, along with it, any possibility of 
reaching Dasein in its intimacy is thereby abandoned. In all previous philosophical 


















attempts at understanding history, life itself, “the human-historical reality [Wirklichkeit],” 
was beforehand conceived of as something in need of a “meaning:” only by having an 
unique meaning, life, that is, human reality, could now feel relieved knowing that it 
would not simply go away, that it stands for something that prevents it from historical 
dissolution. Life now can feel safe about itself. It no longer feels threatened by “his own 
past.” 
Nonetheless despite the fact that I am and live how I“have” my own past, I do 
not normally - first and foremost - live focused on, or even aware of, this “manner” in 
which I myself live and am. The manner in which I live and am leaves itself out of play. 
The manner of Dabeiseins goes therefore unnoticed306. I do not live in such a way as to 
normally come to see how I live. Whoever makes experiences does not in turn make the 
experience that he makes experiences307. In other words, the way in which I live is not 
genuinely determined by the very way in which I am, namely always already referred to 
myself temporally. To be able to turn around and focus on your Weise des Dabeiseins 
requires, according to Heidegger, a unique experience. This experience was achieved in 
the primitive Christian life-experience. Primitive Christian life-experience should be 
interpreted as this turning around of factic life onto itself, as the self’s reorienting and 
focusing on the very manner in which the self is there. As a result, Heidegger claims, 
Christian life-experience was historical through and through. Das Ich und sein Erleben, 
the self-world, becomes the decisive shaping factor in determining WHAT life is all 
about and HOW it should go about. In doing so, the Christians made the primordial 
experience that life (life of the self) is … time. 
The factic life-experience is historical. The Christian religiosity lived 
temporality as such.308 
In factic Christian life-experience the self comes to itself, that is, experiences 
himself as the self in preparation for the “end of time.” His life is an incessant experience 
of living how the present is drawing near to its end; it is the experience of life as coming-








to-the-end of time309. Moreover, a Christian is someone who knows he has become 
Christian (by listening the proclamation of the “good news.”) Christian life-experience is 
essentially determined by this experience: one is a Christian only as someone who has 
become Christian and knows it. To be a Christian is to constantly experience, and know at 
the same time of, one’s own “having-become” Christian: I am now what I have become, 
and this means, I live as a Christian, I lead a Christian life: my having-become a Christian 
is now the manner in which (How) I lead my life (how I comport myself in factic life310). 
Let us now pay attention to Heidegger’s choice of words when he clarifies these 
relations: 
Knowledge of one’s own having-become (Gewordensein) poses a very 
special task for the explication. From out of this the meaning of a facticity 
is determined, one that is accompanied by a particular knowledge. We tear 
the facticity apart from knowledge, but the facticity is entirely originarily 
co-experienced… Now, having-become is not an arbitrary event 
(Vorkommnis) in life; it is constantly co-experienced and in such a way 
that their being now (jetziges Sein) [Christian’s being, my note] is their 
having-become. Their having-become (Gewordensein) is their being now 
(jetzigesSein).311 
This paragraph is significant for our purposes in several respects: 1. Firstly, it 
brings life, facticity, thesense of temporality, and being all-together in a way that makes it 
a little easier to decipher what Heidegger means by them. 2. Secondly, it clarifies to some 
extent what Heidegger means by the genuine “historicality” or temporality of life; from 
this paragraph it is clear that the historical characterof life lies in the way in which the 
self lives by beingsomehow, in a horizon of expectation, how he has become. 3. And 
thirdly, it offers us a clue for understanding why being was found to be “appropriate” for 
clarifying the phenomenon of life in its historicity: the historical character of life cannot 
easily, if at all, be couched in terms derivative of life: that is, by using expressions like 
“past life,” “present life,” “I live,” “I have lived,” “lived past,” “my having-lived,” and so 
on and so forth. It is noteworthy that Heidegger introduces now words in his vocabulary 
(I was, I am, Gewordensein etc.) to clarify the phenomenon of life before he comes 









explicitly to reject “life” as the proper topic of philosophy.Initially, these terms, being, 
time, historicity, world and so on and so forth were all meant to interpret life, and not 
being. The way in which the “past” figures into the “living present” does not lend itself to 
be couched as easily in terms taken from the vocabulary of life. Expressions like “I am 
living the past,” “lived past” and so on have been used by Heidegger relatively often, but 
they must have appeared to him not only as too easily open to misinterpretations but also 
as too rigid to express the inner “dynamism” of factic-historical life. How can one use 
“life” and its linguistic variants to speak of the “becoming” inherent in life but in such a 
way as to avoid the theoretical attitude which cannot but understand the becoming as the 
transition from one temporally distinct stage or phase to another temporally different 
stage or phase? 4. And last but not least, the paragraph contains also the key to 
understanding Heidegger’s next step in his investigations of the phenomenon of life: 
“facticity” and Wissen of one’s own having-become are “entirely originarily co-
experienced.” Factic life-experience has therefore its own Wissen and Wissen of its own 
“having become.” In other words, factic life-experience is already an expression of an 
understanding, which is co-experienced together with the facticity itself: factic life 
experience has thus its Eigenexplikation312. I will come back to this later when I will 
discuss in detail Heidegger’s phenomenological method of formal indication. 
Of course, if even Heidegger has now some good reasons to deploy the terms 
Sein and Dasein more often in correlation with factic (historical) life, this alone by no 
means entails that Heidegger has yet already a full-fledged understanding of the 
fundamental distinction between beings and being, of the ontological difference as he 
will coin this distinction a couple of years later. He has nonetheless a clear understanding 
of the fundamental difference between the sense in which the self is there (lives – coming 
to itself temporally) and the sense in which everything else can be (is lived by the self – 
genuinely as worldly significant things, and then, in the non-genuine derivative 
theoretical attitude, as “objects” in and for a cognitive relation). 
Knowing of one’s own having-become for a coming-to-an-end is originarily 
co-experienced with the facticity of life, with the fact that one is how one has become in 
anticipation of an end. Anything experienced is now experienced against the background 





of awaiting or expectation. Something is the way it is in virtue of its being experienced in 
a certain expectation stemming from life itself. For example, I can come to experience 
something as hard, strenuous, or difficult precisely because I have been somehow 
expecting things to be easy, uncomplicated, and undemanding: I “myself live in a 
delectatio.313” Everything is what it is as the expression of the fact that life has already 
been oriented somehow, had its own expectations and tendencies. And everything 
experienced is itself the expression of how life performs[Vollzug] its own tendencies. 
Life-experience is, Heidegger concludes, historical: it can experience something only 
insofar as the self himself is implicated in “an historical experiencing.314” And most 
importantly the experiences of the self are not “simply there” [einfach da] in the flowing 
stream of counsciousness, but are “possessed” [sind gehabt] in experiencing.  
For Heidegger Christian life experience is not a special experience that only 
Christians can have. On the contrary, what Christians have experienced is how life itself 
experiences itself. Their experience is life experience itself in its facticity. In other words, 
life itself is the self-experience of Gewordenseins, and ein Wissen davon, a co-experience 
of its own having-become along with an understanding of its own having-become. 
Facticity refers to the having-become moment of the being of life as such, which itself is 
co-experienced in any experience. Experience of something is only possible within the 
horizon opened up by life as this kind of entity. Life itself comes to itself in this kind of 
experience. Life is this self-concerned self-having of life as a temporal stretching.     
Since now Heidegger speaks more and more of the being of life, it comes as no 
surprise to see him baptizing some of the fundamental terms in which he addressed the 
phenomenon of life with new names: life no longer lives and is lived, but now “my life 
‘is’315”; the “self-concern” of the self [Selbstbekümmerung] becomes “concern for one’s 
own being”316; the self himself becomes ein Wie des ‘bin’317; the lived past becomes the 











fundamental experience of time; the self becomes the self’s temporally stretching self-
having, while lifeitself is now understood as a mode of being [ein Wie des Seins318].  
The phenomenon of “Ich erlebe etwas” investigated in the first lectures, after 
having been recouched in terms of the phenomenon of Michselbsthaben,becomes now the 
phenomenon of “’I’ ‘is’ and as such ‘has’ it:319” meaning that, the self is in his own 
having-become and has the “is” as its own, that is, the self “is” (facticity) and “has” 
(existence) its being.  Heidegger has now clearly stepped onto the path to his later 
conception of Dasein as the being who is its own being. Rudi Visker in this article 
“Intransitive Facticity?” writes: 
One is one’s being, like one lives one’s life. But not quite like one 
cooksone’s dinner… One can choose not to cook one’s dinner and eat out 
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Chapter Six: Philosophy and Life 
Haben and Vollzug  
The question of how lived experiences can be investigated in their genuine 
character as lived experiences has taken the form of the question regarding the way in 
which the self is da in his (worldly, holistic, familiar, self-oriented) experiences of a (his 
own) world. The self lives his own life experiences in the manner in which he is 
participating (active verb) therein321. As we remember, for Heidegger the ultimate reality 
is the self in the actual performance [Vollzug] of life-experience, the self in self-
experiencing. The self is da by having himself somehow, and this “having” entails to 
some extent having its own past in the way in which he lives (into the future). The self is 
da, “is having” his own self in concern, by carrying out his having-become 
[Gewordensein] in the expectations he already has and cannot but have. Any experience 
of a wordly thing takes place within this “stretching of temporality.322” Since life’s self-
having is, however, not amorphous and undetermined, it is already an historical self-
understanding, the concern in self-having is a concern for a certain kind of his being in 
life, a certain way or sense of himself in life. I am not concerned with being in general, 
abstractly as it were, but with what and how I myself can be. “One’s own having-oneself 
– realized, intended in that of ‘life’ - is concern for one’s own being.” 
To say that the self has himself somehow is to say that the self already posseses 
an understanding of what it means for him to be himself and lives it, that is, the self ishow 
he understands himself to be: to live in an understanding of himself, which is the way in 
which the self is da, is to be it. This understanding is itself historical, and not simply 
attached to life like an accessory from the outside: in other words, the understanding is 
the understanding of someone who always is (now) what he was, interpretedness. It isan 
understanding in the form of having been interpreted.Life’s own understanding is the 
performance of how it has always already interpreted itself. It is, in a sense, the very 
performance of life, how life is lived: 
The nexuses of performance [Vollzugszusammenhänge] themselves are, in 






accordance with their own sense, an ‘understanding’.323 
To say that life has always already interpreted itself at the most originary level 
of temporality, and understands everything in light of this self-interpretedness, is to say 
that life has already always “addressed” its contents somehow. In any having, whatever is 
experienced is already somehow “spoken of.” That means that the self is himself 
somehow “spoken of” in his worlly experiences. Factic life has its own way of speaking 
of itself, its own Explikation, its own language. Moreoever, life experience,life’s self-
havingis not static, but an intrinsically dynamic movement. The “having” can only be 
experienced in … “having.” It has, in other words, a performative character again. It is 
the same idea from the first lectures, namely that the living character of lived experiences 
can only by experienced in living. Questions regarding the manner in which the self “is 
having” itself temporally in his world experiences will take us to what is arguably the 
most important element in our reconstitution of the motives that prompted Heidegger to 
move from “life” to “being.” As I will try to make clear in this chapter, terms like Dasein, 
Sein, Faktizität, even Temporalität should all be understood as “methodological” 
concepts proper to a hermeneutics whose only aim is to situate itself in life experience so 
as to make explicit the very sense in which life is da, in other words, how the self is 
concretely the self that it is, or, in other words, the very sense in which “I am.” I have not 
used the expression “in other words” arbitrarily, as a mere form of speech. It is the point 
of this section and of the next chapter to show that “I am” is indeed a different – so 
Heidegger – methodologically more adequate formulation of Ich erlebe etwas, that 
Faktizität is indeed a different, methodologically speaking, more adequate expression of 
the way life is da, just as Dasein is a better methodological expression for the living self. 
All these expressions are not meant to change the subject of philosophical research, but to 
bring it instead more adequately, methodologically speaking, to self-presentation. The 
philosophy of being is not meant, at least initially, to overcome, but to radicalize, life-
philosophy. 
Heidegger’s breakthrough 
Heidegger was constantly preoccupied with methodological considerations 






concerning the adequate manner in which the object of philosophy, life, is to be 
approached. From the middle of 1919 when he was questioning into the manner in which 
the eminently concrete lived experience of something is to be addressed until later when 
we find him preoccupied with the manner in which the self “is actualizing his self” (is 
having) himself in self-concern as factic world experience, he will not cease to raise the 
question regarding the proper manner in which this Etwas can be properly experienced 
and explicitly revealed as it itself is. Heidegger realized from the beginning that life 
(Erlebnis, Lebenserfahrung, factic life) cannot be “had” as ein Etwas one can look at. 
This Etwas (Erlebnis) was given originarily and genuinely only in the experiencing or 
living of it; it is highly “personal.”To experience something is to for a self to “have” it 
somehow in one of life’s tendencies and motivations.  The self lives inasmuch as it itself 
is somehow lived, it always finds itself one way or another in the movement of 
performing one of life’s ways of “having” itself in the way in which it encounters worldly 
things.  Philosophy as a systematic and explicatory approach of life in its unique 
character had to be centered on the problem of liv-ing or experience-ing. The proper 
access to life as life is to be gained through a radicalization of the “personal” character of 
life, and by no means by an eradication of it. As such, philosophy can genuinely have its 
“object,” life in its living character, its performative character, only in and as a 
“repetition” of this “performance.” As a result, philosophy itself has a performative 
character: it only consists in “philosophizing:” it is the movement of life’s own 
understanding to come to a clarification of itself. Philosophy understands itself as an 
illuminating of the living. Philosophy is not about life; philosophy is life caught in the 
movement of self-understanding324. Philosophy itself is an accomplishment of life325 or a 
particular, yet crucial, way in which life is performing (vollziehen) itself.  
This is the reason why for Heidegger philosophical concepts are not like 
theoretical concepts in general in that they are not intended to describe an object and 
place it into an internally ordered objective region of entities. Philosophy understands 
itself as an intensification of life’s own tendencies and motivations, an “intensified” 








living, a radicalization of life’s own interpretative tendencies, for the sake of pushing for 
an explication of life that brings it face to face to itself. As mentioned above, Haben and 
understanding are co-originary: one ““is” what one apprehendes and apprehends what 
one “is”.326” To “have” something is to have understood it somehow already327. 
Philosophy, according to Heidegger, is nothing but a “repetition” of life’s own self-
interpretation, aiming at preventing life from getting totally absorbed in its contents and 
at revealing the having-become presence (Dasein) of the self in the articulation of those 
contents, or, to put it slightly differently, the interpretedness “in” which Dasein lives. 
Any experience is an encounter328: things encountered in situations are various 
“resolutions” to life’s motivations.  
Heidegger’s breakthough, I believe, was when he realized that the performative 
character, the living, personal dimension, of any experience, has already “entered” factic 
experience as the unquestioned, taken-for-granted, obvious “manner” in which an object 
has already been encountered as an object of concern for self.  
Having-myself and being can be determined in accordance with its sense 
out of the concrete situation, that is, out of the lived lifeworld.329 
Life is lived in the manner in which life is living. It is precisely this manner of 
having already encountered the world somehow that represents life at its most basic, 
originary level. The (always one’s own) world is alreadyverstanden, the world as is 
factically lived is an “answer,” as it were, to life’s questions and needs. Life lives in how 
the world has been encountered already. The self lives in its Verständlichkeit. It is what 
life is in and of itself: factic life. Husserl’s phenomenology provided him with the 
conceptual means for conceptualizing this HOW of life without falling back on the 
theoretical attitude, which cannot but “view” its objects objectively, more dangerously so 
when it comes to “objects” that are not objects at all, while Dilthey gave him the insights 
into the nature of the philosophical understanding as a movement of, from and for life 










Any worldly experience of something is performed or lived in the manner in 
which that something has already been encountered, intelligibly articulated, in and for 
life. This “articulatedness” (having-interpreted, interpretedness) refers to eine 
Grunderfahrung. It is a fundamental experience in the sense that it is “prior” to any 
concrete, factic experience but “constituting” at the same time precisely the concreteness 
of the experience, the structure, the articulation, the “senses” in which something can 
become an object of concern for a self always in the movement of being concerned for 
itself. In other words, the ways in which the concrete experience is concretely taking 
place (performed): as always an experience of a self. It is a “concrete,” not abstract 
moment of experience. It cannot be given in any other way than in experience. Prior, of 
course, not in the Kantian sense of a priori, as subjective categories of objectivity, but 
prior in the sense that it pre-figures, projects the way in which the experienced can make 
sense as an object of concern in advance, can appear in the experience of the self’s 
movement of performing [Vollzug] his care for self. It is the “lived” moment, or the 
experiencing [Erfahren] moment of experience, set in contrast with the content of 
experience (Erfahrenes). Or, as Crowell likes to point out, it is the locus where Heidegger 
discovers the difference between meaning (of entities) and entities331. It is noteworthy 
that for Heidegger, the lived [gelebte]aspect of life is precisely the performative character 
of life: gelebt, that is, vollzogen332.  
 
Living and Philosophizing 
To drive this important point home one more time, crucial or Heidegger is the 
fact that in any concrete experience the way in which the self has decided to “possess” 
(verstanden) the content of experience is already operative in the experience as such and, 










very importantly, is itself lived-through in that experience333.Any ordinary experience of 
an object (understood formally as something) is the “expression” of a fundamental 
experiencing of that object. In encountering an entity in the world the self is already 
implicated into a self-experiencing which is da (Heidegger says oftentime “structured”) 
as the way in which the object has “already” been addressed, verstanden, interpreted as 
something in principle, and as requiring both its own manner of access in principle and 
its own manner of accomplishing this manner of access in principle – the pre-worldly 
something. As we will see shortly, by “in principle” Heidegger means “formal” in a 
special sense. Philosophy is life’s movement of making explicit the way in which objects 
(das Erlebte, later entitities) have already been encountered, and this always means, 
verstandenin principle by a self who always lives by being concerned for self: philosophy 
is, says Heidegger, “prinzipielles Haben334“; it is, if I understand Heidegger correctly, a 
“re-doing” of how life is having its (own) world but only in regard to how it can have it 
in principle, as something the self can be concerned about in and for his dynamic 
concernfor self.  Philosophy does not replace life, it only points the way in the direction 
of those own possibilities in which life can have itself genuinely, in other words, it only 
prescribes the ways in which life can accomplish or perform its concern for self more 
adequately relative to its own possibilities. 
This repetition (re-minding) of das Verstandene for the sake of illuminating the 
way in which the self has already taken itinto possession, put its stamp on it, made it its 
own (the appropriation inherent in Erlebnis as Er-eignen), has to deal with the fact that 
das Verstandene is life’s own Verstandene, which here means that it is das Verstandene 
des Verstehens335. It is a repetition (re-minding, re-calling, re-searching) of what one has 
already understood, and not of a “foreign” body of knowledge. For Heidegger this 
amounts to saying that what philosophy (life’s movement towards an “explicit” self-
understanding) has to do is to appropriate what life itself has already understood. This 
appropriation of its own Verstandene can only take the form of a disarticulation of the 









ways in which das Verstandene has become verstanden. Verstehen has to disarticulate its 
own manner in which it has had its Verstandene with regard to its Verständlichkeit. 
Philosophy is thus inevitably caught up in a historical understanding: it is life’s turning 
back onto itself336. Philosophy as life’s own tendency to self-appropriation in 
understanding can only come to understanding life - life in its facticity as a movement of 
the self - only by way of a dis-articulation or de-pretation (Destruktion) of its own 
articulatedness or interpretedness with respect to its being-intended as articulated, 
intelligible as an object of concern for self. Life is intentional but intentionality is not the 
mark of a “pure ego,” a transcendental I, or of pure consciousness; it is instead the mark 
of a self always found in the movement of being concernedfor self. Intentionality, so 
Heidegger, has not fallen accidentaly from the sky. On the contrary: it is embedded in 
life337. It is how life “operates,” the movement of concernfor self: “gerichteten, 
sorgenden Ausssein auf etwas338”. 
 
Heidegger’s Critique of Life Philosophy of his time 
This idea that philosophy can only proceed by destructively appropriating its 
factical understanding is what constitutes the main charge Heidegger raises against all 
preceding philosophies of life. Their biggest failure, according to him, was that they did 
not take into consideration the fact that their investigation of life was already moving 
within a prior interpretedness of life as a “specific kind of object” with its “specific 
manner of access.” One cannot arrive at an adequate understanding of the movement of 
life unless one pays attention to the fact that any understanding of life moves already “in” 
a prior interpretedness of life: in other words, it is itself caught up in one of life’s 
motivated tendecies and itself an articulation of such a motivation. Life has already been 
verstanden somehow. If one fails to see that life has already been verstandenprior to 
one’s explicit coming to terms with life, one misses thereby the opportunity of freeing 
oneself from the shackles of an inauthentic understanding, which amounts to missing the 







opportunity of living authentically339. The “interpretedness” of life is to be found not in 
the positive advancements philosophers make in their push to conceive of life in “better,” 
“deeper” or “more accurate” ways, but in the “implicit” manners in which they have 
already taken their object, life, to “stand in view,” as something, Etwas,an objectto be 
investigated. The way in which life figures already in their understanding prior to any 
explicit focusing on it theoretically, is an articulation of the way in which life has 
encountered itself already. The “past” haunts the present not by imposing its “old” 
contents on the present, but in the very manners in which “new” contents are to be 
experienced: new contents are so experienced that they are already appearing “in” a prior 
addressing of them by the self in the movement of concern for self.  
Pre-worldly something = Phenomenon (Gehalt, Bezug, Vollzug) 
The phenomenological, living, pre-worldly Etwas of the first lectures has 
become now the mannerin which the self is performing the concernfor self in situations 
by possessing himself already, in advance in the experience of a worldly something; it 
reveals, in other words, the manner in which something can figure in self’s self-
performing concern for itself. The problem of the proper way of grasping lived 
experiences in their living, personal character has now been redescribed as the problem of 
the manner in which the self is having itself (coming into one’s own possession) 
concretely in and as world experience: interpreting any ordinary, taken-for-granted 
experience of something (history or life for example) as itself the expression of the way 
in which the self is encountering itself and taking itself into possession factically or, to 
use Heidegger’s early terminology, as the expression of how life itself fulfills its own 
inherent motivations, is Heidegger’s next step towards finding a solution to the problem 
of the proper way of grasping living experiences in their living character. It is clear, 
however, thatthe problem of the proper manner in which living experiences are to be 
addressed in advance as the proper topic of investigation, and of how one can grasp the 









living experience in its living character (how the self is there), has continued to be of 
crucial signifiance for Heidegger, and more important than any new discoveries about it 
based on a conceptual frame left unexamined and unquestioned. Lived experiences as the 
ultimate source of meaningcan be explicated in their meaning-conffering role only by 
exploiting life’s own tendency to “turn back upon itself.” This now is couched by 
Heidegger as life’s tendency to snatch itself back from its absorption into the world. The 
very “manner” in which the world is factically experienced refers life back to itself. The 
preworldly something is the “manner” in which life, the living self is dato and for itself in 
experiencing a worldy something (as fully understood and taken for granted). And the 
living self is da in concern for self.  The concern for self makes explicit, however, that 
the self is “something” it can have: the self is da by being always open to the possibility 
of either losing or gaining it-self. This possibility is played out however in the self’s 
active, performative engagement with the things and situations it deals with. The question 
now is how Heidegger can make explicit the way the self is da, the very active 
engagement or participation of the self, or the pre-worldly something as die 
Motivierungsprozeß des Lebens, without lapsing into an objectifying attitude which 
would render the self as yet another “object” in the world. 
The experience of any object is characterized formally by a specific manner in 
which the object has (1) already been had, taken into possession [Vorhabe]as something 
(for example, as an object-like entity),(2) has alreadybeen conceived of in specific terms 
[Vorgriff], for example, as a mental process), and (3) equally importantly, by a specific 
manner in which the having and conceptualizing have beenperformed or carried 
outconcretely.  A concrete experience consistsin both having and conceiving of  
“something.” The “having,” “conceiving” and “performing” are all, in a sense, formal 
properties of any concrete experience: they constitute the structure of the pre-worldly 
something, as Heidegger understands it. A living experiencecan now be understood as a 
living experience provided that we grasp the three “senses” or modalitiesfiguring into any 
experience and whose “completion” or fulfillingis the concrete, ordinary, factical 
experience: the content-sense (Gehaltsinn- the “whatness”, the formal character of that 
which the experience is about; for example, “objectively real,” “worldly significant” 




relation to the content; for example, perceptual, loving, cognitive, emotional etc.), and the 
performing-sense (Vollzugsinn - the formal character of the manner in which the 
relating-sense is performed, “and thus governing the manner in which the content is 
presented340”). I live “in” an interpretedness of life -which amounts to saying that the self 
is in possession of itself factically and lives in this constant preoccupation with itself-, 
means now that the self is da in accordance with these three intentional moments341.  
’Phenomenon’ is sense-completion with respect to these three directions. 
Phenomenology is the explicating of this sense-completion; it gives the 
‘logos’ of phenomena...342 
It should be kept in mind that these three senses are not, according to 
Heidegger, a new kind of “object.” They can indeed be brought out in any experience of 
an object in general, but this should not be construed as if the possibility of bringing them 
into view makes them into “objects” in the theoretical or formally theoretical sense. The 
making explicit of these three sense dimensions in accordance with which any experience 
takes place and can be an experience of the self, can only be conducted from within the 
experience itself as any attempt at stepping out of the experience results in its 
objectivation. As Oudemanns rightly observes – with the help, I believe, of Heidegger’s 
later interpretion of categorical intuition from his lectures on the history of concept of 
time from 1924 -: 
The sense of objectlike-ness is not a new objectuality or a new region of 
objects; it only indicates a manner of experiencing, a sense of relation 
which shows itself only in a ‘manner’ of performing.343 
These senses are, according to Heidegger, gelebt and not erlebt: experience 
consists in theirperforming, but is not about them344. They characterize the modalities in 















which something shows up as what it is in our dealings with it. They are “implicit,” not 
“explicit” in experience. Life is not concernfor understanding, but for some understood 
Etwas. Something, however, would not be an object of concern for self unless it appears 
“in” an understanding of the self for self: that is, unless it appears as somehow already 
interpreted in, from and for a situation of the self. It is die Verständlichkeit of life that 
accounts for the sense in which Etwas is. Needless to say, in any situation the three 
senses are to be distinguished only insofar as emphasis on each one of them reveals 
aspects not easily accountable for when emphasis is put on the other two.  Any situation 
can be analyzed in accordance with these three immanent dimensions – Heidegger uses 
often the term “direction” instead of “sense.”  They all form one unitary sense-
completion345. They are “elements” constituting the sense346. They express the Urstruktur 
of any situation: 
The leading back to the sense-relations and the articulation of the genuine 
sense-directions incorporated therein is the end of phenomenological 
task.347 
To gain access to the manner in which the content is had in a particular 
situation, one must pay full attention to the concrete, factic performing of the situation; in 
other words, one has to pay close attention to the manner in which the self “engages in” 
the whole experience348. We cannot properly account phenomenologically for a 
phenomenon without taking into consideration a carefully distinguished “sense” of 
existence. The performing sense is the “being-there” of the self349. Phenomenology, 
according to Heidegger, is the attempt at making these “senses” explicit in such a way as 
to make them available for a systematic grasping of life in and of itself. The content, 
relational and performing sense are Heidegger’s proposal to rethink the “being-there” of 
the living self, of the way in which life is da concretely, in and for itself.As I understand 













it, Heidegger has now reinterpreted the living, personal character of lived experience as 
the “manners” or “senses” in which “something” can figure into the self’s concern for 
self. These gelebt senses represent the very manner in which the living takes place, the 
way in which life encounters itself, the manner in which the self is having itself. Life and 
philosophy have the same “content” but they differ both in the manner in which they go 
about this content and also the manner in which they perform this engagement with it. 
As mentioned earlier, life itself – as is the case with any“object” - has already 
been interpreted. This interpretation can be subjected to a phenomenological 
investigation intent on laying bare the three directions in accordance with which “life” 
has been addressed already350. Heidegger discussed in his early lectures three cases in 
which “life” has already been interpreted one way or another: Dilthey’s, Rickert’s and 
Jaspers’ philosophies of life. The manner of approaching life, that is, the relating sense, is 
different in each case (historical, epistemological and “aesthetical”), but all three have 
two important things in common: a prior “setting-up” of life as something “made-up of” 
or “constituted by” isolated, discreet lived experiences, life as a flowing series of lived 
experiences (which, to Heidegger, is the most advanced form of theorizing), and an 
indifference as to how life makes itself “present” concretely in our concretely lived living 
experiences (the performing sense). As a result of this critique Heidegger refuses to take 
life as being somehow constituted (“life is altogether there”), and puts emphasis on the 
sense of performing (Vollzug) of life, which for Heidegger is, again, nothing but the 
“being-there of the self351.” The performing sense characterizes life in its livingness; it is 
the facticity of life. Without gaining access to the facticity of life, “the fundamental sense 
of the being of life352” would remain closed to us.  
The destruction or de-pretation of das Verstandene takes now a more elaborate 
and precise form in light of the intentional moments “constituting” any situation as 
situation. The content-sense commits the self to a certain manner of addressing and also 
to a certain manner of performing this manner of addressing. Sometimes it may so 
happen that the relational sense may turn out to be incompatible with the content sense, to 







the effect that the manner of approaching can be more or less unsuitable for the kind of 
content sought to be experienced: what is experienced may be distorted partially or 
completely by the very manner in which the content is experienced. Also it may also 
happen that the manner of carrying out the relational sense might turn out to be 
unsuitable for the specific kind of relational sense in which the content is sought to be 
had/experienced. It is precisely this kind of “unsuitability” between the three sense-
directions that opens the door to a philosophical critique [Auseinander-setzung]. A 
situation can be analyzed on the basis of the proper mutual suitability of its three 
dimensions353. 
The difficulty right at the heart of life lies in the fact that this sense-completion 
in which the world and the self are there is not readily visible. It takes phenomenology, a 
special movement of life, to bring it to light. Phenomenology is life’s own re-channeling 
of its own tendency to get absorbed in the telos of actualizing, das Verstandene, in the 
world and self-world as they have already been understood and now facticaly engaged 
with in the manner in which the self understands to deal with things, people and various 
issues in situations, into itself as a self-actualizer354as such. Accordingly, philosophy 
does not deal with “concrete” contents, but only with the ways in which contents of 
experience can become “concrete:” in other words, it only deals with the ways (senses) in 
which something can “become” and has as a matter of fact already become “concrete” for 
a self who is the very manner in which “something” can appear only as “taken into care.”   
To talk of “ways in which something becomes concrete” can be misleading in 
this context. It may leave the false impression that what we are dealing here with is an 
activity of a subject who is “imposing” its own structures of understanding on the “real 
objects” and modifies them so as to correspond to what the “subject” can apprehend: it is 
not “the result of the activity of intellectual understanding upon the external world.355” 











Heidegger’s reinterpretation of intentionality as the basic mode of being of a self caught 
in the movement of being concern for self is not a return to Kant’s transcendentalism. 
The senses do not  “constitute” a phenomenon in the sense of “fabricating” or 
“producing” it. It is only an accentuation of some ideal moments meant to present things 
in a “new” light. They are indeed a priori but in the sense of “unquestionable from 
within,” and not in that of “universally valid.356” They bring to light the manner in which 
Etwas can be experienced. Nor do the senses represent a redescription of the Husserilian 
sense of the “formal,” for the “intentional act” is grasped first and foremost as the very 
manner in which a self performs its own concern for self. The intentional act is not 
interpreted as an act of consciousness in general, as an intentional act as eidos: it is, on 
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Chapter Seven: Life as being 
Formal Indicators 
In the wake of his critique of the philosophies of life of his time, Heidegger is 
now fully aware that philosophy cannot proceed blindly, that is, without taking into 
consideration its own “presuppositions,” its own taken-for-granted, always in action 
(vollzugshaft),a priori “take on” the object of investigation.  This taking into 
consideration of one’s own already operative “take on” the object cannot, however, be 
done directly. Any attempt to tackle the three “fore-senses” directly falls prey to the 
theoretical attitude in that it fails to account for the object from within its performative 
dynamics. Any “direct” approach to one’s own philosophical presuppositions would 
enforce once more the hold the interpretedness of life has on any attempts at interpreting 
life from within. What philosophy can do, however, is to re-actualize a concrete 
experience in which the object of investigation has already been addressed and try to 
“accentuate” the senses in which the object of experience has already been “had,” 
“conceptualized” and “actualized” as the very manner in which the object has been in 
advance held into view as Etwas dealt with, in the hopes that such an accentuation will 
eventually lead to the genuine way in which the object has already been encountered and 
whose expression the concrete experience is: experience as a phenomenon. “Here as well 
as everywhere it is all about bringing to mind an experience,357” for the sake of 
accentuating the manners of its concretization. As a repetition of a performance that has 
already its own self-interpretation, philosophy can only re-perform the self-interpretation 
of life in an accentuation of the fore-having already operative in any experience. Since, 
however, philosophy does not want to be an ordinary “calling to mind” of an experience, 
a mere repetition, but a “re-doing” [Wieder-holen] of the experience with a “new 
intention” in mind - with the intention namely of explicating the manner in which the 
object has already been “had” and “conceptualized” in advance in accordance with the 
three senses -, the philosophical approach is barred from the beginning from having its 
objects in an authentic way, that is, in the fully concrete way in which things are 
ordinarily experienced. That which is the object of philosophical investigation can only 





be approached and open to investigation only in the manner in which it has already been 
encountered. Philosophy is a formal activity. Its concepts are “formal,” in the sense that 
they express a “sense” in which things can be and in fact are already, that is, in 
advance,encountered in life. They are formal in that they express a manner of 
experiencing. They do no refer to a “region of being.” Philosophical concepts are formal 
only in the sense that they characterize the manner in which the fully concrete, that is, the 
whole intentional act is performed. They give expression to the manner in which a self is 
the movement of being concerned with self by living in a world already interpreted by 
and for self.  
Despite the fact that in factical, ordinary concrete experience, the self is having 
itself more genuinely than in theoretical experience, in ordinary experience the self is still 
constantly prone to lapsing into forgetting itself, that is, is still not having itself 
authentically. The self lives first and foremost in a tendency to fall away from itself. The 
performative character of living, which is the being-there of the self, gets lost, as it were, 
in the very performing of living. The self loses itself whenbeing itself. Philosophy is 
life’s movement of turning back upon itself, the self’s own movement of re-capturing the 
way it itself is there in the experience of something, as a possibility of the self to 
encounter itself more authentically. Philosophy begins with this inauthentic having of life 
and as a movement or “struggle” against it. As already mentioned, life and philosophy 
have the same “content;” philosophy, however, has a different manner of going about this 
same content. What is different is the manner in which the content is being presented: in 
philosophy the content (the world as such) is so presented that the being-there of the self 
is addressed only from within those life experiences in which life itself has become 
highly questionable.In other words, philosophy is made possible by those contexts in life 
in which the ordinary intelligibility of life collapses, and life becomes questionable and 
itself in need to come to an understanding of itself. Instead of finding itself oriented 
towards the world through experience/living, life comes to experience the world’s 
character of “being experienced” itself. The world therefore appears in a “new” light 
insofar as the manner of approaching it has changed.  
The performance of philosophical interpretation is an anti-ruinance 
movement, and indeed so that it performs itself in the appropriated manner 




that factical life comes to its authentically developable self-giveness.358 
According to Heidegger, it is crucial to re-experience the “content” and the 
“relating” sense from the standpoint of life’s movement [Vollzug] of turning back upon 
itself. “That something, something lived, gives itself always in some way or another 
(what I encounter – I myself whom I myself encounter in various ways), can be 
terminologically formulated as follows: it appears, it is a phenomenon.”359 
As a phenomenon life, like any other phenomenon, can only be understood in a 
formally indicative manner, indicative in the sense that any concrete situation (any 
concrete, ordinary, factic lived experience of something) as a phenomenon refers the 
phenomenologist to life’s structured a priori “take on” das Erlebte; to the three senses in 
accordance with which the situation takes place, and make up dieUr-struktur of the 
situation. The phenomenolog can understand the living experience, now situation or 
factic life or life experience, in its living character, that is, in its peculiarity of being a 
self’s experience and self-experience, but only in a “formally indicative” manner, only 
insofar as he can grasp the three senses “making up” the situation. All philosophical 
concepts are to be understood and employed as “formal indicators:”  
We call the methodical use of a sense guiding the phenomenological 
exposition ‘formal indicator’.360 
Philosophy wants to pave the way for a genuine encounter of the object, on the 
basis of an ongoing directed dis-articulation of the ways in which the object has already 
been encountered. Philosophy, in other words, wants to lead life to a more genuine self-
encounter. To this end, philosophy must in advance “take” its own object in such a way 
as to leave open the possibility of encountering it anew. In missing out the concrete, 















whole manner (Sinnganzheit) in which an object is genuinely encountered, all previous 
philosophies of life missed the opportunity of encountering life in theonly manner 
adequate to it. Their mistake was to focus solely on the content-sense and leave intact the 
relating and performing sense in which the object was genuinely, that is, facticaly, given. 
Life, Heidegger suggests, develops a “sense” of itself only in living, only in being itself, 
and this “manner” of self-giviness has to be replicated for an illumination of 
life.Philosophy, as Heidegger understands it, can no longer afford to repeat the same 
mistake: “Die Erben haben es verspielt361.”Philosophy as formal indicating must not, 
therefore, blindly pre-judge (fall into it unreflectively) the manner in which its object is 
given in and for experience (Bezug), nor the manner in which the object is to be given in 
its experiencing (Vollzug). As a result, the philosophical method must keep the content 
and peforming sense open for further determinations. Only by accentuating the senses 
(the hows, manners, modes)in which the object has already been experienced with the 
intention now of becoming aware of one’s own concrete manner of having the object as 
an object of investigation (Bezug and Vollzug), can philosophy succeed in pressing for a 
more genuine encounter (the unity of Gehalt, Bezug and Vollzug) of the object by 
revealing new possibilities of genuine encounter. Life itself comes to itself in 
understanding how it has already encountered its contents, in understanding the world in 
its being-encountered by life itself. Formal indicators are formal also in the sense that 
they are indications of amanner of a genuine encounter with an object. They regard the 
object only with respect to the twofold manner [Bezug and Vollzug] in and through which 
its content sense is being presented as an object of concer for self. Philosophical concepts 
are indicators of a genuine encounter of the object.  
The [formal indicator] belongs to the phenomenological exposition as a 
methodical moment. Why is it called ‘formal’? The formal character has 
to do with the relating aspect. The indicator wants to indicate in 
advancethe relating of the phenomenon – though in a negative sense, only 
as a warning, so to speak. A phenomenon should be given in advance in 
such a way as to keep its relating sense in suspension. One must avoid 
assuming that its relating sense is originarily theoretical. The relating and 
performing sense of the phenomenon are not determined in advance; it is 
held in suspension… The formal indicator is a defence, a preliminary 
measure of security, so that the performing character still remains free. 





The necessity to have a measure of security stems from the fallentendency 
of factic life-experience that threatens constantly to slip in objectlikeness 
[Objektmäßiges] from out of which we must however bring the 
phenomenon out362. 
Accordingly, concepts as formal indicators are meant to be articulations of the 
ways in which objects are to be given in living, in experience. Their retrieval coincide 
with an appropriation of life itself. They express a “manner of access:” that to which they 
provide access is not however an “object” per se, but a manner of experiencing it, that is, 
to a sense of the self as living. 
It is important to underscore the point that das formale Anzeige is, for 
Heidegger, the only manner in which we can articulate our understanding of a situation as 
a “unity in living.363” The point is important because it indicates that the elaboration of 
the formal indicator as the proper philosophical method has been arrived at and 
conducted in the context of Heidegger’s preocuppations with life. As we remember, a 
situation is  “eine Einheit im Erleben;” it is the concrete, factic articulation of the (whole) 
self’s having himself in his (holistic) experiencing of something, which experiencing 
takes places as the self’s living (acting, thinking, remembering etc.) in an interpretedness 
of that something as an object of concern for self. A situation, a factic life-experience is 
Heidegger’s elaboration of the “living character” of Erlebnis.   
Heidegger is now claiming that the only proper way to keep the “living” 
character of life experience, life, lived experience alive in philosophy, is by keeping the 
relating and performingsense of the phenomenon of life open to more genuine 
determinations. 
In light of his newly elaborated method of formal indicating, Heidegger will 
approach again all the “categories” of life he had already found as being exhibited in and 
by life, this time, however, in the clear consciousness that they all should be explicitly 
interpreted as “formal indicators.” If up until now methodological considerations 
accompanied Heidegger’s incursions into the proper way in which life can become an 
object of investigation, from now on they will take center stage. In the early years, 
Heidegger appears to have only to some extent arrived at his insights into the “categories 






of life” as a result and in the wake of a destruction of contemporary life philosophy. 
Living in a world, concern as the manner in which the self finds itself and its own world, 
the self encountering himself not as an I but in the manner in which he lives in his own 
world, the self-having of the self, the facticity of life as the lived structural disclosure of 
the self and world, prior to but performed in and as the specific manners in which worldly 
objects are concretely encountered or experienced, all these are not the direct result of 
Heidegger’s destruction of traditional interpretations of life. Heidegger’s critique of 
previous life philosophies is in point of fact conducted on the basis of a prior grasp 
(Vorgriff) of life as anything but a “natural occurrence,” and of an explicit refusal to take 
life as something “in” nature that can be genuinely given in a theoretical, contemplative 
relation to it. Heidegger’s Vorgriff of his “take on” life has all along been “directed, 
caring being-out-to.”  In other words, his insights into life (situational-, world-, self- 
character of life, Bedeutsamkeit as the sense in which worldly objects are given in and for 
the concern for self) have been to some extent gained prior, or, in any case, along with 
his renewed attempts at developing a clear understanding of how philosophical method 
works. Once he becomes clear on the nature and precise role of philosophical method in 
the form of formal indicators, Heidegger appears to change his tactics a bit: in the years 
1920-1922 he appears to be preoccupied more with re-appropriating his early insights 
into life in a manner explicitly consistent with the formal indicating character of all 
philosophical concepts: life, world, care, self, even philosophy itself will be now re-
visited in order to bring out their formal indicative character. Anything philosophy 
operates with – “life” included - is reinterpreted explicitly now as a formal indicator. The 
shift from life to being will be accounted for by Heidegger’s explicit move to revisit his 
philosophy of life and re-appropriate it in light and terms of his understanding of the 
formal indicating character of philosophy. 
Heidegger’s move, however, is more of a reformulation of the same problem 







Philosophy undergoes the same process of being redefined in light of a more 
mature understanding of how philosophical concepts work as formal indicators. As 
already said, formal indicators pave the way for a genuine encounter of a phenomenon in 
the totality of its intentional moments. They should enable one to “go back” and “repeat” 
those original life situations out of which philosophy as a possibility of life become 
meaningful in and for life in the first place. “They thereby open up recollective access to 
the origins of meaning as lived.”On the basis of an explication of the conceptual fore-
having operative in the way in which philosophy has already been encountered and 
interpreted, phenomenology, as Heidegger understands it, has the task of pushing for a 
renewed genuine experiencing of the phenomenon in question in order to bring out the 
missed opportunities, as it were, in the preconception already at work in the concrete 
experience of the object. To open the way for a new, more genuine, interpretation of the 
phenomenon - in fuller agreement with its own basic intentional moments -, Heidegger 
has to avoid pre-judging the phenomenon relative to its intentional moments. However, 
since no interpretation can dispense with a preliminary addressing of its object, 
Heidegger opts for a fore-conception believed to do as little pre-judging as possible to the 
genuine encountering as is being sought. On the side of the relating sense, philosophy is 
interpreted asa conceptive (erkennen) comportment to... which can be given only in and 
through philosophizing, in itsconcrete performing. Formally, philosophy can only be 
encountered “in” and “as” the tendency or movement to conceive of objects as objects364, 
whereby ‘object’ designates formal-ontologically anything that can experienced in its 
respective concrete [gehaltlich] sense365.  
Philosophy as a conceptive comportment “‘says’ that, what and how the object 
is.366”  Philosophy is thus interpreted as an unique relating to what is concretely  (in its 
jeweiligen gehaltigen Sinn) experienced, intent on determining [Bestimmen] what and 
how it is in its being-experienced: 








The comportment […] holds on to the object […] insofar as the object ‘is’ 
something somehow. The relating is held by something as being, and 
being as being and such being.367 
Accordingly, the content sense of philosophy, the towards which of the relating 
sense, can be determined formally – without determining in advance what it is, just 
indicating the sense/manner in which it can be the “towards which” of the relating - as 
follows: “something as a being and being such-and-such.” Being is thus not a descriptive 
label for an entity: it is instead a formalization of the concept of “object” – that is, that 
content-sense of “object” - which in turn is a formalization of the concept of Erfahrene, 
itself a formalization of the concept of Etwas which finally is the formalized version of 
das Erlebte.If we remain faithful to Heidegger’s methodology of formal indicating, then 
we should interpret “beings as being” as the “towards which” or the content-sense of 
“philosophizing” as a phenomenon - as a lived possibility of life – that towards which life 
“holds on to” when it finds itself in need to come to an understanding of itself. 
Philosophy as a possibility life can develop out of itself can be genuinely, yet formally, 
encountered in the comportment to beings as being, in terms of ‘being,’ that is, in terms 
of what and how they are (the sense in which they are: Seinssinn). The conceptive 
comportment to beings as being is ultimately a possibility of life emerging from, and 
signaling, the need for life to appropriate itself: the necessity to conceive of beings in 
their being is triggered by, and returns eventually to, factical life that now experiences 
itself in need to be itself.  
If this is what philosophy is, then the possibility of encountering philosophy 
genuinely presupposes in turn that it itself as the conceptive comportment to beings as 
being can be encountered as a being and conceived in its character of being something 
and somehow. The very comportment to beings as being should thus be given as a being, 
as something, an object that is and is somehow. A genuine interpretation of philosophy 
presupposes thus that it itself can be experienced, “had” as a being (something) in its 
being. It is the “having” or “experiencing” of the conceptive relating to beings as being 
that should be given as “something,” as a being which can be conceived in its being. The 
self-interpretation or self-experience of philosophy depends therefore on the “being of 






having of the conceptive comportment to beings as being.368” In the very way in which 
the conceptive comportment to beings as being takes place (philosophy as 
philosophizing, performing sense) and for it, there exists the possibility of disclosing the 
sense in which this very conceptive comportment is. The sense in which the conceptive 
comportment to beings as being is (Seinssinn) must somehow be given in and for this 
very comportment. The conceptive comportment itself ishow it concretely comports 
conceptively to beings as being. 
The object of philosophy (beings in their being) co-determines from out of 
itself (function of principle) the comportment. As a comportment at the 
level of principle, what is an issue in it is its being. The conceptive 
comportment has a quite original and radical relation of principle to beings 
in their being (not a mere attitude toward grasping, a mere discussion, but 
a relating that even and precisely through grasping ‘is’ what it grasps and 
grasps what it ‘is’).369 
To “have” a comportment is to comport oneself in a certain way.  It is, in other words, a 
manner of the comportment itself. The “being” of the comportment is a “manner” of the 
comportment itself. Accordingly, philosophy requires a sort of “being” (Seiendes, die 
Verhaltenden370) that “is” (Sein) in a certain manner of “being” for itself. Sein is taken, of 
course, as in a formally indicative manner: but now in addition to being the content-sense 
of “philosophizing” it is also the very manner in which the content sense, being, is being 
presented [Vollzugsinn]: in a certain manner of being for itself the very being of this 
being can be disclosed in and for this manner of being371.  
It is about being, namely that it ‘is’, being of being, that being ‘is’, in other 
words, it is genuinely and in accordance with its import (in phenomenon) 
there as being. Phenomenon: existenziell. It is about ‘being’, about the fact 
that ‘being’ is what is striven for, but is not there for mere reflection and 
inspection. It is indeed the being of comportment, that is, here 
(phenomenologically) through comportment; its temporalizing. 
Comportment is what is it is only in becoming fully concrete, that is, in 













In other words, the access, or comportment, to comportment (self-interpretation 
of philosophy) is a manner of the comportment itself which means that its being can be 
disclosed only in a specific manner of comporting itself. We can only find out “how” the 
comportment “is” by, in and for the comportment itself. The being of the comportment 
(as-what and as-how) is disclosed in the very manner in which die Verhaltenden ‘are’. In 
other words, it all depends on “how” we, die Verhaltenden, “are.”  As we know already, 
we live always already in a concrete worldly situation, in a concrete context of life. We 
live “it” in the manner in which we are, “out of and in our factic Dasein.373” The having 
of the conceptive comportment to beings as being requires accordingly an interpretation 
of factic life as a being - as something whose content (What) and relational (How) senses 
can be somehow disclosed. Life is now in advance interpreted, in a formally indicative 
manner, as “being in and through life:” 
Life = Dasein, ‘being’ in and through life.374 
It is should noted, nevertheless, that despite his efforts to push for an 
increasingly radical formally indicative understanding of philosophy, and go deeper to 
“the source of meaning as lived,” Heidegger finds itself facing the “same” hauting 
problem: how can he explicate how we are factically where factical life is an expression 
of the very way in which life is being itself somehow in its lived relating to beingsas 
being. The sense of life inherent in, and accessible only through, the very performance of 
living, is now expected to be elaborated out of an interpretation of life as a being 
(Gehaltsinn) that becomes itself somehow only “in” being related to beings as being.  














We should keep in mind all the time that life for Heidegger is both “passive” 
and “active,” both the experiencing and the experienced,both erlebt and gelebt. If we 
miss this twofold dimension of life, then we would find difficult to see how life can be 
for Heidegger both the indicated, as well as the indicator. It is the indicator in the sense 
that it is the source of lived meaning as such: any object whatsoever makes sense only out 
of and for a basic life experience (being-experienced) in which it is fully, concretely 
given. The lived experience of an object (the experiencing) indicates how life itself is 
lived “in” and “as” the experience of an object (the experienced). And it is the indicated 
in the sense that the lived tendency or possibility to conceive of objects as objects out of 
and in terms of their original life experiences refers us ultimately back to life’s own need 
to understand itself, which is the very manner in which life lives: it lives “in need” or “in 
the tendency” to understand itself. By tracing philosophy as a possibility of life back to 
its original life experience, life itself is thus “shown” to be “the tendency” to understand 
itself, to conceive of itself as “something” that is and is somehow. This need, however, is 
given only “in” (that is, is itself lived or experienced as) the need to conceive of objects 
as objects, of beings as being. In other words, life as lived or experienced cannot be given 
independently from lifeasliving or experiencing (of an object). Life is lived only in its 
motivated tendency to… , in living. This is the only sense in which living life can be 
disclosed in its living character: any factical experience, any life situation is the 
expression of a “tendency to.” The “tendency to” is the “formal” moment of the 
experiencing, and represents “life” as such.  
Life itself arises as an object out of specific life situations. Analysing these life 
situations in a formally indicative manner holds the prospect of showing how life itself 
“speaks of” itself as something that is and is somehow. As such, “life” as a phenomenon 
can be investigated relative to its content, relating and performingsense. In keeping with 
the method of formal indicating, life is not in advance determined in its relating and 
performing sense. At the beginning of investigation, “life” is merely a word whose 




genuine encounter of the phenomenon designated by it. At the beginning, we act as if we 
do not know what life is, and work on the assumption that our standard interpretation of 
life could be “inappropriate.” The ‘object’ sought is therefore not genuinelygiven. What 
we know however is that, since I am “it,” the sense of life is somehow already 
“operative,” at work in my endevours to articulate it even if inauthentically. 
The formally indicative investigation of life takes its cue now from those 
experiences in which life as such has already been interpreted and expressed. As such the 
next step it to re-call [vergegenwärtigen] a life-experience in which life figures 
prominently so as to make explicit the senses/manners/modalities in which life has 
already been experienced. For Heidegger the place to locate where life has already 
articulated its own self-understanding is language, more specifically, in the ordinary use 
of language375. Life is factic, and as such it already lives in an interpretedness of itself376. 
The ordinary use of language is the expression of this interpretedness. It is the “exponent 
of our situation.377” As a result, how “life” is “spoken of” in the ordinary use of language, 
the various meanings it has, should be regarded as expressions of a certain experience or 
encountering of life, of a particular “sense” in which life as a phenomenon has already 
been intended as something, and in a specific manner of intending.  
The ordinary use of language  “has” life as an intransitive as well as transitive 
verb: to live [am Leben sein] as well as to live something [etwas erleben, das Leben 
leben]. The linguistic use of the intransitive in all of its various forms (live in, for, 
against, with, alongside etc. something) indicates that life has already been interpreted as 
having “something” to live on, in, out to, against, for, from, side-by-side, alongside with 
etc.378 In a purely indicative manner, Heidegger calls worldthe “towards which” of life as 
living out to, that which life is “out to, on, from, against, alongside with, for the sake of 
etc.” “World” is not a descriptive name of an entity. It is that towards which life is “out 
to.” Life is “relating-to-world” performing.Life is “in-the-world” living. “World” 










constitutes the content-sense of the phenomenon of “life.” 
By the phenomenological category of ‘world’ we designate at the same 
time – and this is important – that which is lived, that by which life is 
sustained, that which it holds on to.379 
The content sense is always “had” in a relating to it, in a way of having the 
content. How is the world lived? In what way is life lived as its own world? What is the 
way in which life relates itself to its own world? Heidegger’s answer is: concern (Sorge). 
Life is daby being concerned about that which it goes about, the world. Concern, again, 
arises from life’s own self-interpretation but is “formalized,” emptied of its everyday 
reference “while retaining reference to their attitudinal motivation”in life such that it can 
“indicate” the immediate life situations out of which they arise and toward which the 
philosopher, thinking by means of them, comes to be directed380. It is not the name of a 
“feeling” among other feelings. It is not a descriptive term. It is, again and again, the 
manner (category now) in which the content sense is presented: “in concern.” The things 
encountered are not mere things, simply lying there before the self, but things meaning 
(Bedeutsam) something to the self, about which the self is concerned. Worldly things are 
encountered in this relating, not merely noticed as “rocks on the road:” they are always 
genuinely “far” or “near,” “hard” or “easy,” “achievable” or “beyond reach, impossible,” 
“worthwhile” or a “waste of time,” a cause of “pain” or “joy” etc., and by no means mere 
“realities,” objective, neutral, indifferent entities: 
The world, the worldly objects are there in the fundamental manner of 
life’s relating: concern.381 
The access to the relating element of life is not yet another relation. Factic life 
is genuinely given only im Vollzug des Sorgens, in the performance of concern, in 
concern. The proper access to it is, obviously, not observation, but by somehowbeing this 
very performing: anything, life itself, can only show up, be experienced, as an object of 
concern. The access to life in its performing character lies therefore in a specific manner 










of being concerned. It is only for someone living “in concern” that life can be made 
accessible in its performative character as the performing of Sorge. Differently put, the 
possibility of apprehending the performing sense precisely in its performing character is 
provided by our “having” it somehow already. 
The genuine having of a relation [Verhalten] qua relation is a manner of 
its performing. Important is therefore the being of performing 
(temporalizing, the historical)…382 
The possibility of disclosing the performative character of life lies in the „fact“ 
that being-concerneditself can be concerned with itself383. When the self-concerned self 
becomes – in the very movement of concern, that is, “in” concern - concerned about his 
concern for self and remains concerned about his concern for itself there arises the 
opportunity of apprehending life in its performing character. Life „occurs,“ that is, “is” in 
the performing of concern for self. It encounters itself for the most part in a worldly 
manner, by lapsing completely into that which it concerns about (the world), while the 
self as the very “activity” of concernis performed for the most part as a concern for things 
other than itself.  Life „shines through“ this worldly character384: in it it is revealed both 
what life is (object-sense, what kind of an object it is) and that it is (being-sense). This 
occurrence, of course, is not an objective event in the natural world, but itself a manner in 
which concern is performed: 
The way in which life (as a formal indicator) is something … so that it 
itself, as its world, is something that is in such a way as to have the 
tendency, to “be” in the sense in which it performs the having-‘itself’385 
Decisive for Heidegger is therefore, time and again, the fact that life “is” or 
“occurs” as the manner in which the self is having its own self as absorption in its own 
world in which he lives concernedly: the having-itself and being are to be determined 













from “the respective concrete situation, that is, from the lived lifeworld.386” Life becomes 
what it itself “is” in the self’s having-itself as the (its own) world in which the self lives.   
The self revisited 
Heidegger searches for a disclosure of life more originary than traditional 
interpretations of life. Such an original disclosure can only be done with the 
consciousness that it is not a new interpretation of life that is needed, fixing somehow the 
shortcomings of previous interpretations and ending up supplanting them, but a full 
understanding of why traditional philosophy has always missed the unum necessarium, 
life in its uniqueness. The original disclosure of life must therefore go hand in hand with 
the attempt at explicating how life had the tendency to constantly lapse into its own mis-
interpretation, in an interpretation of itself as an “object.” The assumption that previous 
philosophers had somehow gotten the whole “idea” of life wrong originates in 
Heidegger’s conviction that life cannot “be” an object of contemplation. What then is 
life? What life is has already been “expressed” in the very way in which life has “spoken” 
of itself. To get to that we need first to take “life” as something spoken of in a variety of 
contexts and in a variety of ways. Since we cannot describe life - as description 
presupposes again its objectification -, we must leave this word in its indeterminacy 
regarding the relational and performing sense. Whatever life is its sense must not to be 
read off or into a particular life situation. So far Heidegger has come to know that much: 
the movement of understanding life is itself a unique performance of life that must be 
uniquely qualified to take itself somehow into consideration as a performance of life. 
Nevertheless, the vagueness surrounding the term “life” should not be taken for 
meaninglessness.  
Whenever life is being spoken of, it is always addressed as someone’s life. In a 
formally indicative manner, therefore, life can be said to always involve someone 
somehow, an “I”: my life, your life, their lives etc. In order to again avoid the pitfalls of 
objectification, Heidegger does not yet decide what this “I,” intrinsically related to life, 
is.  The I itself is left indeterminate. In a formally indicative manner, the “I” is meant 






only as a “self,” itself left undetermined: the self can only be disclosed in being it, in 
living as self. “Life” indicates formally that a self is da somehow. A self, again, indicates 
formally a relation to oneself. In order to genuinely encounter something as a self, we 
must apprehend the sense of self as somehow relating to oneself and also of being there 
for oneself in this relating. In keeping with the phenomenological commandment to 
constantly keep away from objectifying the object of investigation, the sense of self as 
being somehow in “relation to and for self” is taken to indicate formally a dynamical, 
self-concerned SichHaben: the self ‘has’ oneself, is in one’s own possession.Accordingly, 
the sense of self indicates formally - that is, the very ways387 in which it can be388 
genuinely experienced - the phenomenon of having-himself as coming oneself into one’s 
own possession389. “Self” as SichHaben is genuinely given only in the process of a 
concerned coming oneself into one’s own possession, or of a concerned self-
appropriation of the self390. Factic life is always “volle eigene.” To be for a self means - 
in a formally indicative manner again, that is, without pre-judging either the manner in 
which we are going about the “being of self” or the manner (self-oriented or not) in 
which this being of self is concretely presented in that manner  - to be coming oneself 
into one’s own possession. Moreover, the self is whatever it is only in, through and for 
this self-having.  Thus “life” indicates formally a “being” in the process of bringing itself 
into one’s own possession (Haben). In a purely formally indicative manner, life can be 
interpreted as a way of being. Formally conceived-and-indicated, life is a way of being 
whose peculiarity lies in the fact that it “is” only as, in and for the tendency to be itself.   
Of course, the burden now shifts from revealing the sense or senses in which 
life is what and how it is to showing how “being” itself can be revealed in its peculiarity: 
Seinssein.  
 









The formally indicative “I am” 
That life is conceived and indicated a way of being can be also seen when, 
instead of engaging in a phenomenological investigation of the phenomenon of life as has 
been already addressed and interpreted in factic life, one starts explicating 
phenomenologically the sense in which an I is interpreted to be in theeveryday 
understanding of the expression “I am” [Ich bin]: 
In a formally indicative manner, the question concerning the sense of the 
being of factic life, or, concretely, the respective one’s own concrete life, 
can be framed as the question concerning the sense of ‘I am’391. 
In order to avoid objectifying the phenomenon of “I am,” Heidegger takes it to 
refer to the unique kind of being there whose proper interpretation can only be arrived at 
from within itself, from within its own manner of being there. The sense of being of “I 
am” as well as the sense of “I” to be interpreted is left initially undetermined. What is not 
left undetermined, however, is the manner in which this phenomenon has already been 
and therefore is to be encountered: namely in being it, in the performance of “am” in “I 
am,” which itself is the sense in which the self is392. Only an “I” fully engaged in being 
itself can develop an understanding of what it means for itself “to be” and to be as 
itself393. Life, self and being are all now fundamental concepts closely intertwined.  
Life can only be adequately interpreted from the performing of “am” and not 
from the self as an “I.” The determination of the way in which I am, life as my being me, 
life as my being in such a way as to have to be me, should take precedence over the 
determination of life as an “I” or “self” (the I as subject, consciousness, rationality, spirit 
etc.). Therefore the being (“am”) of the self becomes relevant for an understanding of life 
in and of itself:  
In the specific character of being belonging to ‘I am’ decisive is “am” and 
not ‘I’. This approach is here taken as a formal indication into a radically 
different problematic: to bring life to show itself.394 
The framing of the question of the sense of life as the question concerning the 
proper sense in which “I am” becomes fruitful only when I notice that in asking the 








question “Am I?” I leave open the possibility that I might not bemyself. The interesting 
thing about the significance of “I am” for the entire problematic of an originary access to 
life in and of itself is that it appears to introduce a distinction now that will prove crucial 
to understanding Heidegger’s move from life to being. The object of investigation is, as 
always has been, life, factic life as concrete life experience. Factic life, however, in the 
“form” of “I am” can be interrogated with respect to its own kind of “am,” of being. In 
asking “Am I?” life is giving expression to (or indicates) its own way in which it is 
(indicated): as the tendency to be itself, or as the concern for being itself. In asking “Am 
I?” life is concernedly raising the possibility that it is in a way improperto the kind of 
being it itself is. I “am” the concern for “being myself”. My being and my being myself 
in concern are thus not to be immediately identified: existence is only a possibility rooted 
in facticity395. The mere possibility of asking the question, “Am I?,” indicates again that 
my being is not directly accessible: I am in such a way that my own “being” has to be 
disclosed and is to be disclosed only “in” being me, in having to be me. I am not in such a 
way as to experience or encounter the genuine sense in which I am directly and without 
preparation. The sense of my own being is not something I normally come across. The 
sense in which factic life is, which formally can be said to be the sense in which I am in 
being myself, is something “to be elaborated.396” It emerges only from, through and for 
the act of questioning the very sense in which I am, the sense of being proper to factic 
life. Such questioning is a possibility rooted in factic life. It is only in the concrete factic 
actualizing of a possibility of life to question itself with regard to the very sense in which 
it itself is, and in being such possibility, that opens up the possibility of encountering the 
sense in which life as life is, “der Seinssinn des faktischen Lebens.” What is therefore 
sought for is not the sense of being of life, but a sense in which factic life is, one obtained 
through my radical questioning of the sense in which “I am” and making thus possible an 
encountering of myself as myself, my being myself.  
Life “in general” does not have a sense. Life is always voll eigene. It acquires a 









sense through my “living in” a tendency to question myself, the sense in which I myself 
am. This questioning is itself a factical life experience, a way in which life is. As factic 
life, I have been already in a possibility of me being myself. “I am” meanshaving to be 
me. What this is can only be disclosed in and for the lived possibility of my radical 
questioning of my own being: 
“One cannot ask directly and in general what existence is. It can become 
accessible in itself only in rendering facticity questionable, in the 
respective concrete deconstruction of facticity relative to its directions, 
motives and intentional availability.” 
Formally conceived and indicated, life is eine Weise des Seins397. The only 
possible way in which life can be genuinely experienced is in the concern for being 
oneself. The formal indicative method of philosophy has the aim of intensifying the 
concern of self by radicalizing the “manner” in which the content-sense is 
beingconcretely presented in a relating to it. 
Of course, being is just another formal indicative concept.398 It only indicates 
formally the way in which the genuine experience of life can be performed: as a being 
which “is in such a way that it is concerned with its being in the very concrete 
temporalizing of its being.399” 
One is what and how one becomes in the processof being oneself. One’s own 
being is not a fact, something “given” already, but a task: one has to be one’s own being. 
Life is not some thing. Life is, in a sense, a “production” [Zeitigung] of its own being. 
Life is not an “object,” but the fulfilling of a way of being. If one fails to understand that 
the being of life (as its own) is “had” (disclosed and performed at the same time!) only in 
















and for the act of calling its own being into question,400 and that it can only emerge as a 
“result” and “in the process” of such questioning and for it, one fails to understand das 
Sein des Lebens in its uniqueness. The “essence” of life is that it is ein Wie des Seins. 
Philosophy has now a redefined task: to reveal beings in what and how they 
are, in their being, but only for the sake of “showing” or disclosing life as the very 
“sense” in which beings as being “are” what and how they are. Life as the manner or 
sense of beings’ being-experiencedcan be disclosed only through the process of a radical 
destruction of life’s security and comfort – when it becomes utterly questionable. When 
the world has become highly questionable in its being (its what and how), the living self 
has the opportunity to “shine through:”  
What is immediate: life. Indication of a being-character: life as being. 
Genuineness of the approach: being! Mode of being!... Life (especially 
restricted: subjective! ‘I’, self) is alien or too familiar; life philosophy: 
trivial!) It must be both! The object is consumed in ‘immediacy’ and 
decline! Not genuine: not as ‘being’ and the questionability of being, as 
worthy of questioning being.401 
 
1923 – Ontology: Hermeneutics of facticity 
If in early 1919 Heidegger was trying to figure out a way to express and 
articulate the living character of any experience genuinely given as my own experience, 
efforts which will culminate a couple of years in the attempt to investigate the 
phenomenon of Sichselbsthaben, or “own-ness” constitutive of any genuinely lived life-
experience, as of 1922 he will narrow down the task of phenomenology and define it now 
in ontological terms: phenomenology is about factic life but now formalized as the being 
(its pure sense of what and how) of factic life. It is about factic life in its being, and 













eventually about being as being, the sense of being. The object of philosophical 
investigations is now “the human Dasein as interrogated about its character of being.402” 
The reason why Dasein, factic life403 or the facticity of life, is now placed in the center of 
investigations has, of course, to do with Heidegger’s discovery that the being of such an 
entity is itself the concretization (Zeitigung – temporalization or maturation) of a certain 
way of being itself. This being is both a fact, factum, something already “made” and at 
the same time always “on its way to being itself.” Life is a way of finding and 
simultaneously bringing oneself into one’s own possession404. Life is being in such a way 
that one is in search for one’s own“is,” being. The mystery of life lies, as it were, in the 
fact that I am in such a way that I have to be myself. Dasein is the formally indicative 
term for that entity characterized above all by a sense of “own-ness” (Eigenheit405).  My 
life is who I am, the task I always have to accomplish. I am always “in” the process of 
appropriating myself406. I always find myself in the process of accomplishing “who I 
am,” on my way to being “myself”:  
Dasein is only in itself. Itis, but as its underway to it.407 
Dasein “is” properly who Dasein has been in play to be. The double play of 
being and being itself the accomplishing of being itself is what Heidegger designates by 
the term facticity. Facticity is the name for this mode of being: 
Facticityis the designation for the kind of being characterizing ‘our’ ‘own’ 
Dasein.408 
Phenomenology draws near ontology. It is not traditional ontology, however, in 
that its “object,” being, is not something that can be had409 in experience: it can never be 

















given as “something” one can intentionally be directed to. As was the case with life, 
“being” only becomes “apparent” only one “does” certain things, namely when one goes 
against the natural tendency to get absorbed in the “content” of experience, and focuses 
instead on the manner of concrete experiencing. It only appears “in” such counter-
movement. This being cannot be contemplated: one cannot see “it,“ one can be “it:” to be 
for Dasein is to be “it”. This being will always have for Heidegger a transitive meaning 
built into it: the table is, the car is, but “I am” for me always means, “I am myself”. I am 
“it,” I have my “own” life.  
Being – transitive: to be factic life!410 
Accordingly, factic life can be understood in a formally indicative manner as 
Dasein, a unique mode of being (being “there”). Dasein is that wherein Dasein lives.411 
And I am also the manner itself in which I can be myself: 
If one takes ‘life’ as a mode of ‘being’, then ‘factic life’ means: our own Dasein 
as ‘there’ in some form of explicitness of its character of being.412 
Explicitness therefore is itself a mode of being of this being. To be in an 
interpretation of oneself is not something super-imposed on this being, it is not as if in 
addition to being what it is, Dasein has also the ability to interpret itself. Dasein is 
interpreting, and interpreting oneself. In other words, one’s own life is itself the 
interpretation of what factic life is (its sense of being): Dasein “lives in” an interpretation 
of itself. As such, the disclosing of one’s own being is a certain mode of being: “The 
interpretation is a being of the kind of being peculiar to factic life itself.413” This 
interpretedness “in” which Dasein lives is not, however, easily appropriated. It can 
“show” itself only when it fails to deliver, as it were. In such a breaking-up of everyday 














interpretedness, Dasein has now the opportunity of interrogating its own self, and be ‘it’, 
in the form of an interrogation about beings as being - instead of being related to beings 
through sense. In a certain mode of being itself, the self could come to experience what it 
means for itself to be itself: to be “it.” “It is there only insofar as it ‘is’ a life each 
time.414” In such an experience Dasein encounters itself: its own being is disclosed in its 
being for this being.  The genuine self-interpretation of life is life’s most decisive way to 
encounter itself, that is, to be itself. For Heidegger this self-interpretation as self-
encounter has taken place in philosophy and history, most notably, in the philosophy of 
history.  
 In conclusion, life is a mode of being. The formally indicative name for 
life as a mode of being is Dasein: Dasein is the designation for the being characteristic of 
“human life” as well as of “the world,415” since life is always life in a world. Life can be 
encountered as a way of being characterized primarily by concern for self, for being 
itself. This way of being can itself be encountered only in a certain way of beingfor itself. 
The way in which Dasein as a way of being itself can be encountered is a possibility of 
this being: it can be encountered only in the self’s being its own self, being itself proper 
or authentically. Existence is a way of being of Dasein, and as such a way in which 
Dasein, itself a way of being, can be encountered. Existence is the formally indicative 
term for the mode of being of Dasein, the possibility of being itself in the most authentic 
way, ‘it’ itself, which itself is not an accomplishment of an inquisitive and deep 
understanding, but a being, a certain kind of living, and in which Dasein can encounter 
itself as Dasein, that is, exists in the most authentic possibility of it being itself. 
Philosophy does not aim at “taking cognizance of” (one’s own) being, but at existential 
knowing: in and by it Dasein strives to be itself for itself in the transparency of its own 
being. In other words, it strives at “being.416” The explicitness of its own being in which 
Dasein “lives” and which itself makes possible, as an articulation of this explicitness 
itself, the self-interpretation of Dasein, is something “woraus es lebt, wovon es gelebt 









wird (ein Wie des Seins.)417” This interpretation is “what life in its most authentic Self is 
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Chapter Eight: Concluding Chapter 
Introduction 
We are now in a position to not only to review Heidegger’s transition from 
Erlebnis and Leben to Sein, but also to point out the motives that led Heidegger to such a 
move and even to evaluate their philosophical validity.  In this last section I will try to 
defend the claim that (1) Heidegger’s main preoccupation has in fact been all along with 
bringing to methodical grasp the very phenomenon of “en-owing” (Eigenheit, sich er-
eignen) he discovered early on as the fundamental characteristic of living experiences, 
and (2) that the move from life to being required to some extent by the very ontological-
methodological considerations called for by the very “object” under investigation, 
namely the mineness-character of all of my experiences lived always only as and in my 
living as self (being myself), in my experiencing something, is a narrowing down of the 
topic itself, a purification, as it were, of that which Heidegger is after, a “formalization” 
of “life” meant to bring it more clearly into view, and by no means an answer to, or a 
resolution of, the problematic of life: being refers to how life (always one’s own) is. 
Being is not a different topic, but life as it-self. The question, of course, remains whether 
this formally indicative move from life to being is indeed capable of delivering what it 
proposes to do, namely to find a way to grasp methodically the very living character of 
life, or to put it in more formally indicative terms, the being of life. The professed 
impossibility of this “object” to be intended as such in a cognitive orientation towards it 
raises doubts as to the possibility of such an endeavor. Life, being are not, after all, 
objects in the usual sense. With the move from life to being Heidegger has indeed more 
precisely defined that which he has had in mind all along: with this move, however, he 
does not appear to be in a methodologically superior position to bring to systematic grasp 
that which he is after, life as a mode of being. It should come as no surprise therefore to 
see that Heidegger’s contributions to life philosophy and then to the thinking of being as 
it evolves into Sein und Zeit not only originate in but as a matter of fact are almost all 
accomplished when Heidegger is still in transition from life to being. Dasein’s 
existentials are all the categories discovered by Heidegger to belong to life, to be the very 




determine even more pointedly that which is at stake, namely life as a mode of being, or 
being as and through “my” being, but he is still, methodologically speaking, in the same 
difficult position as before: how to bring being as always my “own” being, as my 
accomplishing, performing of the kind of being I myself am, in a systematic manner into 
view. The formally indicative method of philosophy is not a “productive” method to the 
effect that it is not by itself capable of bringing the object under investigation to a more 
genuine experience. The method of philosophy has, in the end, a prohibitive or defensive 
effect: it is, more than anything else, a method of avoiding falling back on the 
objectifying attitude; as such the method is only indirectly, if at all, capable of 
“producing” new insights. It is, in other words, a way to clear the path towards a more 
genuine pre-conception of the object, which in and by itself does not guarantee that such 
a pre-conception can be achieved nor how can it be achieved.  
 Crucial to understanding life as living are two elements: (1) to live is to live in 
an understanding of itself, and (2) the way in which I have always already been and 
understood myself is the very explicitness of my own being that I have to be. The 
performing character found initially to be the distinguishing mark of any living 
experience, then the very performing of concern for self, then the performing of “am” in 
“I am,” that is, of my being me as myself, and much later the modes in which Dasein “is” 
as being-in-the-world, is “interpreted” every time without a clear indication of how and 
why such an interpretation is justified. How Heidegger arrives, methodologically 
speaking, at these specific interpretations of Vollzugdes Lebens remains unclear: the 
phenomenological intuition is ultimately justified by an “intimacy” with the “issues 
themselves.”  Of all the three senses making up the internal structure of a phenomenon, 
the performing character remains always the most enigmatic. 
 
Erlebnis 
From the beginning Heidegger was convinced that the world posited or entailed 
by theoretical knowledge does not make room for comprehending why things appear to 




in understanding, have their “roots in life.419” The world as is posited in and by 
theoretical attitude has already been somehow disclosed in the mere living of the world in 
pre-theoretical experience.  If the world is made solely of objects given originarily in an 
act modeled on the act of perception, as theoretical cognition presupposes, and by an 
object for understanding we always mean an object “before our eyes” posited in 
separation from the knowing subject, then it becomes impossible to account for my 
experience of the object, my making sense of it: the experience itself will never be 
capable of becoming an “object” in this sense. If things do make sense, then it would be 
natural to inquire about the way in which things do make sense to us the way they do: the 
object is what and how it is “in” my experiencing it. The experience of the object as my 
experience of it is not to be found in the world theoretically conceived, that is, in a world 
made of (reified) objects only. Moreover, the world as experienced prior to our intending 
it as an object of perception, and, by extension, reflection, is already much richer and 
fuller than the world as intended in theoretical attitude.  
It was thus clear for Heidegger what philosophy should, at least initially, be 
about: the object of philosophy was the pre-theoretical experience, that is, how things are 
lived meaningfully in our experiencing of them prior to any attempt at articulating our 
understanding of them theoretically. Such a topic so conceived required, of course, a 
rigorous distinction between theoretical and pre-theoretical experience. The starting-point 
and the very way in which such a distinction was to be elaborated had to be found in the 
pre-theoretical experience itself. If theory is a “de-living” to some extent of the way in 
which we already experience the world in natural attitude, then theory proves incapable 
of explaining itself. The “origin of theory” was of a non-theoretical nature. It was the pre-
theoretical experience for Heidegger that contained the key to understanding the nature 
and limits of theoretical experience itself. But the elucidation of what gives itself in this 
pre-theoretical experience had to be “scientific;” in other words it had to take place as a 
“categorical” elucidation.   
  But how could pre-theoretical experience, genuine lived experience as such, 
become the focus of philosophy without being objectified in the first place? Heidegger’s 






first step towards finding a solution to this legitimate problem was to point out that this 
“experience” we try to grasp categorially was not an alien, external thing that has nothing 
or little to do with us, but “something” which I myself am and live. It is “me.” Above 
anything else, such an experience was always mine somehow. Moreover, this experience 
was not mute and incomprehensible in itself. In (pre-theoretical) lived experience life has 
already been interpreted. Accordingly, philosophy’s aim was not to construct or 
reconstruct the way in which things make sense, but simply to make explicit, to lay out, to 
thematize the very “categories” which life itself has already employed to interpret itself 
and, in doing so, to “live and be” in such an interpretation. The implicit claim Heidegger 
is already making here is that life is a kind of entity that has to “interpret itself” as the 
only way in which it can “be” itselfproperly. Heidegger will make this claim explicitly 
and draw out all its philosophical potential in 1923, when being is already replacing life 
as the theme of philosophy420.   
 To grasp lived experience in its peculiarity amounted thus to “immersing” in 
the very way in which I had already been conceiving/interpreting myself in relation to the 
things I was involved with pre-theoretically. This “immersing” was a “repetition” of 
life’s “own” understanding. The repetition or “partaking of” lived experience, however, 
was conducted with the intention of “making explicit” its own unique mode of 
understanding. Philosophy therefore was essentially an “explication,” a laying-out of an 
understanding as a possibility of that understanding itself. The access to lived experience 
was a certain “partaking” of a lived experience we had already performed or lived 
through countless of times before, this time however with a intensified focus on how this 
“experience” itself has already disclosed itself to itself as itself. In Kisiel’s words, it was 
a return of “experiencing life upon already experienced life.421”  The access to lived 
experience in its genuineness was to be provided by those particular “experiences” in 
life-experience in which life had already disclosed itself to itself as itself.  The science of 
Erlebnisse was not based, according to Heidegger, on a certain “reflection on” 
Erlebnisse. Natorp has already made it clear that reflection on lived experiences cannot 








but end up in reifying them: “reflection necessarily dissects and objectifies the reflected-
upon, transforming its character by ‘stilling the stream’ of mental life.422” Heidegger’s 
way out of this apparently insoluble problem of the proper way of grasping the living 
character of life without objectifying it was to point to those experiences (life stories, 
biographies, philosophy of life, philosophy of history) in life in which life had already 
somehow conceived of itself and thus showed itself to itself without at the same time 
objectifying itself, and raise the possibility of there being a way of conceiving of life 
while remaining “in” life altogether and of elaborating it in a manner fully consistent with 
the non-objectifying manner of self-interpretation proper to life. The possibility of a 
science of lived experiences was to be elaborated out of the “way” in which life had 
already conceived/experienced itself.  
The possibility of grasping lived experience in its unique character as the 
source of intelligibility was conditioned by the kind of “object” lived experience itself 
was. Heidegger never tired repeating over and over again that how lived experience was 
to be approached had to be determined by the manner in which this “object” has been 
“had” in experience originarily. Consequently, ontological considerations took 
precedence to some extent over methodological ones. Heidegger was aware that too 
much insistence on the “method” of philosophy could be a fateful decision preventing us 
from ever experiencing the unique kind of object we are trying to grasp in the first place. 
He charged Natorp with letting methodological considerations decide too much the kind 
of object Erlebnis was meant to be, instead of letting the object, Erlebnis, decide the 
proper method of addressing it423. The critique of Jaspers’ philosophy too consisted 
mainly of the same charge: too many uncritical assumptions about the way in which the 
object was to be approached crept in the pre-conception of the object, so much so that 
any ulterior insights into life were secretly guided by these assumptions and could not 
longer allow for a truly genuine experience of life. The insights into the unique kind of 
entity lived experience was (es weltet, Er-eignis, Bedeutsamkeit) largely preceded 
Heidegger’s methodological elaborations of the proper access to it. Nonetheless, 








methodological considerations were necessary above all to ensure that ontological 
insights were on the right track. This double play of ontological and methodological 
considerations eventually flew into a conception of philosophical method as constant 
renewal and renewed approval of the insights arrived at in the process of “partaking” of 
life: the insights were to “be critically appropriated in light of a renewed showing of these 
‘things’ as the ultimate criterion of phenomenological research.424” Once Heidegger 
became clear on what exactly he was after, namely my lived experiencing of something 
as the source of meaning and in whose performing life gives expression to its own 
interpretation of itself, he will from now on tirelessly try to develop a method appropriate 
to this “topic.”  
Kisiel was therefore right: Heidegger has indeed arrived at his lifelong topic in 
the early Freiburg lectures. He would, from now on, continuously refine “this” topic, but 
never abandon it as a topic of research. The only qualification is, however, that this topic 
is not that much a “topic” as is a “manner” in which a “topic” is what it is. His focus was 
indeed on lived experience, but the ultimate aim was the way in which lived experience 
as a meaningful experience of something can so be carried out as to make possible, from 
within itself, a disclosure of itself as the source of its own intelligibility. Kisiel’s idea that 
Heidegger’s “topic is a double play of matter and method, What and How, drawn to a 
point where they are one and the same425” should be qualified as follows: WHAT 
Heidegger was after was a HOW (and not the other way around). He was interested in 
methodological issues not because he was a philosopher in the first place, as Crowell, in 
my opinion, mistakenly assumes426, but simply because he was after the very “way” in 
which life is so lived that a self-interpretation of life is not only possible but always 
already operative in any attempt at grasping the living character of life. He never asked, 
what is Erlebnis?; on the contrary, his question was always: how is experience 
experiencing so as to show itself as itself and as making sense of itself? 
And what were Heidegger’s first and arguably most enduring insights into the 








kind of “something” Erlebnis was and that would make up from now on his “pre-
conception”(later sense of being) of Erlebnis prior to any focused elaborations of it, and 
significantly determine the kind of method called for by such an object of investigation? 
Lived experience was to be in advance approached as: (1) something we ourselves are, 
we are it, it is our life; (2) something so unique and so fundamentally different from any 
object-like, or reified entity (Ereignis, neither Sache nor Vorgang); (3) something whose 
fundamental character lies not in being some thing, but in “being out to something” 
(Aussein auf Etwas); a carrying out of a way of having something as something; (4) 
something of the character of a Self (Ich, Selbst, Mein) always experiencing itself but not 
necessarily as a self(voll eigene, never an “isolated act,427” sich er-eignen); (4) something 
that was itself its own “expression,” the articulation of how it had already understood 
itself “in relation to” whatever was to be experienced (the world in Bedeutsamkeit). This 
“object” as so conceived (or had) in pre-conception was to be further elaborated and 
elaborated in a manner consistent with its own object-character. This elaboration had to 
be a categorical elucidation.At this stage in his philosophical journey, Heidegger has 
become aware that Erlebnis is missed as a phenomenon once we lose sight of that which 
renders it “alive” in the first place: the “presence” of a “self” as Er-eignis.   
How does life knows itself? The interpretation of life presupposes thus that life 
itself can find a way to lay out its own manner in which it knows or encounters itself.  
 
 Selbstleben 
The next decisive step Heidegger will take would be to equate the living 
character of life with the character of any experience to be “my” experience somehow, 
Leben is essentially Selbstleben, the world is always self-world, life is the life of self. The 
science of lived experiences takes the form now of an elaboration of the very way in 
which the self knows itself in ‘living’ (it-self), of course, in a pre-theoretical way. To 
know itself amounts to saying that the self is somehow disclosed to it, and lives “in” self-
disclosure. The self in the concrete movement and performing of life experience is, 
according to Heidegger, “the ultimate question of philosophy.” That life experience can 





itself be experienced in its living character, that is, can show itself in experience 
somehow, is then to be investigated in the form of the question regarding the proper way 
in which any lived experience lives and is lived as “mine.” To say that life itself is 
somehow experienced amounts to saying that “I” myself am somehow co-experienced in 
“my own” experiences: I not only live but “am lived” (gelebte Erlebnisse) as well. It is 
now the moment when Erlebnis is further refined as Lebenserfahrung via Situation: a 
situation, which is a full, concrete (life) experience of worldly somethings (“spring 
semester,” “marriage,” “reading a book,” “going on a mountain trip” etc.), is how I co-
experience myself (always as a “whole” self). I am da somehow in my worldly life 
experiences. Life experience is the “whole active and passive human comportment to the 
world.” It is the self’s experience of something (active) along with the co-experience of 
the self itself (passive). The question now becomes, how does the self co-experience 
itself in and as its own worldly life experiences? And how can Heidegger make explicit 
this showing up of the self in its own experiences? 
Crucial, again, is that the living self is not an object; it is what it is, concretely 
and wholly, only in its “own” experiencing. It is an ongoing fulfillment of tendencies, a 
“self-exercise” rooted in itself. The sense in which the self is da in its experiencing must 
be disclosed in accordance with its own sense, that is, in accordance with the very way in 
which it shows itself (to itself) within its own experience. First of all, the way in which it 
shows itself (to itself) is not explicit. It has to be made explicit. In experiencing, I find 
myself neither as an object, nor a self, but always already engaged in various situations. 
For the most part “I” do not show up as a self, an “I,” nor as a subject or consciousness, 
but as playing a role in the situations I always find myself engaged in. The self as 
engagement in situations is disclosed to itself as the manner in which the with-which of 
engagementmakes sense: as a meaningful world. Furthermore, fully immersed in 
experience, in the usual daily activities, I always find myself concerned with one thing or 
another, but always somehow concerned. The self is there, therefore, in concern. 
“World” and “concern” are the very categories of life used by life to interpret itself. They 
are formalized in the sense that they have lost their ordinary references, but are 
maintained in their capacity to refer one to the very manner/sense/how in which life can 




experience, is disclosed to itself - in an implicit manner nevertheless – “as” the character 
of meaningfulness or familiarity of the world in which it lives.  
To understand the next step Heidegger will make we must keep in mind that 
philosophy, as he conceives it, is life’s own movement to thematize or make explicit its 
own self-understanding in and as its own experience of a world. This thematization, 
however, should not be understood as a simple tendency to self-reflection, to mere taking 
notice of itself, but as life’s striving for being it-self, for appropriating itself. The 
possibility to categorically elaborate the mode of understanding peculiar to life in its 
world would be opened up by Husserl’s phenomenology. As understanding life is 
intentional through and through. Concrete life experience is an intentional phenomenon. 
Adopting the language of Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger will define a 
phenomenon as the unity of three intentional moments: the content sense (Husserl’s 
noema), relating sense (Husserl’s manner of intending), and “performing sense” or 
“temporalizing meaning” (the performance of the intentional relation – the equivalent in 
Husserl would be “making-present.”) The living self is da in the sense that any life 
experience can be articulated in accordance with the three intentional senses. To 
experience something (the pre-worldly or living something) coincides thus with the 
concrete performing of the relating sense in which the content shows up. The da of the 
self in experience gets expressed and articulated in the way in which “things” have 
already been encountered, taken as, showed up or “given” in the pre-conception 
belonging necessarily to factic life, without which things would not possibly show up as 
the things they are: in the context of worldly meaningfulness a priorilived by the self, the 
self is disclosed to itself. Life, once again, is comprehension, is itself a way of rendering 
everything meaningful. And the self is da as the manner in which that towards which life 
is always out to, has already “showed up” in preconception somehow. The living, pre-
worldly something of experience shows itself up as the “way,” mode or sense in which 
life already approached (as-what), addressed (as-how) and concretely performed this 
approaching and addressing in a situation. Contrary to what Husserl believed, for 




put it, we do not say what we see, but see what we say428.  
Heidegger himself wishes to make primary precisely the prior unthematic 
categorical ‘interpretedness’ or ‘expressedness’ of all experience in 
preconception, without which the sensed object would never have been 
accessible.429 
If Husserl took intentionality as the structure of consciousness, ultimately of the 
transcendental I, that renders everything meaningful, and as such as the possibility of 
making sense of this very process of making sense, for Heidegger intentionality becomes 
the fundamental function of the living self always in “need” not to “understand” but to 
“be itself.” “Understanding” is one way, perhaps the way, in which someone always in 
need to be oneself is exercising this very need. The ultimate goal of philosophy is not 
cognition or knowledge, but “being,” “living as self.” 
The meaningfulness of the situation is precisely that which, for Heidegger, 
constitutes the way in which the living self is da to itself. The meaningfulness of any 
situation is articulated in the intentional structure of preconception. In preconception the 
living self encounters itself in a way more primary than in any ordinary experience of 
something wherein the self is fully absorbed, and the concern is primarily concern for 
something, and concern for self. The meaningfulness of a situation, when things “make 
sense” and the self “finds its way” in dealing with them, is the self-disclosure of the self. 
In preconception the living self has been disclosed to itself. Philosophy as 
hermeneutics has the task of “re-calling” the preconception, “doing” it again, for the sake 
of laying it out, making it explicit. In ordinary life, fully caught and immersed in dealing 
with various problems and things, the self is merely blindly repeating and reinforcing a 
self-disclosure (in preconception), a certain manner of addressing and conceiving of 
worldly things, its own self included, that is simply taken for granted and no longer 
regarded as itself one decisive, critical interpretation of the proper way in which the self 
is da. The there of the self is merely preserved and reinforced instead of being 
appropriated and turned into an opportunity for self to decide it-self. In ordinary living, 
the self is lost in that it lives in the forgetfulness of its being a self, and of its own 







“calling” to be a self. Proximally and for the most past, the self lives absorbed in its 
worldly engagements, and in so doing passes over the opportunity of understanding the 
worldy engagements as its way of being there.  The tendency of the in-the-world-living 
self to be itself is lived only in its dedication to the world. When the meaningfulness of 
the world collapses, the self can now deal with itself explicitly. When the world is seen in 
that towards which the in-the-world-living-self is oriented, the self finds itself “called 
upon” and “on its way” to deciding who it is.  Life is ultimately the dynamic between 
“me” and “my self.” In ordinary life, however, life has become unproblematic. Life has to 
be made again problematic, uncertain, and insecure for the sake of opening up a way for a 
more genuine self-appropriation. In those concrete worldly situations in which life has 
already found an inner motive to become questionable and problematic to itself (“Am I?”, 
Jaspers’ notion of limit-situations, philosophy of life, history), Heidegger’s proposal is to 
partake of them in such a way as to retain the “motivational” aspect as much as possible, 
that is, the element that prompted such a “controversy” regarding one’s own life in the 
first place. Philosophy must retain for understanding the questionability of life, and even 
enhance it, and not the “solutions” (fulfillments of possibilities projected in 
understanding) and answers offered thus far in its response. In the solution/answered 
offered – that is, in the actual interpretations of life – philosophy has to trace back the 
preconception that led to and render meaningful the proposed ‘solution’ (that 
interpretation of life). The intent is “eminently critical and in accord with the tradition of 
enlightenment.430” Philosophy is ultimately life’s own way of coming to itself since in 
philosophical interpretation life’s “understanding does not become something else431” but 
itself. Philosophy is the working out of the possibilities projected in understanding, that 
is, an interpretation (Auslegung), laying-out, unfolding, ex-plication432 of the pre-
conception for the sake of a more genuine appropriation of the self. The self becomes 
existentially it-self in such a reflective appropriation: life comes to itself. The self is the 










exercising of this self-appropriation. Time and again, Heidegger’s steadfast focus appears 
to be constantly on the “selfhood” or the “own” dimension of life without which it would 
no longer be my own life: for him, life is characterized fundamentally, above anything 
else, by the concern for self or, better yet, the demand, call or need, even burden to 
beitself. Life is something “in need” to be itself: formally indicatively, life is a being in 
need of being itself. And Heidegger is also unwavering in his conviction that this 
“concern for self” or “has-to-be-itself” is the source of intelligibility, the origin of sense. 
The world makes sense out of and in terms of this “concern for self,” of this need to be 
itself.  The self itself is what and who it is out of the concern for self. Life becomes 
explicit in the ‘exercising’ of (Vollzug) the concern for self, in other words, when it itself 
comes to grasp its need to be itself. The “need” to be it-self belongs to the very being of 
this being. In laying out the preconception at work in self-understanding, as in any 
understanding of anything at all, life becomes explicit on its own “need” to be itself and 
can now develop a sense for a more “appropriate” way to come be itself understandingly.  
 
Michselbsthaben – as lived time 
The next element needed to understand why Heidegger moved from life to 
being is the historicity of life. Time itself is disclosed as time in and by the self’s “need” 
to be itself. “In the lived experience as such which I have lived through I have myself.” 
What historicity will bring new to the table is (1) that the living self finds itself only in 
‘re-living,’ in retrieving itself from its own past (having-been) (2) that in “retrieving” 
itself from its own have-been, the self lives in an interpretation of itself that already 
decided what and who the self is; and (3) life is ultimately faced with the “burden” of 
deciding what and who it was, is and will be. All these new insights will pave the way to 
the next step: the living self is in such a way that its own being is an “issue” for itself. 
This “entity” is not, not in the same sense in which a table, for example, is; the self is 
only insofar as it is deciding, out of its own having-been and for its future, who it is.  
In laying out the preconception operative in “history” as a phenomenon that we 
already experience, that is, in the various meanings “history” has come to have in 




Heidegger tries to trace back and outline the projected meaningfulness whose one 
possible fulfillment is those very meanings of “history.” This a priori projected 
meaningfulness represents the self at ground zero, the self-disclosure of the self, theda of 
the living self.  
 What history as a formal indicator reveals is that the self finds itself as always 
already having been caught in certain way of understanding itself and the world it lives 
in. The self is bound to rediscover itself in what and how it has been. This discovery or 
self-appropriation, however, is not a mere taking note of itself in the past, where the past 
is understood as a region of beings comprising anything which is “no longer” present. 
The self needs to recapitulate, go back to its own past experiences in order to be now in a 
position to retrieve itself. The self comes to itself, “has” itself only in and as its retrieving 
from its own having-been. The self is, that is, can be only historically. The ‘performance’ 
of living has a ‘historical’ character. The self is living in the sense that it “stretches” 
temporally. It is itself the “stretching of temporality:” it is and determined to be so by 
knowing that it itself is who it is as having become the one who it is. Furthermore, his 
‘knowledge’ of one’s own having-become as an integral part of what one is presently is 
crucial in shaping one’s own future. Heidegger finds this experience of ‘lived time’ as the 
very way in which the self comes to itself in primitive Christian life experience: there 
one’s own life ‘is decided’ by one’s ‘knowing’ of one’s own having become for the sake 
of a ‘imminent’ future.  
On the other hand, “history” is not something added to the self, but the very 
condition of possibility for the self to “have” itself. “History” is the participatory living of 
life, the familiarity of life with itself433. History is not an appendage to the self, but the 
condition of possibility for self to become appropriated as itself. History, again, is not the 
collection of things past, but that which “disturbs” the self and constantly calls upon it to 
decide its own being.  
                                                
433 “Geschichte ist hier nicht verstanden als historische Wissenschaft, sondern als 






The living self is always living in a self-interpretation. In factic life this 
interpretation takes the form of an understanding of “what is going on” in a particular 
situation. Any disturbance in the taken-for-granted familiarity of the self with a situation 
could become an occasion for self to “look for itself.” Life is ultimately the struggle to 
come back to oneself from self-alienation. Once in the movement to snatch itself back 
from alienation, life does not encounter it-self as an object.  
For as long as life is, life remains essentially a movement, a doing, a 
performance, and consequently it can encounter itself genuinely only as a movement, 
performance, ‘doing’. In being [Vollzug] somehow [Bezug] oriented towards a wordly 
something [Gehalt] life “knows” itself already, ‘has’ itself but in a way what does not call 
for an explication; this knowledge/interpretation is “lived” through and only shown or 
“indicated formally” by the very manner in which the self’s being-oriented-towards takes 
place factically, concretely, historically. This implicit, “lived” self-interpretation of life is 
the “origin of meaning,” and has to be made explicit, in other words, has to be 
appropriated. This movement corresponds to Heidegger’s transition from being gelebt to 
being erlebt, from being implicit to becoming explicit. Such a “turning back of life upon 
itself” can only be done in the manner of life, that is, in being-oriented-towards-
something, in living out to. But what Heidegger tries to distinguish in it is how this being-
oriented-towards-something indicates the da of the self, the way in which the self’s own 
being is in play for the self. The in-the-world-living self lives always “in” an 
interpretation of what it means for it to be. The living is “done” or “performed” as a 
movement in itself, as itself, for itself, out of itself and even against itself since life is “its 
own need to be itself.” Life is the “exercising” of the need to be itself. Die Vollzug des 
Selbst remains for Heidegger the highest philosophical prize that can only be formally 
indicated. 
As such life can encounter itself as life only in those situations in which life 
itself has found itself in need to come to a decision about itself. Philosophy as life’s self-
interpretation can only succeed as a repetition of these situations for the sake of an 
illumination (explicitation, laying-out) of that intentional pre-conception that renders life 




itself becomes a problem for itself, an undecided “issue.” Philosophy is life’s own 
“movement” of making explicit its own need to decide itself. The self, of course, is not an 
isolated entity that finds itself in an external relation to the world in which it lives. Itself 
means also the way in which its own world is. To decide itself is to decide the way in 
which its “own” worldis.  
This is the role, I believe, Heidegger assigned to formal indicators: the formal 
indicator ‘indicates’ those experiences in which a decision is being made as to what and 
how life understands itself to be, or is to be. The being-oriented-towards-the-world is the 
expression of life’s own identity. It is life’s own way of re-mind itself of its own ‘need’ to 
be itself (concern for self) and of how life ‘now’ is already a “satisfaction” or 
“fulfillment” of this need. In ordinary life, the self is ‘exercising’ the need to be itself by 
falling constantly back on an interpretation of itself (and its world) blindly accepted as 
the last solution to what one is and should be. To interpret “life” as a formal indicator is 
to “go back to” what made life “questionable” in the first place: in the questionability of 
one’s own being life itself appears as an “issue” to itself, as in need to decide who it is. 
One’s own being is decided in the ways in which the questionability of one’s own being 
is being “exercised” by the self.  
This is Heidegger’s decisive discovery that prompted him to abandon life and 
embrace being as that which philosophy is ultimately concerned with, philosophy as 
life’s own movement of making itself explicit in its own need to be itself. But being for 
Heidegger will always mean being it-self, one’s own being, and never ‘being’ in general, 
or the “sense” as such of what something is. ‘Being’ means ‘being itself,’ life as being. 
What makes life problematic and questionable, in other words, is not life per se, 
Heidegger appears to argue, but a sense in which it itself can be.  
What is immediate: life. Indication of a being-character: life as being. 
Genuineness of the approach: being! Mode of being!... Life (especially 
restricted: subjective! ‘I’, self) is alien or too familiar; life philosophy: 
trivial!) It must be both! The object is consumed in ‘immediacy’ and 
decline! Not genuine: not as ‘being’ and the questionability of being, as 
worthy of questioning being.434 







One’s own being as the sense in which one can be itself, I believe, rightly 
regarded by Heidegger as that which is at issue in and for life, and also at issue in any 
attempt at making explicit the “living” character of life, but by itself is no “solution” to 
life problematic. It only represents the mode in which life can be genuinely encountered: 
in the ‘exercising’ of the questionability of “one’s own being.” Heidegger is thus correct 
in moving from life to being but the move is not from one topic to another: being as the 
sense of one’s own being at issue in one’s living is the very way in which life, 
encountering its own immanent need to be itself, wants to be itself. But the difficulties 
besetting Heidegger’s first attempt to grapple the living character of Erlebnis are by not 
means overcome. They are still there. And it should come as no surprise to see Heidegger 
essentially repeating in Being and Time what he already discovered in his investigations 
of lived experience. 
Much later in life, in the so-called Four Seminars435from 1968-1973, Heidegger 
will discuss Hegel’s interpretation of the “need for philosophy” by interpreting Hegel’s 
apparently paradoxical claim that “a torn sock is better than a mended one.” For 
Heidegger what Hegel’s claim makes clear is that it is precisely the tear that reveals the 
unity of the sock. The tear is not that much an undesired state of the sock, but rather the 
very condition of the sock to be seen in its unity, as unity, as an “integral” sock: “it is 
only in the tearing that the Unity, as absent, can appear.” Life is the need to be itself, is 
the struggle for itself, the struggle to find itself out of estrangement, from alienation. 
What philosophy can do is make this “tear” be experienced as such: “In the tearing, the 
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